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Abstract
As Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) become more technically capable and econom-
ically feasible, they are being increasingly used in a great many areas of defence, commercial
and environmental applications. These applications are tending towards using independent,
autonomous, ad-hoc, collaborative behaviour of teams or fleets of these AUV platforms. This
convergence of research experiences in the Underwater Acoustic Network (UAN) and Mobile
Ad-hoc Network (MANET) fields, along with the increasing Level of Automation (LOA) of
such platforms, creates unique challenges to secure the operation and communication of these
networks.
The question of security and reliability of operation in networked systems has usually been
resolved by having a centralised coordinating agent to manage shared secrets and monitor for
misbehaviour. However, in the sparse, noisy and constrained communications environment
of UANs, the communications overheads and single-point-of-failure risk of this model is
challenged (particularly when faced with capable attackers).
As such, more lightweight, distributed, experience based1 systems of “Trust” have been
proposed to dynamically model and evaluate the “trustworthiness” of nodes within a MANET
across the network to prevent or isolate the impact of malicious, selfish, or faulty misbehaviour.
Previously, these models have monitored actions purely within the communications domain.
Moreover, the vast majority rely on only one type of observation (metric) to evaluate trust;
successful packet forwarding. In these cases, motivated actors may use this limited scope of
observation to either perform unfairly without repercussions in other domains/metrics, or
to make another, fair, node appear to be operating unfairly.
This thesis is primarily concerned with the use of terrestrial-MANET trust frameworks
to the UAN space. Considering the massive theoretical and practical difference in the com-
munications environment, these frameworks must be reassessed for suitability to the marine
realm. We find that current single-metric Trust Management Frameworks (TMFs) do not
perform well in a best-case scaling of the marine network, due to sparse and noisy observa-
tion metrics, and while basic multi-metric communications-only frameworks perform better
than their single-metric forms, this performance is still not at a reliable level. We propose,
demonstrate (through simulation) and integrate the use of physical observational metrics for
trust assessment, in tandem with metrics from the communications realm, improving the
safety, security, reliability and integrity of autonomous UANs.
1rather than “Evidence based” in the case of shared keys, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) etc.
iii
Three main novelties are demonstrated in this work: Trust evaluation using metrics
from the physical domain (movement/distribution/etc.), demonstration of the failings of
Communications-based Trust evaluation in sparse, noisy, delayful and non-linear UAN environ-
ments, and the deployment of trust assessment across multiple domains, e.g. the physical and
communications domains. The latter contribution includes the generation and optimisation
of cross-domain metric composition or“synthetic domains” as a performance improvement
method.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Context
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs)
With the explosive growth in the use of mobile telephony and the increasing miniaturisation
and efficiency gains of portable communications devices, the classical paradigm of broadcast/re-
ceiver (or server/client) communications has given way to an increasing use of decentralised,
ad-hoc networks that take advantage of this network dynamism to improve service efficiency.
Whether these networks are decentralised cellular / Radio Frequency (RF) / 802.11 WiFi
networks for use in disaster relief areas [1] or biologically inspired wireless sensor networks
for low-energy, low-maintenance environmental monitoring [2, 3], Mobile Ad-hoc Network
(MANET) theory has gone from its first formal definition, emerging from Defence Advanced
Research Projects Agencys (DARPAs) Packet Radio Network research, to being an integral
part of modern practical communications [4].
Minimally, a MANET consists of of a collection of mobile physical entities (nodes) that
communicate cooperatively to collect, distribute, disseminate, and collate data and/or influence
across an area. In most cases MANET nodes incorporate bi-directional transceivers to send
and receive data1 MANETs may utilise omnidirectional, static, or steerable communications
antennae, and a selection of protocols such as WiFi, Bluetooth, Global System for Mobile
communications (GSM), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), as well as
Optical or Acoustic media, and may incorporate a range of mobilities across nodes, from static
devices, terrestrial and marine surface platforms, as well as aerial and underwater platforms.
A core characteristic of MANETs is the inclusion and integration of heterogeneous node
collections, i.e. different nodes or groups of nodes in a network may have different capabilities
in terms of propulsion, sensor apparatus, communications capability, etc.
MANETs may be totally independent with no external connections, may include indepen-
dent per-node communications backhauls (e.g. Cellular Modems in mobile phones as part of
a Bluetooth Personal Area Network), or include static nodes that provide infrastructure based
1However this bi-directionality is not always a requirement; for example in the area of Wireless Sensor
Network (WSN) [5])
1
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backhaul. However, this multiplicity of variations and options presents several challenges to
users and operators; the physical topology of MANETs can vary wildly over short periods of
time. A particular challenge to MANET operation is that given any node may operate as a rout-
ing / gateway node, if/when that node moves to a different region, network segments that had
previously used that node as a routing path must renegotiate / re-establish their routes. These
situations, if not appropriately managed, lead to opportunities for subversion and selfishness.
The characteristics of MANETs as defined by Corson et al. are paraphrased in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Summary of Characteristics of MANETs Corson and Macker [6]
Dynamic
Topologies
Nodes are free to move arbitrarily; thus, the typically multi-hop network
topology may change randomly and rapidly at unpredictable times, and
may consist of both bidirectional and unidirectional links.
Bandwidth
Constrained,
Varied
Capacity
Wireless links will continue to have significantly lower capacity than their
hardwired counterparts. In addition, the realized throughput of wireless
communications, after accounting for the effects of multiple access, fading,
noise, and interference conditions, etc., is often much less than a radio’s
maximum transmission rate.
One effect of the relatively low to moderate link capacities is that congestion
is typically the norm rather than the exception, i.e. aggregate application
demand will likely approach or exceed network capacity frequently.
Energy
Constrained
Operation
Some or all of the nodes in a MANET may rely on batteries or other
exhaustible means for their energy. For these nodes, the most important
system design criteria for optimization may be energy conservation.
Limited
physical
security
Mobile wireless networks are generally more prone to physical security
threats than are fixed cable nets. The increased possibility of eavesdropping,
spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks should be carefully considered.
Existing link security techniques are often applied within wireless networks
to reduce security threats. As a benefit, the decentralized nature of network
control in MANETs provides additional robustness against the single points
of failure of more centralized approaches.
MANETs in Harsh Environments
As MANETs grow beyond the terrestrial arena, their operation and the protocols designed
around them must be reviewed to assess their suitability to different communications envi-
ronments, ensuring their continued security, reliability, and performance.
The distributed and dynamic nature of MANETs mean that it is difficult to maintain an
evidence based “trust” system such as Trusted Third Party (TTP), or Certificate Authority
(CA) or by using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In both cases, there is the assumption
of a run-time canonical source of trust, i.e. a “Master” node or Certifying Authority that can
objectively coordinate the security and trust of the network. This single-point-of-failure is anti-
thetical to MANET architectures, and given the normally limited transmission, storage, battery
and computational power of MANET nodes, the overheads of true TTP or PKI architectures
have been out of the realms of practicality for most applications. Therefore, a distributed,
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collaborative system must be applied to these networks2. Such distributed Trust Management
Frameworks (TMFs) aim to detect, identify, and mitigate the impacts of malicious actors by
distributing per-node assessments and opinions to collectively self-police behaviour. As such,
TMFs can be used to predict and reason on the future interactions between entities in a system.
TMFs provide information to assist the estimation of future states and actions of nodes
within MANETs. This information is used to optimize the performance of a network against
malicious, selfish, or defective misbehaviour by one or more nodes. Previous research has
established the advantages of implementing TMFs in 802.11 based MANETs, particularly
in terms of preventing selfish operation in collaborative systems, and maintaining throughput
in the presence of malicious actors [8, 9].
These works have focused on operations in the communications domain, usually relying on
one type of observation or metric; Packet Loss Rate (PLR) or successful forwarding of data pack-
ets to other nodes in the network. Given the increasingly multi-factor nature of MANET secu-
rity and integrity concerns, these style of frameworks do not look at information outside of their
domain or even their metric. This exposes significant portions of the overall systems’ threat sur-
face to unobservable vulnerability, reducing the ability for a system to be “trusted” (Fig. 1.1).
single metric
observation
Single Metric
single domain
observation
Multi Metric
}Combination ofmultiple vectors,each containing
multiple metrics
Multi Domain
Figure 1.1: Multi-Domain Threat Surface
Autonomous Systems Trust and Trust Engineering
Autonomous MANETs
Autonomy is the capability of an entity to assess its environment and make informed, un-
coerced decisions. In the MANET context, this sliding scale of capability ranges from basic
automated collision avoidance systems while under direct operator control3, through to
self-regulating mission guidance and execution, with limited human interaction4. This non-
deterministic operation presents significant challenges to security and integrity. Fundamentally,
previously accepted formal verification methodologies for guaranteeing operation are not
2Zouridaki et al. [7] have demonstrated an intriguing low-power Distributed CA based MANET architecture,
however given the soon-to-be-discussed assumptions about capable attackers( subsubsection 1.1.2), this
“semi-decentralised” approach is less than ideal
3For example Automated Driver Assistance Systems entering the consumer vehicle market through the
likes of the Tesla P85 and Ford Kuga [10]
4No such systems have been actively deployed, but this form of collaborative autonomy is the centre of
much commercial and academic research[11–13]
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currently capable of accurately validating the actions and interactions of a fleet or swarm
of autonomous nodes in dynamic, noisy environments with imperfect operators [13]. As such
an overlapping combination of “Secure” and “Trusted” approaches is required throughout
the lifecycle and operation of an Autonomous MANET capability to maintain the integrity
of such collaborative systems.
Trust vs Security vs Integrity
Early attempts to secure and protect the integrity of MANETs have relied on various forms
of strong-cryptography to protect information being transferred from tampering or malicious
inspection. While such approaches protect the integrity of individual pieces of data, the in-
creased computation, and storage requirements of modern, strong, decentralised cryptographic
systems presents a clear avenue for Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on MANETs. This threat
is particularly relevant in resource-constrained networks, where one or more aspects of the
environment are limited, be it available power, mobility, data storage, on-board processing,
bandwidth, and channel resources such as capacity and delay. In such networks, where there is
a requirement for security and/or integrity monitoring, strong-cryptographic methods present
an entirely new opportunity to potential attackers.
One solution to the trade-off between DoS-protection, and security is the assessment
of “trustworthiness” of nodes within a local network. “Trust” in this case is an assess-
ment of capability of a node based on previously observed behaviour. Using this Trust to
make simple routing decisions is significantly simpler and faster than strong-cryptographic
methods, particularly in multi-hop networks or resource constrained networks [14]. With
Trust being reliant on the runtime awareness of some behaviour, and cryptography on the
pre-establishment of some entropy store and the repeated reinforcement of that numerical
security, they represent two very different approaches to system integrity with very different
costs/benefits, and in practice some elements of both methodologies will be used in different
contexts and applications as those applications dictate.
Systemic Trust and Trusted Development
As will be discussed further in Subsection 2.4.3, the “Trust” in a system is critical well
before a system is activated; the incubation, specification, design, development, production
and testing of a system (particularly a system with some Level of Automation (LOA) or
other non-deterministic operation) is critical to the Trust that an end user can put into that
system, and particularly, how much Trust can be exhibited within and between that systems
individual components.
Trust Operation Against Capable Attackers
In any security situation, the hazards and risks of a systemic vulnerability being identified and
exploited by an attacker are tightly coupled to the expectation of capability of that attacker.
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Within the context of this work, it is assumed that any attacking agency has the complexity
and resources of a nation state.
This is also one of the primary motivators for this particular direction of work; where
increasingly complex and subtle evidentiary security measures (passwords, encryption, etc)
are applied, with increasing pressures in computation, connectivity, or communication, the
assumption that a slightly-higher-technical-investment will protect a system from state-level
espionage or infiltration (or the discovery of some technical flaw in the system) is unfounded,
with many examples of cryptographic applications being “disseminated” through human or
technical failings, both internal and external.
Maritime Autonomy
Given the physical difficulties and requirements of having humans operate underwater (par-
ticularly at depth), and the operational limitations of tethered Remotely Operated Vehicles
(ROVs), or even untethered remote controlled surface platforms, there has been a great deal
of research and commercial interest in the development of autonomous systems, particularly
in the defence and petrochemical sectors, where the lives of human operators are most at
risk in normal activity [15].
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) may be designed with a wide range of capabili-
ties and payloads (see Table 1.2). With potential applications ranging from the replacement of
human divers in Mine-Counter Measure (MCM) activity, to persistent littoral hydrography for
environmental flood plain monitoring, many aspects of the proposed efficiencies gained from
moving to autonomous agents rely on decentralised, MANET style collaboration between
individual agents, and a level of trust that an operator (or indeed, agents within the system
itself) can have in terms of the current activity, readiness, and performance of such autonomous
systems [16].
This “Trust”, that we understand implicitly in the human space, is particularly difficult to
establish and maintain in the underwater environment, and as such, the development of stable,
reliable, adaptable trust systems that can operate in this and other challenging environments
is a limiting factor on the adoption of generalised distributed autonomous systems in the
defence space [17].
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Table 1.2: Summary of Generalised AUV capabilities
Classification Payloads
Sensing • Acoustic Doppler Current Profiling (ADCP)
• Inertial Navigation System (INS)
• Pressure
• Conductivity and Temperature
• Depth
• GPS
• Long Base Line (Underwater Acoustic Localisation)
• Dual/Single Frequency Side Scan Sonar
• Synthetic Aperture Sonar
• Environmental Characterization Optics (ECO) Sensors
(fluorometry and turbitity measurement)
• Still and Video Camera
• Acoustic Imaging
• Sub-Bottom Sonar Profiler
Communications • Acoustic Modem
• Broad-beam and Tight-beam Optical Transponders
• 802.11 WiFi
• Iridium Satellite Uplink
In-Team Activities • Collision Avoidance
• Sensor data broadcast/forwarding
• Location data broadcast
• In-network Sensor fusion/reduction/de-duplication/synthesis
• Network Bridging (move to location to mend disconnected
networks)
Additional / Po-
tential Capabilities
• Automated Ship/Shore Launch and Recovery
• End-effector arms/actuators
• Anchoring/Tethering
• Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Problem Statement
Within the given context, the primary problem investigated in this work is that of establishing
and maintaining trust between a team of mobile autonomous agents (AUVs) which collaborate
over a sparse, noisy, and delayful communications channel (Underwater Acoustic Networks
(UANs)) in a distributed fashion to accomplish a specified mission goal (port protection /
persistent situational awareness) with the expectation of subversion of one agent within the
team by a technically capable actor to exhibit a malicious or selfish behaviour against one
or more of the remaining, fairly behaving, agents.
A secondary problem is that of differentiating between malicious or selfish behaviour and
behaviours emerging from damage or misconfiguration of agents (false positive identification).
TThe proposed solution to these problems is the use of distributed trust assessment
across multiple domains of observation (i.e. communications and relative movement), using
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Figure 1.2: An AUV maps the sea-floor with sonar c©MBARI 2009
a weighted grey theoretic grading to synthesise trust observations across metrics and domains
to provide a total perspective on the threat surface of agents within a network. This would
constrain the available undetectable misbehaviours of malicious or selfish actors, enforcing
“fair behaviour” on the network as a whole. Such filters would be trained against machine
learning modelled vectors of “important metrics” for particular metrics, ideally reducing the
computational complexity of identification and detection.
This proposal relies on several chained “problem statement questions” that require testing.
PSQ.1 Given the difference in operation and performance of terrestrial free-space RF vs UAN,
what is an optimal point of data rate and node separation that simultaneously maximises
network performance while matching realistic constraints of application?
PSQ.2 How much of existing RF Communications based Trust Management best practice and
theory can be carried over to the harsh marine acoustic environment? Indeed, given
the long delays and sparse communications, will existing TMFs be able to operate at
all? Are there any differences in the threats to trust in this new environment?
PSQ.3 Do machine learning and optimisation techniques increase the efficacy of metric weight
selection in multi-metric TMFs on blind simulations?
PSQ.4 Can these same or similar approaches to communications Trust be applied to other
metric domains, such as the relative position/movement of agents?
PSQ.5 Can these domains of Trust assessment be combined efficiently while improving detection
performance?
PSQ.6 Is this combined assessment method more effective than domain-only detection? Are
there particular classes of misbehaviour that are easy/difficult to identify using these
methods?
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The exploration, experimentation, validation and resolution of these questions is sum-
marised in Table 1.3.
Thesis Layout
Chapter 2 MANETs and Trust
In this chapter, current literature and research on concepts, theory, and applications concern-
ing Trust and Trust Management are explored, specifically leaning towards the applications
of Trust within Autonomous MANETs.
In Section 2.3, the abstract quantity of “Trust” is explored. In Section 2.4, Autonomy
and “Trusted Operation” of autonomous systems is investigated from a system architects
and a system operators perspective. In Section 2.5, current use and applications of Trusted
operation of MANETs is explored, including current TMFs.
Chapter 3 Maritime Communications and Operations
In Chapter 3, the maritime context is investigated to support the analysis and modelling of
PSQ. 1, particularly the mechanisms of maritime acoustic communications, as well as the
opportunities and challenges of the marine acoustic channel and its modelling (Section 3.2).
Additionally, the application scope of AUVs, littoral and sub-marine operations are explored
to provide context to the problems PSQ. 1 and PSQ. 2 (Section 3.1).
Chapter 4 Assessment of TMF Performance in Marine Environments
In Chapter 4, the need for multi-metric trust assessment in UAN is demonstrated as an
example of a harsh network environment, supporting PSQ. 1.
The operation of a selection of traditional MANET TMFs is investigated in this environ-
ment. These challenges are characterised and results leveraging a machine learning based opti-
misation method are presented that demonstrate a multi-metric approach to Trust can greatly
enhance the effectiveness of TMFs in these environments, supporting PSQ. 2 and PSQ. 3.
In Section 4.3 an experimental configuration for the marine space is established, and the
scenarios and results presented in Guo et al. [18] are reviewed for comparison, which dealt
with terrestrial, 802.11 based RF MANETs. In Subsection 4.4.1 findings in trust establish-
ment and malicious behaviour detection are presented, comparing with current single metric
TMFs (Hermes and Objective Trust Management Framework (OTMF)) and the use of this
multi-metric (vector) approach to detecting malicious and selfish behaviour in autonomous
marine networks is analysed using Multi-parameter Trust Framework for MANETs (MTFM).
The contributions of this chapter are the first study on the comparative operation and
performance of TMFs in UANs, and a discussion of metric suitability for TMFs in marine
environments, informing future metric selection for experimenters and theorists, and iden-
tifying both the opportunity and need to generate trust from additional domains, such as the
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physical domain. Finally, methodology to assess the usefulness of metrics in discriminating
against misbehaviours in such constrained, delay-tolerant networks is demonstrated.
Key parts of this chapter were published as Andrew Bolster and Alan Marshall. Single and
Multi-metric Trust Management Frameworks for Use in Underwater Autonomous Networks.
In Trust. 2015 IEEE, volume 1, pages 685–693, aug 2015. doi: 10.1109/Trustcom.2015.435.
URL http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs{_}all.jsp?arnumber=7345343.
Chapter 5 Use of Physical Behaviours for Trust Assessment
Current approaches to operational security have been focused on the establishment of trust/se-
curity in the communications domain, and ignore other potential threats to the network
exploited through physical movement. This threat is particularly evident in collaborative
autonomous systems where nodes are tasked to accomplish some survey / exploration /
observation objective in a distributed fashion, where individual nodes make decisions based
on the actions of their “team”. This collaboration opens the opportunity for a physically-
misbehaving actor to selfishly conserve it’s own resources, or maliciously “drain” a given
target node. Current security / trust systems applied to MANETs are not concerned with
the threat of such physical misbehaviours.
To investigate PSQ. 4, this chapter proposes a new approach to trust in resource-
constrained networks of autonomous systems based on their physical behaviour, using the
motion of nodes within a team to detect and identify malicious or failing operation within a
cohort. This is accomplished by looking at operations within the three dimensions of the un-
derwater space, based on kinematics of industry standard AUVs. A series of composite metrics
based on physical movement are presented and applied to the detection and discrimination of
sample physical misbehaviours. This approach opens the possibility of bringing information
about both the physical and communications behaviours of autonomous MANETs together
to strengthen and expand the application of Trust Management Frameworks in sparse and/or
resource constrained environments.
Chapter 6 Multi-Domain Trust Assessment in Collaborative Marine MANETs
In this chapter a methodology is demonstrated that applies the Grey Relational Grading
method used in MTFM to assess trust across multiple metrics across multiple domains. The
question of direct-applicability of domain-metrics to inter-domain behaviours (i.e. physical
metrics being used to detect communications misbehaviours and visa versa.) is investigated
in two stages; first reassessing relative metric significance on a comparative regression directly
comparing “misbehaving” and “Fair” results across execution runs to identify what metrics are
most important in differentiating behaviours from an abstract perspective. This significance is
then used to generate targeted weighting vectors to maximally distrust nodes observed exhibit-
ing that behaviour, acting as a selection filter. From the resultant metric weighting vectors
across both basic domains (communications/physical and their full metric union), potential
“Alternate” domain groupings are selected by inspection. By utilising information from multiple
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domains, it is demonstrated that trust assessment can be more accurate and consistent in identi-
fying misbehaviour than in single-domain assessment ( PSQ. 5). Further, a methodology for as-
sessing the usefulness of individual metrics in this cross-domain space is demonstrated, allowing
for the elimination of redundant metrics, simplifying the runtime assessment process (PSQ. 6).
Key parts of this chapter are published as Andrew Bolster and Alan Marshall. Analytical
metric weight generation for multi-domain trust in autonomous underwater MANETs. In
2016 IEEE Third Underw. Commun. Netw. Conf., pages 1–5. IEEE, aug 2016. ISBN 978-
1-5090-2696-8. doi: 10.1109/UComms.2016.7583465. URL http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
document/7583465/.
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• Misbehaviours impact across domains
• Inherent redundancy (eg INDD/PRX)
allows differential behaviours to be
detected
• Application level selfishness (STS) very
difficult to automatically detect
• Extend Chapter 4 behaviour based
optimisation of MTFM to dynamically
select most significant metrics, leading
to higher performance PSQ. 6

Chapter 2
MANETs and Trust
Mobile Ad-hoc Network Topologies & Routing
MANETs are wireless networks consisting of mobile devices acting simultaneously as sen-
sor/processing/effector nodes and routing nodes, acting without a classical WLAN structured
architecture. Given constraints on propagation in such wireless networks, it is impractical
for nodes to be “fully connected” to the rest of the network, and is instead constructed
from single-hop “node-pair” links, through and across which data is routed to more distant
parts of the network. This link-wise approach coupled with inherent Node mobility results
in a highly dynamic topology, where the instantaneous graph of node-pair connectivity can
change dramatically in short intervals, and it may take considerable time for the network to
“re-optimise” for this new, possibly temporary, topology.
In order to understand and clarify the challenges to generic MANET applications, it
is beneficial to explore some concepts from Graph Theory that apply to the discussion of
MANET topologies.
Network Density and Connectivity
One fundamental compromise in the operation of wireless MANETs is the trade-off between
the number of hops required between source and destination nodes and the effective bandwidth
available to the network overall [21]. This compromise is encapsulated in the relative density
of a given network; that is, the number of nodes in a given node’s one-hop locality, drawing
direct links between wireless transmission strength / reception sensitivity, the environmental
Graph Theory Network Engineering
Vertex Node
Edge Link
Undirected Symmetric
Directed Asymmetric
Table 2.1: Basic mapping between Graph and Network Theory nomenclatures
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(a) Fully connected (Complete) (D=1.0,k=8.0 (b) (D=0.64,k=3)
(c) (D=0.5,k=1) (d) Minimally Connected (D=0.22,k=1)
(e) Disconnected (D=0.19,k=0) (f) An Empty Graph (D=0,k=0)
Figure 2.1: Network Density and Connectivity Examples
noise floor, environmental channel characteristics, the mobility of the nodes and the number
of nodes deployed in a region.
From graph theory, the concept of “Density” is a DG=[0,1] bounded measure of how
“Complete” or fully-connected a given graph G consisting of the set of vertices V and edges
(links) E is. “Connectivity” can be generalised as the routing-ability and the possible redun-
dancy of that routing ability across the graph, i.e. for a “Connected” graph, such that there
is a sequence of edges (a path) that can be traversed to link all possible pairs of nodes, but
if any of the nodes were removed, the graph becomes disconnected or separated, that graph
has a connectivity of 1. If this is not possible, but it is possible to disconnect the graph by
removing two vertices, the graph has connectivity 2, and so on. A graph with a connectivity
of 0 indicates that that graph has separated (or disconnected) vertices.
The concepts of graph density and connectivity are demonstrated visually in Fig. 2.1,
constructed with a uniform vertex distribution and decomposed by removing subsequent
“longest edges” from a fully connected (Complete) graph.
Node Density in MANETs
In practical wireless network applications, connectivity is a product of the physical distribution
of nodes within an environment, and the propagation characteristics of the medium.
Taking the same physical configuration as in Fig. 2.1, the structure, density and connec-
tivity of the network with different assumed propagation ranges r can be shown (See Fig. 2.2).
As the relative transmission range is reduced, the density and connectivity of the network
reduces down to the point in Fig. 2.2d where the “network” is fundamentally broken.
Another graph theoretic factor that is worth considering in MANET design is Centrality,
that is, the measure of importance of individual nodes to the connectivity of the network.
There are a great many methods for calculating centrality, however the important under-
standing from a network perspective is that of network-relative centralisation; in Fig. 2.3,
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1 Unit
(a) (r=2.5,D=0.69,k=3)
1 Unit
(b) (r=2,D=0.53,k=2)
1 Unit
(c) (r=1.5,D=0.39,k=1)
1 Unit
(d) (r=1,D=0.08,k=0)
Figure 2.2: Examples of states of MANET topologies
(a) Centralised (b) Decentralised
(c) Distributed
Figure 2.3: Example of routing strategies and logical connectivity in a sample network
our previously deployed network layout is used to demonstrate three delineations of network
centrality. In the first, all nodes are connected to one node, and that one node is totally
responsible for communications and routing in the network. This is architecturally similar to
switch-managed wired networks in a small office or home. In the second example, a generally
decentralised layout is set, with a generally hierarchical logical routing setup, where a few
nodes take the brunt of the connectivity and bridging, almost creating centralised “sub graphs”
with single uplinks. Finally, a truly “distributed” topology is shown, where there are no
architecturally important nodes and, in general, shorter link distances.
The last issue to consider directly is that of the impacts of node mobility and temporary
absence. In Fig. 2.4, a node leaves the network from one “side”, and later reappears at
another part of the network. This is quite possible in cases where node links may be physically
interrupted by obstructions (or indeed, pre-planned paths for nodes are obstructed, requiring
a course correction and delay). When the node reappears, all routing information that may
have been established (i.e. node 5 would send packets destined to node 9 to nodes 6 or 7 rather
than nodes 3 or 4) must be renegotiated and re-distributed across the network before efficient
operation can continue. Secondarily to this, any authentication and validation that may be
required to positively identify node 9 as actually being node 9 may have to be transited from
node 8, which had previously been the only node directly communicating to node 9.
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(a) Initial State
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9
(b) Node 9 moves out of range and loses connectivity
1
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3
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9
(c) Node 9 rejoins the network at some future point in a different topology
Figure 2.4: Example of node mobility in MANET topology changes
These factors of network density, link length, centralisation and mobility simultaneously
give MANETs their strength and resilience as well as their risks and challenges.
Routing in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
Given the decentralised nature of MANET operations, routing protocols have been an ac-
tive area of research since their inception [4]. This research is classified according to the
strategies used for discovering, monitoring and updating routes within the network, and are
usually grouped into three classes; proactive (or Table Driven), reactive (or On Demand)
and hybrid protocols. A summary of the generalised characteristics of these classes is shown
in Table 2.2. Additional, these classes can be further rearranged, combined or augmented
based on assumptions made about the structure of the baseline topology, i.e. flat, hierarchical
or geographic) or by assumed constraints of the available resources of the nodes within
the network i.e. heterogeneity in power, mobility, or communications capabilities where
resource-based heuristics are used as well as purely topological considerations [22, 23].
Proactive Routing
In Proactive routing, protocols attempt to maintain a up-to-date, global topology awareness
of the network, where every node knows how the best next-hop to contact any other node
in the network. This is extremely efficient for relatively small, static networks, with minimal
storage and time requirements [24]. When the network topology is significantly modified by
a shift in topology, either due to a node “dropping out” or moving, route renegotiation and
optimisation is extremely resource consuming, as this global state is converged upon in a
distributed manner by nodes exchanging their local knowledge of the “new” topology. The
decomposition and updating of the node-knowledge of the network state, and the method
of updating these state-tables, is the primary differentiator between proactive protocols, a
selection of which are summarised below.
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Destination-Sequences Distance Vector (DSDV)
Destination-Sequences Distance Vector is a loop free derivative of the Distributed Bellman-
Ford algorithm where each node maintains two tables; one that attempts to maintain a globally
accurate next-hop routing table for all destination nodes (the routing table) and a route adver-
tisement table, monitoring routes that the node itself can provide. These tables are updated
both periodically and opportunistically. Loop-free status is maintained by monitoring a mono-
tonic “sequence number”, which guarantees that if a long-loop returned packet is observed,
it is discarded in favour of a route with a higher sequence number (i.e. newer route) [25].
Optimised Link State Routing (OLSR)
Optimised Link State Routing reduces the traffic-overhead of truly distributed link-state
exchange and monitoring by establishing a multipoint replaying strategy (MRP) where nodes
select a subset of their one-hop network relay to retransmit their packets, based on the two-hop
connectivity of the network, thereby reducing contention and overheads by reducing local
re-transmitters. However, OLSR does not monitor link quality beyond binary “active/failed”
state which can lead to non-optimial MRP and route selection in wireless networks for instance.
Topology Dissemination Based On Reverse-Path Forwarding (TBRPF)
Topology Dissemination Based On Reverse-Path Forwarding consists of two main modules;
the neighbour discovery module and the routing module; the neighbour discovery module
uses differential updates to report only the changes in the local topology. Further, instead
of flooding the entire network with updates, TBRPF selectively transmits the relevant route
updates to nodes that are on the minimum spanning tree route of that update. Full topology
updates are also used on a periodic, but occasional basis to maintain consistency and visibility.
Given the use of differential updating, TBRPF is more responsive and resilient in the face
of dynamic mobile networks and incurs lower traffic overheads [26].
Reactive Routing
In contract to Proactive Routing, Reactive (or “on-demand”) routing establishes routing infor-
mation when it is required, rather than in advance or periodically. This route establishment is
usually based on a request-response exchange where the node requesting routing information
“floods” its local network with next-hop requests. The structure of this flooding (and the
context of any responses) are the main differentiators between protocols, discussed below.
There are two main sub-classes of reactive routing; source routing and hop-by-hop routing
where packet routing information is either totally planned in advance and encapsulated in
the packet on transmission, or decided at each forwarding point respectively. The on-demand
nature of of route discovery can lead to significantly lower traffic than proactive routing
protocols, but this is often a trade-off between lower average traffic and larger pre-transmission
discovery delays. As such, reactive routing lends itself to low-traffic, delay tolerant, dynamic
mobile applications as it does not require rediscovery after every topology change, but only
on transmission along a new or stale route.
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Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
On-demand route formation when a transmitting node requests one. However, packets
include full routing information instead of relying on the routing tables at each intermediate
device[27]. Effective for small to medium, minimally mobile networks due to inclusion of
route caching which reduces the number of route request discovery phases and associated
congestion. Ineffective in large networks due to full-route packet overheads as network scale
increases, and less than ideal for mobile networks due to cache-miss delays.
Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)
Based on DSDV and DSR; uses beaconing and sequence numbering (DSDV) as well as
shortest path route discovery from DSR, except that AODV does not use full-path source
routing, instead relying on intermediate-routing based only on a destination. This optimisation
reduces overhead and is more resilient to highly dynamic deployments at the cost of variable
and potentially very long delays due to slow route construction or complete retransmissions
due to link failure [28].
Routing On-demand Acyclic Multipath (ROAM)
ROAM uses inter-nodal coordination along directed acyclic sub-graphs, which is derived
from the routers distance to destination. This operation is referred to as a diffusing computa-
tion. The advantage of this protocol is that it eliminates the search-to-infinity problem present
in some of the on-demand routing protocols by stopping multiple flood searches when the
required destination is no longer reachable. Another advantage is that each router maintains
entries (in a route table) for destinations, which flow data packets through them (i.e. the router
is a node which completes/or connects a router to the destination). This reduces significant
amount of storage space and bandwidth needed to maintain an up-to-date routing table.
Another novelty of ROAM is that each time the distance of a router to a destination changes
by more than a defined threshold, it broadcasts update messages to its neighbouring nodes,
as described earlier. Although this has the benefit of increasing the network connectivity, in
highly dynamic networks it may prevent nodes entering sleep mode to conserve power [29].
Associativity Based Routing (ABR)
ABR extends classical source-routing by including a stability (“associativity”) heuristic
of the long-term link state between mobile nodes, ensuring that the least-mobile nodes are
preferentially used for routing. Further, this heuristic is applied outward from destination
rather than from the source, selecting only the “best” route, reducing the likelihood of packet
duplication in the mid-network. However this “associativity” measure requires periodic
beaconing forcing all nodes to remain active. Finally, in the case where the “best” route fails
through an in-the-air topology change, there is no in-network path recovery mechanism, and
link discovery must be restarted [30].
Location Aided Routing (LAR)
LAR incorporates location information (usually from Global Positioning System (GPS)),
and generates a heuristic based on either the distance from the current node towards the destina-
tion location, or the distance from the current node away from the original source, minimising
and maximising this distance respectively.These methods limit control overheads and usually
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accurately determine the shortest path. However, in highly mobile networks this behaviour
appears increasingly flood-like (similar to DSR and AODV), and the general requirement for
highly accurate and timely positional information restricts the application of this protocol.
Cluster Based Routing Protocol (CBRP)
CBRP uses a hierarchical clustering topology where each cluster has a cluster-head which
coordinates routing within that cluster. As only cluster-heads coordinate routing across
clusters, transmission overheads are minimised compared to other route distribution methods.
However, the negotiation and maintenance overheads and propagation delays associated with
hierarchical clustering make the network susceptible to temporary routing loops as nodes
may have inconsistent residual routing information during cluster re-negotiation.
Geographic Random Forwarding (GeRaF)
GeRaF is a geographic, on-demand, opportunistically routed protocol that could be
considered an edge case of the “reactive” definition, in that it relies on additional knowledge
about the environment to make routing decisions. It’s basic operation is that a source node
broadcasts a packet to be sent, including it’s own location and the estimated location of the
intended recipient. Intermediate nodes then reactively assess their own optimality in relaying
based on maximum distance advancement from source and sink positions, and contend for
the channel to receive the packet and rebroadcast it on. The core innovation of GeRaF is this
intermediate / receiver contention policy [31, 32]. One downside of this distance-only priority
heuristic is that it can induce long, zigzag paths that can be sensitive to node mobility [33].
Hybrid Routing
Hybrid routing protocols combine selected elements from both Proactive and Reactive routing
in an attempt to minimise weaknesses in the respective classes. In many cases, this takes the
form of a tiered or bounded choice between proactive and reactive approaches based, where
inside a given “set” of nodes (either physically proximate or or via a directory-based sub-
grouping), lower latency, deterministic, proactive approaches are used, and outside or between
such sets, reactive approaches are applied. These in general exhibit “better” performance on
average, particularly with increasing numbers and expanding distributions of nodes, but the
variability in performance may be significant, particularly when sets require updating due to
physical mobility of nodes, or where key gateway nodes are removed from the network somehow.
Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP)
A true-blend of Proactive and Reactive policies; ZRP draws “Routing Zones” around
nodes based on hop-distance, within which routing is made proactively, providing immediate
local routes, and reactive, on-demand routes outside this distance. This significantly reduces
local overheads and delays by reducing the scope of potential routes as those nodes on the
edge of the zone. The control of this boundary point is a significant challenge to optimise
with respect to overall network scale.
Distributed Spanning Trees (DST)
Based on a combination of Hybrid Tree Flooding and Distributed Spanning Tree shuttling
on tree based clusters where each cluster has a root node acting as a configuration leader.
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Routing updates are passed through direct neighbours and “up” the spanning trees under
the root; this leads to a highly responsive and low over head routing policy in highly dynamic
networks [34].
Distributed Dynamic Routing (DDR)
A tree protocol similar to DST except without the need for a root node; trees are con-
structed and maintained by periodic neighbour beaconing, where each node becomes the
potential root of its own tree within the “forest” of the wider network. The construction
of this forest follows six phases; neighbour election, forest construction, intra-tree clustering,
inter-tree clustering, zone naming and zone partitioning. Each of these phases are executed
based on information received in the beacon messages. One of the strengths of DST is
its lack of centralisation or a-priori structure requirement (i.e. root/cluster-heads or static
zone maps), however there is no equalisation method to balance the case where a gateway
node that is a preferred neighbour to many sub-trees becomes congested and represents a
significant bottleneck, as the neighbour selection is predicated on graph connectivity alone,
without taking maximum throughput into account. In variably connected networks this could
potentially cause network-wide delays through mid-network packet drops.
Zone-based Hierarchical Link State (ZHLS)
Compared to ZRP, ZHLS extended the zoning concept to include some elements of
LAR, by constructing hierarchical non-overlapping zones based on physical location as well
as connectivity. This location management is purely decentralised, with no explicit “zone-
heads”, eliminating single-point-of-failure concerns and significantly reducing invalid-flooding
overheads, as topology updates only carry towards zones where the information is relevant.
Shifting topologies within zones are tolerated cleanly as the internal zone-map is flat rather
than hierarchical, and does not require re-computation or re-location as long as the node stays
within a given “zone”. This static map also leads to a significant disadvantage in that this
zone-map must be pre-set, so are inappropriate for fully-mobile applications or applications
with dynamic geographic boundaries [35, 36].
Scalable Location Update Routing Protocol (SLURP)
With a similar hierarchical non-overlapping zone structure to ZHLS, SLURP does away
with global routing through a deterministic mapping of node identifiers to “Home” regions,
such that any node attempting to communicate with a node, can directly calculate from
what “Home” zone that node originated.As and when nodes leave their “Home” region, they
feedback to that region their current location. Subsequently when that node is a destination
for a packet, the routing query is automatically directed to the home region which can direct
the source node as to the direction of its destination, upon which the source can start sending
data towards the destination using a most forward with fixed radius (MFR) geographical
forwarding algorithm. Once the data reaches the zone where the destination currently resides,
source-routing is used internally to complete the route. This strategy works well for relatively
static networks with some mobile nodes, or where node mobility is “slow”, such as WSN,
however it still relies on pre-programmes static zone maps as per ZHLS [37]
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Focused Beam Routing (FBR)
FBR is built upon the concepts of GeRaF, which uses straight line distance-from-receiver
minimisation, extending with a cone-based prioritisation metric rather than absolute distance,
mitigating the zigzag effect of GeRaF and implicitly supporting partially overlapping simul-
taneous alternate routing, improving system redundancy and (usually) eliminating the need
for retransmission [33]. This is further augmented with an adaptive open-loop power control
system which both aids in energy consumption and in preventing spurious blocking of the
channel. FBR is particularly well suited to constrained energy mobility networks with high
mobility and high retransmission costs [38].
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Table 2.2: Comparison of Routing Strategy Classes (from Abolhasan et al. [29])
Area
Class
Proactive Reactive Hybrid
Routing
Structure
Both flat and hierar-
chical structures are
available
Mostly flat except
CBRP
Mostly hierarchical
Route
Availability
Always available if
nodes are reachable
Determined when
needed
Depends on the loca-
tion of the destination
Control Traf-
fic Volume
Usually high, attempt
at reduction is made.
e.g. OLSR, TBRPF
Lower than Global
routing and further
improved using GPS.
e.g. LAR
Mostly lower than
proactive and reactive
Periodic
Updating
Yes, some may be
conditional e.g. STAR
Not required, however
some nodes may re-
quire periodic beacons.
e.g. ABRs
Usually used within
each zone or between
gateway nodes
Mobility
Handling
Usually updates occur
at fixed intervals.
DREAM alters peri-
odic updates based on
mobility
ABR uses localised
broadcast queries,
ROAM uses threshold
updates, AODV rout-
ing uses local route
discovery
Usually more than one
path may be available.
Single point of failures
are reduces by working
as a group
Storage Re-
quirements
High Dependent on num-
ber of nodes kept
or required; usually
lower than proactive
protocols
Usually depends on
cluster or zone size;
may become as large
as proactive if clusters
are big
Delay Level Short routes are
predetermined
Higher than proactive Short for destinations
in the same zone/clus-
ter as source. Inter-
zone may be as large
as Reactive protocols
Scalability Up to 100 nodes;
OSPF and TBRPF
may scale higher
Source routing pro-
tocols; up to a few
hundred nodes. Point-
to-point may scale
higher. Depends on
level of traffic and
levels of multihopping
Designed for up to or
more than 1000 nodes
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Summary
Within the context of this work as discussed in Section 1.2, FBR is an ideal candidate routing
scheme to carry forward throughout this work. It’s compromise between location accuracy,
timeliness of location updates, and capability for multiple backup routes without having to
disseminate or collaborate on routing tables, zones, or trees match well with the contented,
delayful and noisy UAN environment. Additionally, it’s emphasis on energy conservation suite
well to already discussed limitations of the current generation of AUVs, as will be discussed in
Subsection 3.1.3. Finally, while early work on MANET UAN was built on protocols such as
DSDV, AODV and DSR, much current research and testing has demonstrated the usefulness
and efficiency of FBR in the marine environment [33, 38, 39], representing a strong body of
work that can be validated against in simulation development.
As such, FBR is selected as the routing protocol used in the remainder of this work.
Trust Definitions, Perspectives, and Relationships
For a term that is so common in every-day speech, “Trust”1 is a challenging discussion area,
particularly given the wealth of proposed definitions (Table 2.3).
Beyond these dry, vague, and often “fuzzy” definitions, there is a significant ontological
conflict between the subjective and objective perspectives of trust; is “trust” an attribute
of the actor performing a given action, or of the observer of such an action? Or indeed is
trust itself an action upon a relationship between actors? Is it qualitative or quantitative?
These questions have challenged philosophers, psychologists and social scientists for decades.
In human trust relationships it is recognized that there can be several domains of trust
for example organizational, sociological, interpersonal, psychological and neurological [40].
These domains of trust are, from a human perspective, quite natural and are formed
during the earliest stages of linguistic integration. This leads to recognisable deviations in the
experiential concept of “trust” across cultures with differing linguistic histories. This has led
to a wealth of work in the social sciences (as well as management schools across the world)
in to how to develop, understand, and repair trust across cultural boundaries [41].
As such it is important to explore the following areas of trust definitions, the characteristics
of trust relationships and the impact of topology on the information available to assess trust
within an abstract network before approaching the application of Trust towards Autonomous
Systems and finally to MANETs.
Modelling Trust Relationships
Mayer et al. [42] proposed a model of trust that encapsulates generalised factors of perceived
trustworthiness of a trustee in interpersonal relationships (Table 2.4), accommodating a
subjective trustworthiness and risk-taking potentiality on the part of the trustor. This
1As a point of notation, in this work ”Trust” and ”trust” are used interchangeably to refer to the concept,
action, or belief of a specified trusting relationship. Where Trust is capitalised outside of grammatical
convention, it is to emphasise “trust as a concept” rather than a particular value or relationship
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Table 2.3: Selected Definitions of Trust
Definition Source
Assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of
someone or something.
Merriam-Webster
Firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something OED
The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a articular
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor
or control that other party
Mayer et al. [42]
An expectancy held by and individual or a group that the word,
promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group
can be relied upon
Rotter [43]
formulation of trust allowed a wider discussion of the characteristics of trust relationships,
both between individuals and within networks or communities.
Table 2.4: Factors of Trust (from Mayer et al. [42])
Factor Definition
Ability Collection of skills, competencies, capabilities and characteristics that
enable a party to have influence or action within some specific domain
Benevolence The extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to or by the
trustor beyond a selfish profit motive
Integrity Acceptance or adherence to a common set of principals of operation that
the trustor finds acceptable
As shown in Fig. 2.5, Mayer primarily focuses on the Trustor’s perspective and processes
with respect to a give trust-based relationship. Three primary factors of perceived trustwor-
thiness (Ability, Benevolence and Integrity); based on previous outcomes, are assessed and
synthesised along with the Trustor’s own internalised propensity to Trust with respect to the
different factors observed, to generate a given trust value. This trust value is incorporated
with the risk / reward as assessed by the trustor to conclude what level of risk taking (Trust)
can be assumed in the relationship between this trustor and a given trustee.
Within the context of this work (Section 1.2), based on the Outcomes of a given
trustor/trustee relationship, the trustor is endeavouring to assess if the Benevolence, Ability
or Integrity of a trustee is compromised, however as these cannot be directly observed, the
trustor must attempt to use particular outcomes over time to estimate what, if any, factors
are compromised.
Lee and See [40] extended and synthesised Mayer et al’s approach to personal and inter-
personal trust towards a generalised concept of trust for human and autonomic/autonomous
systems with alternative contextual definitions shown in Table 2.5 (including their approximate
mappings to Mayer et al’s approach.
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Ability
Benevolence
Integrity
Factors of
Perceived
Trustworthiness
Trust
Trustor’s
Propensity
Risk Taking in
Relationship
Perceived Risk
Outcomes
Trustor
Assessment
Figure 2.5: Model of Trust, adapted from Mayer et al. [42] to clarify the role of
the trustor
Table 2.5: Factors of Trust for Autonomous Systems (from Lee and See [40])
Factor Definition Mayer Term
Performance The current and historical operation of the automation,
including characteristics such as reliability, predictability,
and ability
Ability
Purpose The degree to which the automation is being used within
the realm of the designers intent
Benevolence
Process The degree to which the automation’s algorithms are
appropriate for the situation and able to achieve the
operators goals.
Integrity
Sun et al. [44] suggests that there are two overarching forms of trust:
• Behavioural: That one entity voluntarily depends on another entity in a specific situation
• Intentional: That one entity would be willing to depend on another entity
It is suggested that these overarching forms are supported by and indeed are drawn from
four major constructs within social and networked environments, as identified by Mcknight
and Chervany [45]:
• Trusting Belief: the subjective belief within a system that the other trusted components
are willing and able to act in each others’ best interests
• Dispositional Trust: a general expectation of trustworthiness over time
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Situational
Decision
to Trust
Disposition
to Trust
Belief Formation
Process
System
Trust
Trusting Beliefs
Trusting Intention
Trusting Behaviour
Figure 2.6: Trust Construct Relationships (from Liu and Wang [46])
• Situational Decision Trust: in-situ risk assessment where the benefits of trust outweigh
the negative outcomes of trust
• System Trust: the assurance that formal impersonal or procedural structures are in
place to ensure successful operation.
Sun argues that only System Trust and Behavioural Trust are relevant to trusted net-
working applications. However, it is arguable that in any communications network where
the operation of that network is not the only concern, or where that network has to interact
with any operator, then all of these factors come into play; as we will see (Subsection 2.4.3).
Both System and Behavioural trust rely on what Sun calls a “Belief Formation Process”, or
a trust assessment, while the other trust constructs deal with the interactions between trust
and decision making against an internal assessment of network trustworthiness.
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Taxonomy and Notations of Trust
To abstractly discuss Trust and trust modelling, Sun et al. [47] present a T{subject :
agent,action} notation for individual trust relationships, where Subject and Agent usu-
ally representing individuals but may include groups of individuals or the network as a whole,
and Action may be an action performed by a given agent or a property possessed by that agent.
This trust value is initially considered to be a continuous real number, representing the uncer-
tainty in that the subject has that the agent will be observed performing the action; i.e. this
value is not absolute and from Sun et al. [44], “[is] the opinion of a specific subject. Thus, dif-
ferent subjects can assign different probability values for the same agent and the same action.”
This notation is normally abbreviated such that
T{A :B,a}=TaAB (2.1)
where TaAB denotes the expectation or trust that a node A has that node B will successfully
perform action a.
A special extension is assumed for multi-party trust relationships for the “action” of
recommending another nodes perspective on a given nodes expectation or trust that it will
perform an action a; (aR)
T{A :B,aR}=RaAB (2.2)
Where the action under discussion is implied or there is a single action under debate (for
example, packet routing in MANETs), the action superscript can be left out; TAB,RAB.
Trust can be propagated through a number of nodes, forming a chain of assessments and
recommendations, expressed as per Equ. 2.3. While the particular algorithms and methods
of combination vary between TMFs, the · symbol is used as a generic operator. In any case,
if a given node A has no knowledge about node B, or likewise B having no knowledge of C,
trust between A,C is zero; TABC=0
TAC 7→TABC=RAB ·TBC where RAB 6=0,TBC 6=0 (2.3)
Either notation; TAC,TABC is valid for this chaining depending on the context, where,
TAC is preferred where there is either one unambiguous transiting node B, or where the
value is the multi-path trust synthesis across many individual links, where TABC is then the
preferred notation for a single path within a multi-path network.
For discussion of individual links or subsets of links, Set notation can be applied to TAC
multi-path networks based on the graph theoretic notation introduced in Section 2.1, for
example;
TAC⊆TAxC∀x|−−−→AxC∈E (2.4)
Similarly, these multi-path sets can be decomposed into their individual links, i.e.
Tx≥0∀x∈TAC
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Characteristics of Trust Relationships
There are five commonly considered characteristics or attributes of Trust relationships in
general, but not all relationships exhibit them and they are not assumed to be a complete
specification of Trust (synthesised from [42, 45, 47, 48]):
• Multi-Party - One-to-one; one-to-many; many-to-one; many-to-many. Trust is not an
absolute characteristic of a lone individual. Trust may include multi-agent abstractions
(one-to-many), such as a preferential trust/distrust towards a group exhibiting a par-
ticular attribute, e.g. members of the armed forces / police services. Likewise, there
can be trustor/trustee attributes that can generalise relationships between collectives
(many-to-many), e.g. Jets and Sharks [49].
• Transitive - Trust assessments can be shared (i.e. recommendations), where this second
order trust assessment incorporates both the observed trustworthiness of the trustee, as
well as the trustworthiness of the intermediate trustor. In some models this is further
extended to include out-of-network intermediate trustors that have some other defined
authority, e.g. PKI, CA.
• Evidential - Trust must be based on some form of evidence-based observation or as-
sessment, such as historical success rates of performing a certain action, or second-hand
observations of trust from a third party.
• Directional Asymmetry - The majority of relationships are bi-directional but are asym-
metric, i.e. between two entities who “trust” each other, there are two independent
trust relationships that may have very different “values” or extents.
• Contextual - Trust can be variable and loosely coupled between contexts with respect
to the action being assessed or the environment within which the trustee is operating,
e.g. Doctors are trusted to perform medical procedures but that trust may not improve
their success at correctly wiring an electrical plug. However there are plenty of counter-
examples to this, as from [42], two of the three listed factors of trust are “Benevolence”
and “Integrity” and these are unrelated to the ability of a trustee to perform a particular
action, so it is reasonable to make an initial assumption that if a trustee is being benev-
olent in one activity or context, that that benevolence should extend to other contexts.
Liu and Wang [46] summarises these attributes in a series of axioms
Fundamental Axioms of Trust
Sun et al. [44] demonstrate that by taking an Information Theoretic approach to trust
as function of entropy and as such, uncertainty (i.e. trust having both a valency and a
confidence) 2, a series of axioms can be constructed to model the interactions between trusting
2Donald Rumsfelds famous 2002 “Known Knowns” quote is a perfect example of this
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Figure 2.8: Trust Combination
agents [50]. Many of these axioms are mirrored in pure information theory, as discussed
in [46].
Axioms and their quoted descriptions from [46]
Axiom 1: Concatenation propagation of Trust does not increase Trust
When the subject establishes a trust relationship with the agent through the
recommendation from a third party, the trust value between the subject and
the agent should not be more than the trust value between the subject and the
recommender as well as the trust value between the recommender and the agent.
This axiom sets up the rules for trust propagation from the perspective of trust as a form
of Shannon Entropy and using the notation discussed above, can be expressed as in Equ. 2.5
(see Fig. 2.7 for context) [50].
TAC≤min(RAB,TBC) (2.5)
Axiom 2: Multipath propagation of Trust does not reduce Trust
If the subject receives the same recommendations for the agents from multiple
sources, the trust value should be no less than that in the case when the subject
receives fewer recommendations.
In this case, this axiom sets the groundwork for multi-node analysis of trust networks,
shown in Fig. 2.8 and described in Equ. 2.6. In essence, adding additional information sources of
the same observation should increase the trust value arrived at from a smaller subset of sources.
TAC≥TA′C′≥0, for Rα≥0,Tα≥0
TAC≤TA′C′≤0, for Rα≥0,Tα≤0 (2.6)
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Figure 2.9: Trust Paths
Axiom 3: Trust based on multiple recommendations from a single source should
not be higher than that derived from independent sources.
When the trust relationship is established jointly through concatenation and
multipath trust propagation, [...] recommendations from independent sources can
reduce uncertainty more effectively than can recommendations from correlated
sources.
This axiom addresses the information independence of trust links; In Fig. 2.9 there are
two networks, both with two potential chains from right to left-nodes (A,C,A′,C′),.
TAC={TABCD,TABEC} (2.7)
TA′C′={TA′B′D′C′,TA′F ′E′C} (2.8)
Given that the sub-chain TAB prepends both chains in TAC, the weight of node B’s
recommendations are effectively duplicated, and from Axiom 2, this duplication should not
decrease the trust assessment. However for TA′C′, no such duplication exists, and as such
it’s trust assessment should have a larger magnitude.
TAC≥TA′C′≥0,|TA′C′≥0 (2.9)
TAC≤TA′C′≤0,|TA′C′≤0 (2.10)
Topologies of Multi-Party Trust Networks
Beyond the attributes of an individual bilateral trust relationship, within any multi party
sparsely connected network or community, topological context is useful in both establishing
trust and in disseminating observations for collaborative assessment.
Within sparsely connected networks, there are three primary types of relationship, min-
imally demonstrated in Fig. 2.10;
• Direct - Whereby two nodes have a 1-hop communications link between them (A,B,C
in the given figure)
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Figure 2.10: Direct, Indirect, Recommender Trust relationships from the perspective
of Node A
• Indirect - Where two nodes have a n>1 hop communications link (E,D from A or
Cs perspective in the given figure), i.e. there is no direct link from the trustor (A) to
trustees (E,D)
• Recommendation - Where three nodes are fully connected so as to enable the exchange
of direct opinions and form composite opinions based on the target and reporter (i.e.
A has both its own Direct assessment of C, as well as it’s knowledge of Bs Direct
assessment of C)
Trust Establishment Strategies and their impact on Trust Frameworks
In the majority of cases, the establishment of trust is a purely observational effort, as opposed
to providing a pre-initialised “secure state” [8, 47, 51]. The network is initialised, routes are
dynamically generated and propagated depending on the routing strategy defined, and as
information about the performance of nodes is recorded, Trust is established. This method of
“blind trust establishment” may initially reduce efficiencies in the early phases of operation,
but this is quickly overcome with the establishment of a short “introduction” period, where
the network is not tasked to perform any tasks where thorough Trust is necessary.
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In the course of normal operations, there are two additional “trust establishment” cases
that must be understood in the development of trust frameworks; newcomer integration and
depart-return reintegration. In the first case, where a new node is joining the network, that
new node is initially at a disadvantage; the rest of the network already trusts each other
and could, by default, not perform any trusting behaviours to/with the new node, making
it difficult for that new node to “demonstrate” trustworthiness [8]. This state is resolved by
treating Trust as a multivariate factor consisting of at least two components; “Trust” and
“Knowledge” or “Confidence”, such that there is a substantive difference between “I’m not
sure that this node is totally trustworthy but I’ve observed many actions” and “I have no
idea how trustworthy this node is as I’ve not observed many actions”. As such, when a node
integrates with the trust network, the rest of the network is “ignorant” about it, and can
probabilistically interact with it in a tentatively trusting manner.
In the latter operational case, where a node leaves the network (or “disappears” from the
network in the case of temporarily broken topology such as in Subsection 2.1.1) and returns,
it is not sensible for nodes to maintain their previous opinions of the returning node. As
such (and not purely for this reason) the majority of TMFs maintain a “remembering” (or
forgetting) factor, normally noted as β. This beta factor inversely weights the contributions
of older observations in the formation of the current trust assessment, tending towards
having zero confidence and zero trust in the node over time while it is not observed (or
recommendations regarding that node are not observed).
On the return of a departed node, depending on the duration of the departure with respect
to beta, it may be treated as a total newcomer, but will generally have some residual trust-
valence, which puts it at a slight advantage compared to a complete newcomer. However, this
reaction assumes that the identity of such a returning node can be verified, and in some cases,
it is beneficial to initially distrust an apparent “returner” in case of malicious masquerading.
Attacks on Trust
Liu and Wang [46] identify five types of attacks on Trust within networks that generate
collaborative trust assessments through the exchange of recommendations; On-Off, Conflicting-
behaviour, Badmouthing, Sybil and Newcomer attacks.
1. Bad Mouthing: Where a malicious node provides dishonest recommendations of other
nodes in the network, to disrupt optimal operation by making other nodes appear
untrustworthy
2. Sybil attack: Where a malicious node uses multiple pseudonymous entities to diffuse
blame for bad behaviour, while maintaining a good reputation using the nodes genuine
identity
3. Newcomer Attack: Similar to the Sybil attack in operation, whereby a malicious node
will periodically assume a “fresh” identify with the network, shedding an identity that
as accumulated an “untrustworthy” assessment
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4. Conflicting Behaviour attack: Where a node (or a collaborating collection of malicious
nodes) selectively drops messages, or modified recommendation values to or from certain
nodes or groups of nodes, implicitly reducing the apparent trustworthiness of those
attacked nodes with the rest of the fleet, while reducing the operational efficiency of
the fleet overall. This attack exploits the dynamic properties of trust through taking
advantage of the expected dynamism in topology and behaviours such that other nodes
“won’t notice” (Alternatively called the Grey Hole Attack)
5. On-Off attack: Malicious entities alternate between “good” and “bad” behaviours,
hoping that they can remain undetected while causing damage. This attack exploits
the dynamic properties of trust through time-domain inconsistent behaviours.
It is to be noted that the Sybil and Newcomer attacks do not exclusively rely on trust,
but instead are a problem of network authentication.
All of these attacks can be abstracted as “non-isotropic attacks” i.e. attacks that attempt
to hide malicious / selfish behaviour behind the expected statistical variation in observations
within a cohort. In each case, a different dimension of this assumed statistical normality is
exploited; in On-Off, the attacker attempts to “hide” in the time dimension by only occasionally
misbehaving, in the Badmouth attack the attacker is relying on it’s false recommendation being
equitably received as its targets true actions. In the Conflicting behaviour attack, the attacker
effectively “badmouths” a subset of nodes, hiding itself amid the “false” reports coming
from the conflicting subsets of nodes. Finally, in Sybil/Newcomer attacks the attacker takes
advantage of an assumed naivety of the collective by presenting itself as a “new”, and therefore,
zero-history entity that can initially neither be trusted nor untrusted (See Subsection 2.3.4)
Chapter 2. MANETs and Trust 34
Trusted Development and Operation of Autonomous Systems
Contextual Need for Autonomy
Before exploring autonomy, it’s origins, constraints, limitations and opportunities, it is valuable
to put this investigation into context. Returning to Section 1.2, in this work the purpose of au-
tonomy is for a team of AUVs to perform a given survey task (or other task). Due to the heavy
communications constraints in UANs (as will be discussed in Section 3.2), direct, full-loop re-
mote control is not practical as it is simply not currently possible to have real time bidirectional
streaming of sensor and control data from one AUV to one controller, let alone on a multiple-
access network. This problem is made particularly complex with the impetus to perform
dangerous operations such as MCM at a distance to preserve human life. As such, an element
of control and situational awareness must necessarily be delegated onto the AUVs themselves,
with a “thin”, on-demand, information (rather than “streaming data”) based control loop.
A significant potential advantage of this move towards on-board control is the localisation
of response to adverse events; automated, sonar based collision avoidance can eliminate
control-loop delays to manual avoidance manoeuvring, and in a similar vein, the ability of
nodes to continue operating for a period of time when full-loop control communication is
not possible (i.e. local changes in the intermediate water column causing acoustic shadowing,
etc.) greatly increased the potential efficiency and reliability of deployed systems.
As the use of AUVs increases, so will the demands on any control scheme used, and these
will only explode as increasing AUVs are deployed in tandem, as such node autonomy is an
essential area of ongoing work and understanding it’s applications and limitations is directly
relevant to the meaningful establishment of trust between autonomous systems [17].
Autonomy and Levels of Autonomy
Autonomy, like trust, is a nebulous term applied across research, defence and commercial
circles that has its origins in human experience and interactions.
Autonomy, coming from the Greek roots auto- (self) and nomos (law) is the concept of
a self-driven agency, and can be considered the concept of a “rational” individuals capacity to
make un-coerced decisions in an informed manner. This autonomy is distinct from freedom,
where freedom is the ability to perform an action, not the capability to choose which action to
perform. That is not to say that autonomy or autonomous action exists in an ideal vacuum
with perfect and complete information with no coercive factors or outside influences. The
ability to recognise, process, weight and filter inputs, knowledge, “responsibilities”, influences
and outside factors and come to an effective decision is a key skill for any self-governing
agent, however this is above and beyond the concept of “basic autonomy”. From the implicit
variability and complexity of environment and context that classically autonomous entities3
inhabit, there is little assumption that “autonomy” always produces a categorically “correct”or
3That’s Homo Sapiens
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“good” decision, but is instead a case of an agent choosing the action that is in its own best
interests based on available information [52].4
In the most general case in the world of artificial systems, Autonomy is understood as
a graduated spectrum of allocation of functionality between a system (or system of systems)
and a human operator assigned with performing a given task. Where a system is more
“autonomous”, more of the sensing, planning, decision and action operations are performed by
the system. (See Table 2.6 for a review of current definitions of autonomy and autonomous
systems) This graduated spectrum of allocated functionality is generally termed the Level
of Automation (LOA), where an increasing LOA correlated to increasing control and decision
making freedom to the autonomous system from the human operator(Table 2.7). These
levels can be loosely viewed as a spectrum from across Planning Support, Decision Support,
Bounded Execution, and finally, Informed Execution5.
While Autonomy is largely taken to be a robotics term based in the case of one human
operator and one robotic entity, the development of more generalised cyber-physical sys-
tems has expanded this definition; from over-the-horizon human operation of Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to global networks of collaborating machines such as Googles’ Search
infrastructure, and beyond.
As such, the interactions between autonomous agents are becoming increasingly relevant
to the operating efficiencies of overall collaborative systems, whether or not a human operator
is “in-the-loop”.
See Appendix A for a more thorough discussion on the Human Psychological Factors
related to the planning, use, and integration of trusted autonomous systems in classical
command and control contexts.
Trust Perspectives in Autonomous Operation
For the purposes of this work, two perspectives on trust for autonomous systems are defined:
Design Trust and Operational Trust.
Design Trust - When an autonomous system is under development, a level of Trust is
established in it through the manner in which it has been designed and tested. This is the
same as conventional systems. Given that systems that have high-levels of autonomy are
designed to behave adaptively to dynamic environments, it is challenging to fully predict such
non-deterministic behaviours prior to operational deployment. For example, in a navigation
system it is difficult to predict the dynamic environment it will need to adapt to. Trust needs
to be developed throughout the design and testing of such systems to predict that operation
will be, if not optimal, at least satisfactory.
4Arpaly discusses a counter example of this “goodness” assessment as Huckleberry Finns’ release of Jim
against his “best judgement”, and that rather than this action being an instance of morally justified or self-
congratulatory autonomy, it was “the right thing to do” from an abstract moralistic perspective rather than a jus-
tifiably beneficial action, and it is a case of akrasia; the lacking of self-governance and the antonym of autonomy.
5In theory there is a further “Uninformed execution” level of autonomy, however this is beyond the scope
of this work [53]
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Table 2.6: Definitions of Autonomy
Definition Source
. . . should be able to carry out its actions and to refine or modify
the task and its own behaviour according to the current goal and
execution context of its task
Alami et al. [54]
Autonomy refers to systems capable of operating in the real-world
environment without any for of external control for extended periods
of time
Bekey [55]
. . . a system situated within and a part of an environment that senses
that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own
agenda and so as to effect with it senses in the future. . . . Exercises
control over its own actions
Franklin and
Graesser [56]
An unmanned systems own ability of sensing, perceiving, analysing,
communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting, to achieve
goals as assigned by its human operator(s) through designed HRI.
. . . The condition or quality of being self-governing
Huang [57]
. . . that the robot can operate self-contained, under all reasonable
conditions without requiring recourse to the human operator. Au-
tonomy means that a robot can adapt to change in its environment
. . . or itself . . . and continue to reach a goal.
Murphy [58]
. . . it should learn what it can to compensate for partial or incorrect
prior knowledge
Russell and
Norvig [59]
Autonomy refers to a robot’s ability to accommodate variations in its
environment. Different robots exhibit different degrees of autonomy;
the degree of autonomy is often measured by relating the degree
at which the environment can be varied to the mean time between
failures and other factors indicative of the robots performance.
Thrun [60]
. . . agents operate without the direct intervention of humans or others,
and have some kind of control over their actions and internal states.
Wooldridge and
Jennings [61]
Operational Trust - Trust at runtime or in-situ that both the individual nodes within
a system are operating as expected and that the interfaces between the operator and the
system are as expected. This latter aspect covers issues such as physical/wireless links and
interpretation of data at each end of such a communication link. This can be subdivided into
two types of perspective;
• Hard Trust or technical trust - The quantitative measurement and communication of
the expectation of an actor performing a certain task, based on historic performance
and through consensus building within a networked system. Can be thought of as a
de-risking strategy to measure and monitor the ability of a system, or another actor
within a system, to perform a task unsupervised. Hard Operational Trust is functionally
derived from, but distinct from Design Trust.
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Table 2.7: Levels of Decision Making Automation (Extended from Sheridan and
Verplank [62])
LOA Description
1 The computer offers no assistance; the human must make all decisions and actions
2 The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or
3 Narrows the selection down to a few, or
4 Suggests one alternative and
5 Executes that suggestion if the human operator approves, or
6 Allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or
7 Executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and
8 Informs the human only if asked, or
9 Informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to.
10 The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the human.
Table 2.8: Levels of Automation (paraphrased from Endsley and Kaber [63])
LOA Description
Manual Control The human monitors, generates options, selects options (makes
decisions), and physically carries out options.
Action Support The automation assists the human with execution of selected action.
The human does perform some control actions.
Batch Processing The human generates and selects options; then they are turned over
to automation to be carried out (e.g., cruise control in automobiles)
Shared Control Both the human and the automation generate possible decision
options. The human has control of selecting which options to
implement; however, carrying out the options is a shared task.
Decision Support The automation generates decision options that the human can
select. Once an option is selected, the automation implements it.
Blended Decision
Making
The automation generates an option, selects it, and executes it if
the human consents. The human may approve of the option selected
by the automation, select another, or generate another option.
Rigid System The automation provides a set of options and the human has to select
one of them. Once selected, the automation carries out the function.
Supervisory Con-
trol
The automation selects and carries out an option. The human can
have input in the alternatives generated by the automation.
Automated Deci-
sion Making
The automation generates options, selects, and carries out a desired
option. The human monitors the system and intervenes if needed
(in which case the level of automation becomes Decision Support).
Full Automation The system carries out all actions.
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• Soft Trust or common trust - The qualitative assessment of the ability of an actor to
perform a task or operation consistently and reliably based on social or experiential
factors. Can be viewed as the abstract level of confidence an operator has in an actor
to perform a task unsupervised. This is the “human” form of trust and is the main
motivational driver for the human-factors trust discussion in Appendix A, but is not
directly relevant to this immediate work.
It is already clear that these definitions are extremely close in their construction, but
represent fundamentally different approaches to trust, one coming from a sociological per-
spective of person-to-person and person-to-group relationships from day to day life, and the
other coming from a statistical or formal appraisal of an operation by a system during design,
development, procurement, and deployment.
While the focus of this work is on the operational trust between teams of autonomous
systems (Section 1.2), there are two disjointed areas that are relevant to review for context.
Firstly, it is valuable to briefly discuss the impact and effect of the actions and reactions of
human operators in the context of autonomous operational trust; these human factors can
have significant impact on the design constraints, operation, and indeed the ease-of-adoption
of autonomous systems in the future. Secondly, It is important to understand the wider
Design Trust context to understand potential limitations or constraints on future development
of such systems across their developmental and operational life-cycle.
Summary of Human Factors impacting Operational Trust in Defence Con-
texts
When dealing with human supervision of autonomous or semi-autonomous systems, there is an
inherent conflict between the expectations of the operator, and the hopes of system architects.
System architects aim to provide more and more information to the operator to justify a
systems operation, and Operators in reality need less and less information to be efficient when
things are going well, and responsive in a dynamic environment. This places huge demands
on Human Interface design and indeed on communications design to provide this timely,
relevant, interactive connection between any autonomous system and the end operator(s).
Recent work has presented the idea of taking user interface inspiration from the entertainment
sector, in terms of UI best practises developed over two decades of Real-Time Strategy game
development [64], and follow up work into automated mission debrief demonstrated that
such operational support could improve causal situational awareness of an operator when
compared to a human-baseline [65]. In terms of the human factors challenges 6, they are often
contradictory in their direction, particularly when contrasting between Adaptive Automation
and Cognitive Biases challenges. This is a key part of the “soft trust” perspective, where the
operators and commanders need to be able to implicitly and explicitly trust the operation of
a remote system with limited feed-back bandwidth, high latency, or long-term operation such
that direct remote operation is infeasible or undesirable. To be able to trust that system’s
6See Appendix A for a discussion of these challenges
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ability to continue on a course, survey an area, notify on detection of an anomaly, etc.is going
to be the corner stone of any autonomous systems justification in the future.
Design Trust
As part of work conducted with Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) [66],
five aspects of Design Trust have been identified with respect to Design Trust, with open
research questions identified in each aspect emphasised.
1. Formal Specification of Dynamic Operation: Autonomous Systems (AS) may be
required to operate in complex, uncertain environments and as such their specification
may need to reflect an ability to deal with unspecified circumstances. This includes
engaging with dynamic systems of systems environments where an autonomous system
may cooperate with a system not envisaged at design time. How can systems that are
required to demonstrate that they meet their requirement be specified flexibly enough to
permit adaptive behaviours?
2. Security: Any unmanned system has the potential to be used for illegitimate purposes
by unscrupulous third parties who could exploit security vulnerabilities to gain control
of the system or sub-systems. Any system that has the potential to cause harm from
such actions must have security designed in from the start to ensure that the system
can be trusted to be resilient from cyber attack. Current accreditation schemes rely
on a security assessment of a known architecture and there are mutual accreditation
recognition schemes that could be encoded in dynamic discovery handshake protocols.
This would produce a secure network assured through the accreditation of its component
systems. For example, the Multinational Security Accreditation Board (MSAB) deals
with Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB) and NATO Accreditations
to provide security assurance of internationally connected networks. Encoding such
agreements into secure handshakes could enable dynamic accreditation of autonomous
systems cooperating in a coalition environment. It is not known whether these have been
demonstrated, so the question is: Can autonomous systems be designed to understand
the security situation when interfacing with known or unknown systems?
3. Verification and Validation of a Flexible Specification: Following on from the
description of a flexible specification, establish that the AS conforms and performs
in accordance to the specification. This has direct implication for the trust in the
resultant system. How can systems demonstrate that they will behave acceptably when
the environment is unknown?
4. Trust Modelling and Metrics: This could be argued as part of the Verification
and Validation of the system. However, models are increasingly being embedded into
system design as a reference. Thus it is useful to consider this element separately. How
can trust be modelled sufficiently to span the space of most potential behaviours to help
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ensure that systems will be trusted when moved into operational environments? Can
this be measured to allow comparison and minimum requirements set?
5. Certification: The certification requirements placed on specific systems will vary de-
pending on domain and national approaches to certification. However, the common ele-
ment in the requirement for certification is that a certified system is deemed as sufficiently
trustworthy for use within its context of certification. Additionally Certification also re-
lies on the predictability of a system. Because the aim of autonomous systems is to deal
effectively with uncertain environments, can they (autonomous systems) be certified with-
out being demonstrated in the environment within which they will adapt new behaviour?
While this work is primarily concerned with those aspects of Trust Modelling and Met-
rics, it is useful to consider this Trust assessment in the wider context of the design process, and
what best practices are available. Design against and compliance with existing standards can
contribute significantly to the demonstrable trustworthiness of any systems design. If a system
has been designed to a Standard then it has known properties that have been accepted as good
practice. However, current standards do not address the issue of the five areas listed above.
There are three main organisations that are developing or have developed assurance
standards for Unmanned Systems in commercial, civil and military applications:
• NATO Standardization Office (NSO) (NSO)
• Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
• American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM)
NATO Standardization Office (NSO) (NSO) Faced with the growing adoption of
similar but disparate UAV systems within NATO territories and coalition nations, STANAG
4586 [67] was promulgated in 2005 and defined a logistic and interoperability framework
to provide commonality in the command and control architecture and implementations of
UAV/Ground station communications.
This included a particularly interesting development in the form of Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) Vehicle Specific Module (VSM) interoperability, whereby existing systems
could be grandfathered into STANAG 4586 compliance by the addition of a VSM to operate
as a protocol translator. This VSM could be mounted on the remote system directly, utilising
a compliant Data Link Interface (DLI), or mounted on the ground-based controller, retaining
the proprietary DLI to the remote system. The standard describes five Level of Interoperabilty
(LOI) for compliant UAV systems, shown in Table 2.9. This structure has been criticised
as being short sighted and at odds with the reality of modern and proposed autonomous
vehicle operations [68], specifically that in modern autonomous systems, there is no such thing
as “direct control” or “Operator-in-the-loop”, especially in the case of Beyond Line of Sight
(BLOS) systems, and that in increasingly autonomous systems, operation is done as Human
Supervisory Control (HSC), or more commonly described as “Operator-on-the-loop”, whereby
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LOI Description
1 Indirect receipt/transmission of UAV related payload data
2 Direct receipt of ISR data where “direct” covers reception
of UAV payload data by the UCS when it has direct
communication with the UAV
3 Control and monitoring of the UAV payload in addition
to direct receipt of ISR/other data
4 Control and monitoring of the UAV, less launch and
recovery
5 Launch and Recovery in addition to LOI 4
Table 2.9: Levels of Interoperability for STANAG 4586 Compliant UCS [67]
the operator interacts with the intermediate autonomous system and that autonomous system
eventually performs that task on the hardware.
Further, the standard predominantly deals with a one-to-one mapping between operators
and nodes, when this is quite against the current state of the art; greater focus is being made
in collective and collaborative assignment and having a single operating agent managing
groups of autonomous nodes in-field, and handing off vehicle management responsibilities to
the individual nodes. This is exemplified in the so-called “Sheepdog” approach, where human
operators exhibit a general external emphasis or control vector on a vast number of autonomous
systems to “Shepard” them rather than individually controlling each entity directly [69, 70].
SAE The AS-4 steering group is responsible for the development and maintenance of the
Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems (JAUS) standards, which provide several service
sets for Inter-System cooperation and interoperability, either in the form of a specified design
language (JSIDL7) or as a direct framework implementation, such as the JAUS Mobility,
Mission Spooling, Environment Sensing, or Manipulator Service Sets8. This provides a
stack-like interoperability model akin to the OSI inter-networking standard, providing logical
connections between common levels across devices regardless of how subordinate layers are
implemented. Importantly, JAUS service models are open-sourced under the BSD-license, and
a development toolkit is available for anyone to develop JAUS-compatible communications
and control protocols [71].
It is also important to note that JAUS is part funded, and heavily utilised by, US Army
and Marine Robotic Systems Joint Project Office (RS-JPO), which manage the development,
testing, and fielding of unmanned (ground) systems for those respective forces [57, 71]. This
includes now legacy M160 mine clearance platform and the highly popular (both with forces
and their in-field operators) iRobot Packbot inspection and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) family of robotic platforms.
7JAUS Service Interface Definition Language
8SAE AS 6009, AS 6062, AS 6060, and AS 6057 respectively
Chapter 2. MANETs and Trust 42
Authorised Client
UUV Comms
(F2594)
UUV Autonomy & Control
(F2541)
UUV Mission
Payload Interface
(WK11283)
UUV Sensor
Data Formats
(F2595)
UUV Sensor
Data Formats
(F2595)
Vehicle Payload
Figure 2.11: ASTM F41 UMVS Architecture (with relevant substandards in
parenthesis)
American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) The ASTM F38 committee
has developed a Line of Sight (LOS), single-asset-single-operator stove-piped framework for
Unmanned Air Systems that is too constrained in scope for applicability to a more hetero-
geneous operating environment [72]. However, the F41 Committee, focused on Unmanned
Maritime Vehicle Systems (UMVSs) has collectively developed a range of interoperable
standards, covering Communications, Autonomy and Control, Sensor Data Formats, and
Mission Payload Interfacing. Of particular interest is the Autonomy and Control standard
which highlighted a requirement on the vehicle system to be able to recognise an authorised
client, be that a human operator or an additional collaborating vehicle [73]. Further, the
standard states that the responsibility of the safety and integrity of any payload remains
with the vehicle. This standard was withdrawn in 2015 due to ASTM regulations requiring
standards to be updated within 8 years of approval, and has no direct replacement within
ASTM, but stands as a useful guiding perspective on autonomy standards within industry.
Legal Considerations in Design Trust
If there is one key feature of the application of robotics and autonomy to the defence field
that separates it from applications in commercial and civil fields, it is the potential direct
impact on life and safety.
The process of some entity, be it human or autonomous, to commit to the decision to fire
any kind of weapon is a critical one, and the criticality of this decision making process weighs
heavily on the development of autonomous weapons systems and platforms [17, 67, 74, 75].
Key challenges to autonomy in this space include accurate friend-or-foe identification, rapid
assessment of incoming threat, and discerning “appropriate levels of force”, all of which are
key parts of international combat doctrine and law [76]. Beyond these ethical and operational
challenges, one key piece of legislation that makes the dissemination of fire control to au-
tonomous weapons systems particularly challenging; under the 1907 Hague Conventions [77],
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lawful combat requires any combatant “to be commanded by a person.”, and in particular,
The Martens Clause of that convention (originally introduced in the earlier 1899 convention)
specifically demands the application of “the principle of humanity” in combat [78]. The
problem presented by these principles has already been briefly introduced in paragraph 2.4.5,
in that modern remote operation systems perform with the operator “on-the-loop” for the
majority of time, with on-board autonomy taking over “simple” on-board processes such as
local navigation, collision avoidance, positioning etc.
Once this “on-the-loop” platform is in theatre, direct control must be assumed before any
fire-orders are given, otherwise commanders would be in direct breach of the above conventions.
Whether such breaches have already occurred is outside the scope of this work, and as discussed
in Section 1.2, this work is primarily concerned with actions that involve no fire control
what so ever. However, there is one potentially relevant area of application to which these
doctrines may arguably apply. As will be discussed in subsubsection 3.1.1, a significant area of
application of UAN autonomy is in EOD as part of MCM operations, i.e. mine-clearance with
explosive devices. Current operational doctrine as well as currently in-testing systems utilise
autonomous survey and Mine Like Object (MLO) localisation, and then this information is
used to send in a human diving team to perform clearance, placing them at extreme risk.
However, none of the above applies to this work and is presented for context.
Summary of Design Trust
The implications of trust in autonomy beyond securing communications and data are an
area in need of further research. Of particular concern is the verification of autonomous
behaviours and fail-safe behaviour [79]. The addition of increased on-board autonomy in
all unmanned systems, properly understood and verified, would greatly improve this future
capability, similar to recent developments in the UMVS arena [68].
There are opportunities for increased decentralisation and in-field collaboration [80], how-
ever, difficulties in “Trust” between human operators and autonomous systems have already
been clearly identified [81],and this has been demonstrated by the recent decision by the
German government to renege on its e500M investment in the Euro Hawk programme, due
to concerns about civil certification of the on-board autonomy [82]. In order for these new
distributed structures to be relied upon to provide operational performance, reliability and
to maintain in-field situational awareness, vulnerabilities to disruption, interruption, and
subversion need to be understood and minimised.
Trust in Autonomous MANETs
Trust Model Design Considerations
From the previous sections, Trust can be redefined as “the level of confidence one agent
has in another to perform a given action on request or in a certain context”. Trust in the
autonomous or semi-autonomous realm is the ability of a system to establish and maintain
this level of confidence in itself or another systems’ operations.
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There are five topics that are important to address in any MANETs trust model [83]:
• The trust model should be without infrastructure. Because the network routing
infrastructure is formed in an ad-hoc fashion, the trust management can not depend
on, e.g., a Trusted Third Party (TTP). There is no PKI, where some central nodes
monitor the network, and publish illegal nodes periodically. In a MANET, there are no
certification authorities (CA) or registration authorities (RA) with elevated privileges etc.
• The trust model should be anonymous because of the anonymity of mobile nodes in
MANETs.
• The trust model should be robust. That is, it can be robust to all kinds of unfriendly
attacks and the network itself should not be susceptible to attacks by unfriendly nodes.
Moreover, in the presence of malicious nodes, they may attempt to subvert the model
in order to get an unfairly good trust value.
• The trust model should have minimal control overhead in accordance with computation,
storage, and complexity.
• The trust model should be self-organized. MANETs are characterized to have dynamic,
random, rapidly changing and multi-hop topologies composed of variably bandwidth-
constrained links
Vulnerabilities of MANETs
The openness of the MANET architecture leaves it inherently vulnerable to security threats.
Mitigation protocols must be built on top of this architecture to maintain security and reliabil-
ity in the face of open-access threats (whether these threats be directed attacks, uncooperative
or selfish operation, or indeed malfunctioning/failing nodes). It is worthwhile to briefly
summarise the factors of MANET architecture that make it vulnerable to different threat
vectors, establish the inter-node threat surface within an operating MANET.
Exposed Threat Surfaces
This section based on a summary of Sen et al. [84] and other sources directly cited
Wireless Links - The use of wireless interfaces expose such networks to eavesdropping and
active interference, with no physical access required. These links normally have significant
channel access and bandwidth constraints compared to closed-wired networks. This presents
outside threats with the ability to eavesdrop or actively interfere with the operation of the
network, leading to data security risk and risk of DoS-style attacks.
Mobility and Dynamic Topology - Nodes joining/leaving/re-joining the network and
moving around the environment leads to significant topology and access control changes,
making it difficult to differentiate between malicious and normal behaviour. Additionally
this assumption of node mobility and “temporary disconnection” presents opportunities to
outside attackers to physically compromise, capture or replicate nodes.
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Table 2.10: Selected Attacks on the Protocol Stack extended from Sen et al. [84]
Layer Attacks
Application Data Corruption, Malware, Virii and Worms
Transport SYN Flooding, Session Hijacking
Network “HELLO” Flood, (Black/Worm/Sink)hole, Sybil,
Replay, Fishing, Resource-Consumption
Data Link Monitoring, Traffic Analysis
Physical Eavesdropping, Active Interference
Table 2.11: Threat Actor Classification from Gagandeep and Kumar [86]
Emission Location Quantity Target Rationality Mobility
Active Insider Individual Confidentiality Rational Static
Passive Outsider Collaborating Integrity Irrational Mobile
Fairness
Authorisation
DoS
Assumption of Cooperation - MANET routing is predicated on the assumed “fairness” of
nodes both in their routing operation and their “advertisement” of routing capability, leading
to opportunities to disrupt the optimal operation of the network [85].
Resource Constraint - In MANETs, more than in static wired networks, secondary re-
sources such as power, and tertiary resources such as locomotion, on-board processing and
data storage capabilities present additional opportunities for selfish or malicious threat that
simultaneously constrain the ability of nodes to mitigate threat (i.e. limited processing power
restricting the use of advanced cryptographic protocols, power/locomotion constraints limiting
the available operational time to “learn” about attack characteristics, etc.)
Insecure/Fuzzy Operational Boundary - With no hard boundary between “in network”
and “out of network”, MANET security must combat both internal and external threats.
Threat Mitigation Strategies
Many classical mitigation strategies focus on selfishness rather than malicious attack, usually
including some form of misbehaviour-induced backoff policy to passively punish misbe-
haviour [87, 88]. On the other hand, many strategies are usually based on some derivative
form of hard-line network Intrusion Detection System (IDS) frameworks, where such systems
passively observe a network for misbehaviour and notify an operator when a threat is detected.
Zhang et al. [89] first proposed a general IDS framework for MANETs; leveraging the
distributed and cooperative predicates of the architecture, introducing both per-node and
cooperative IDS sub-modules such that nodes work independently and cooperatively to identify
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certain misbehaviours, specifically targeting routing attacks and incongruities. Extensions to
this framework were also proposed to have a range of these modules operate at each layer of the
protocol stack to improve detection response and range [90] However it is commonly accepted
that these frameworks had significant deficiencies in terms of power and communications
overheads [84, 91]. One interesting aspect to highlight about Zhang et al. [89] is that while
information about the physical mobility was assessed in the detection of misbehaviours in the
context of routing changes, no collective cross-comparison was used, and rather focused on a
per-node relative distance/velocity estimation to identify anomalous routing table updates.
Trust Management Frameworks
Distributed trust management frameworks for MANETs aim to detect, identify, and mitigate
the impacts of malicious or selfish actors by generating, distributing and integrating per-node
assessments and opinions to collectively self-police behaviour. From the settled upon definition
of trust (From Subsection 2.5.1), these opinions are attempting to model the confidence of
success in a particular actor for a particular future action.
This predictive behaviour attempts to solve four important problems (paraphrased
from [44]):
• Decision support - For example; making informed routing table decisions based on past
successes/failures.
• Adaptability - Ongoing prediction of the networks future trust states directly determines
the risk faced by the network. Internalised knowledge of the expected risk can aid in
selecting appropriate measures/ countermeasures such as automatically varying the
level of authentication required for network activities.
• Misbehaviour Detection - Trust evaluation leads to a the natural policy that highly
variable or low-trust nodes within a network should be subject to higher scrutiny;
triggering this response indicates that a node is damaged or misbehaving.
• Abstraction of Collective security characteristics - Through per-node trust evaluation,
the generalised trustworthiness of a set or subset of nodes can be derived to encapsulate
the “health” of the network as a whole.
Various models and algorithms for describing trust and developing trust management in
distributed systems, Peer to Peer (P2P) communities or wireless networks have been considered.
Taking some examples;
• Hermes Trust Establishment Framework uses a Bayesian Beta function to model per-
link PLR over time, combining “Trust” and “Confidence of Assessment” into a single
value [92].
• Objective Trust Management Framework (OTMF) takes a Bayesian approach and in-
troduces the idea of applying a Beta function to changes in the per-link PLR over time,
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combining “Trust” and “Confidence of Assessment” into a single value [93]. OTMF
however does not appropriately combat multi-node-collusion in the network [94].
• Trust-based Secure Routing demonstrated an extension to DSR, incorporating a Hidden
Markov Model of the wider ad-hoc network, reducing the efficacy of Byzantine attacks,
particularly black-hole attacks but is limited by focusing on single metric observation
(PLR) [94, 95].
• Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Adhoc NeTworks (CONFIDANT); pre-
sented an approach using a probabilistic estimation of normal observations, similar to
OTMF. Also introduced a greedy topology weighting scheme that internally weighted
incoming trust assessments based on historical experience of the reporter [9].
• Fuzzy Trust-Based Filtering presents a method using Fuzzy Inference to cope with
imperfect or malicious recommendation based on a probabilistic estimation of trust-
worthiness using conditional similarity to classify performance using overlapping Fuzzy
Set Membership functions to collaboratively filter reputations across a network [96].
• Multi-parameter Trust Framework for MANETs (MTFM) uses a number of communica-
tions metrics together for form a vector of trust, apply grey information theory to allow
a system to detect and identify the tactics being used to undermine or subvert trust [18].
Analytical Trust vs. Game Theoretic/Bio-inspired approaches
While a quantitative, observation driven and analytical approach to Trust has been used in
this work, this is not the only potential approach. Two alternative schools of thought are
those based on Game Theory [97–100], and those based on emergent behaviour models taken
from the world of biology, so called Bio-Inspired approaches [101, 102].
In many cases, both of these approaches arrive at similar styles of implementation
and operation in so far as they generally rely on online strategy adaptation and run-time
distributed meta-programming optimisations such as Genetic Algorithms (GA)9. These ap-
proaches have three fundamental drawbacks in the context of optimising for high levels of
automation; extremely complex initialisation assumptions (particularly in GA where the
construction and “breeding” of strategies is extremely prone to subjective projection by
the implementers [103]), sensitivity to local minima and saddle points in high-dimensional
datasets10, and non-deterministic operation in changing environments / applications.
Given that in the given context (Section 1.2), attacks on trust can be expected to be
rare in operation, focus should be generating near-static trust assessment strategies that can
quickly identify these attacks, rather than continuously optimising against a rare event. In
9The genetic algorithm is a method for solving both constrained and unconstrained optimization problems
that is based on natural selection, the process that drives biological evolution. The genetic algorithm repeatedly
modifies a population of individual solutions by combining or “breeding” solutions that perform well
10Some theoretical resolutions to this second option have been proposed to the general problem in Deep
Learning, but this has thus far not been applied in either the MANET sphere or the general Trust management
domain [104]
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addition, a constrained, analytical approach allows the separation of the particular task or
level of automation of nodes, and focuses solely on the potential impacts of untrustworthy
behaviour, which is particularly important while increasing levels of automation are not totally
“socially trusted” in many domains yet due to their difficulty in formal validation [17]. In
effect, adding these highly dynamic Trust approaches atop high levels of operational autonomy
greatly explodes the challenge in validating that operational autonomy, by coupling two
potentially non-deterministic systems together.
Selected Single Metric Trust Frameworks
The Hermes trust establishment framework [92] uses Bayesian reasoning to generate a posterior
distribution function of “belief”, or trust, given a sequence of observations of that behaviour,
p(B|O)Equ. 2.11.
p(B|O)= p(O|B)×p(B)
ρ
(2.11)
Where p(B) is the prior probability density function for the expected normal behaviour, and
ρ is a normalising factor.
Due to it’s flexibility and simplicity, Hermes assumes that p(B) is a Beta function Equ. 2.12,
and therefore the evaluation of this trust assessment is based around the expectation value of
the distribution Equ. 2.14 where α and β represent the number of successful and unsuccessful
observed actions respectively for a particular node i, i.e. forwarded packets.
beta(p|αi,βi)= Γ(αi+βi)
Γ(αi)Γ(βi)
pαi−1 (2.12)
E(p)=
αi
αi+βi
(2.13)
where 0≤p≤1;αi,βi>0and αi+βi=total observed actions by i
A secondary measurement of the confidence factor of the trust assessment t is generated
as Equ. 2.15 and these measurements are combined to form a “trustworthiness” value T in
Equ. 2.16.
ti→E[beta(p|α,β)]= αi
αi+βi
(2.14)
ci=1−
√
12αiβi
(αi+βi)2(αi+βi+1)
(2.15)
Ti=1−
√
(ti−1)2
x2
+ (ci−1)
2
y2√
1
x2
+ 1
y2
(2.16)
In Equ. 2.16, x and y are constants to weight the two-dimensional polar mapping of trust
and confidence assessments (ti,ci) From Zouridaki et al. [92] these are set to x=
√
2,y=
√
9,
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generating an elliptical mapping f(t,c) 7→ T , effectively weighting the level of confidence
heavier than the observed trust behaviour.
Upon this per-node assessment methodology, OTMF overlays an observation distribution
protocol so as to make the measurements αi and βi representative of the direct and 1-hop
networks observations of the target node i, as well as expiring old observations from assessment
and eliminating observations from “untrustworthy” nodes.
To date this work has been mostly limited to terrestrial, RF based networks. There
are many situations where the observed metrics will include significant noise and occur at
irregular, sparse, intervals. Conventional approaches such as probabilistic estimation do not
produce trust values that reflect the underlying reality and context of the metrics available,
as they require a-priori assumption that the trust value under exploration has an expected
distribution, that that distribution is mono-modal, and that the input metrics are binary.
In scenarios with variable, sparse, noisy metrics, estimating the distribution is difficult to
accomplish a-priori. These single metric TMFs provide malicious actors with a significant
advantage if their activity is undetectable by that one assessed metric, especially if the attacker
is aware of the observed metric in advance.
The objective of operating a TMF is to increase the confidence in, and efficiency of, a
system by reducing the amount of undetectable negative operations an attacker can perform.
In the case where the attacker can subvert the TMF, the metric under assessment by that TMF
does not cover the threat mounted by the attacker. In turn, this causes a super-linearly negative
effect in the efficiency of the network as the TMF is assumed to have reduced the possible set
of attacks when in fact it has only made it more advantageous to attack a different aspect of
the networks operation. An example of such a behaviour would be the case in a TMF focused
on PLR where an attacker selectively delays packets going through it, reducing the overall
throughput of one or more network routes. Such behaviour would not be detected by the TMF.
Multi-Metric Trust Frameworks
Given the potential incentives to a selfish attacker and potential threats to trust and fairness
in sparse, noisy, and constrained environments, single metric trusts discussed above do not
suitably cover the exposed threat surface.
A multi-metric approach may be more appropriate to capture and monitor the realities
of harsh and sparse communications environments.
MTFM [18] uses Grey Theory (see Appendix B) to perform cohort based normalization
of metrics at runtime, providing a “grey relational grade” of trust compared to other ob-
served nodes in that interval for individual metrics, while maintaining the ability to reduce
trust values down to a stable assessment range for decision support without requiring every
environment entered into to be characterised. This presents a stark difference between the
Grey and Probabilistic approaches. Grey assessments are relative in both fairly and unfairly
operating networks. All nodes will receive mid-range trust assessments if there are no malicious
actors as there is nothing “bad” to compare against, and variations in assessment will be
primarily driven by topological and environmental factors. Guo et al. [18] demonstrated the
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ability of Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) to normalise and combine disparate traits of a
communications link such as instantaneous throughput/load, received signal strength, etc.
into a Grey Relational Coefficient (GRC), or a “trust vector” in this instance.
The grey relational vector is given as
θtk,j=
mink|atk,j−gtj|+ρmaxk|atk,j−gtj|
|atk,j−gtj|+ρmaxk|atk,j−gtj|
(2.17)
φtk,j=
mink|atk,j−btj|+ρmaxk|atk,j−btj|
|atk,j−btj|+ρmaxk|atk,j−btj|
where atk,j is the value of an observed metric xj for a given node k at time t, ρ is a distin-
guishing coefficient set to 0.5, g and b are respectively the “good” and “bad” reference metric
sequences from {atk,jk=1,2...K}, i.e. gj=maxk(atk,j), bj=mink(atk,j) (where each metric is
selected to be monotonically positive for trust assessment, e.g. higher throughput is presumed
to be always better).
Weighting can be applied before generating a scalar value Equ. 2.18 allowing the detection
and classification of misbehaviours.
[θtk,φ
t
k]=
 M∑
j=0
hjθ
t
k,j,
M∑
j=0
hjφ
t
k,j
 (2.18)
Where H= [h0...hM ] is a metric weighting vector such that
∑
hj = 1, and in un-weighted
case, H=[ 1M ,
1
M ...
1
M ]. θ and φ are then scaled to [0,1] using the mapping y=1.5x−0.5. To
minimise the uncertainties of belonging to either best (g) or worst (b) sequences in Equ. 2.17
the [θ,φ] values are reduced into a scalar trust value using Equ. 2.19 from [105].
T tk=
(
1+
(φtk)
2
(θtk)
2
)−1
(2.19)
MTFM combines this GRA with a topology-aware weighting scheme Equ. 2.20 and a
fuzzy whitenization model Equ. 2.21. This whitenization model allows the previously grey
value to be practically computed on and used to generate the final trust assessment, through
fuzzy sequence classification, functionally treating each observation differently if it appear to
be Trusted, Untrusted or Ignorant (Fig. 2.12) [106]. See Appendix B for a wider discussion
of this topic and the operation of Grey numbers.
There are three classes of topological trust relationship used; Direct, Recommendation,
and Indirect, as discussed in Subsection 2.3.3. Where an observing node ni assesses the trust
of another target node, nj; the Direct relationship is ni’s own observations nj’s behaviour.
In the Recommendation case, a node nk which shares Direct relationships with both ni and
nj, gives its assessment of nj to ni. In the Indirect case, similar to the Recommendation case,
the recommender nk does not have a direct link with the observer ni but nk has a Direct
link with the target node, nj. These relationships give node sets, NR and NI containing the
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Figure 2.12: Centre-Point Triangular Whitenization used in MTFM Equ. 2.21
nodes that have recommendation or indirect, relationships to the observing node respectively.
TMTFMi,j =
1
2
·max
s
{fs(Ti,j)}Ti,j (2.20)
+
1
2
2|NR|
2|NR|+|NI|
∑
n∈NR
max
s
{fs(Ti,n)}Ti,n
+
1
2
|NI|
2|NR|+|NI|
∑
n∈NI
max
s
{fs(Ti,n)}Ti,n
Where Ti,n is the subjective trust assessment of ni by nn, and fs=[f1,f2,f3] given as:
f1(x)=−x+1
f2(x)=
2x if x≤0.5−2x+2 if x>0.5 (2.21)
f3(x)=x
In the case of the terrestrial communications network used in [18], the observed metric
set X=x1,...,xM representing the measurements taken by each node of its neighbours at least
interval, is defined as X=[packet loss rate, signal strength, data rate, delay, throughput].
Guo et al. [18] demonstrated that when compared against OTMF and Hermes trust
assessment, MTFM provided increased variation in trust assessment over time, providing
more information about the nodes’ behaviours than packet delivery probability alone can in
the terrestrial RF 802.11 based experimental network used.
Conclusion
Key Outcomes:
• Definition of Trust (Subsection 2.5.1)
• Understanding of Levels and Constraints of Autonomy (Section 2.4)
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• Recognition of the current lack of specification and validation afforded to autonomous
systems (Subsection 2.4.5)
• Review of potential threats against MANETs (Subsection 2.5.2)
• Review of current TMFs applied to the terrestrial domain (Subsection 2.5.3)
In this chapter, MANET implementations, topologies, and applications have been explored.
Further, the concept of a “Trusting” network has been explored, both on a abstract theoretical
basis, and in the context of a wider development and operational pipeline involving autonomous
actors, including a review of current Trust Management Frameworks (TMFs). These TMFs
have several aspects that are dependant on assumptions of sufficient available resources and con-
nectivity, that they may not behave as efficiently as would be hoped in constrained or delayful
networks, particularly in cases where metric assessment data may be extremely sparse or noisy.
While many aspects of this Trust have been discussed, we are primarily concerned with
this problem of assessment of trust through experiential observation of node behaviours in
a practical runtime environment, namely the underwater acoustic environment. In the next
chapter, the marine communications environment will be studied, as will the current state of
the art in the use of autonomy in defence related maritime applications, and briefly discussing
the context of those operations.
Chapter 3
Maritime
Communications and Operations
Marine Operations, Payloads, Technologies, and Durations
The use and applications of AUVs has undergone a great expansion in recent years [107].
The primary application for AUVs has long been identified as the environmental monitoring
of marine areas, and are actively being researched by a great range of industrial and defence
sector applications, with secondary applications in the physical sciences and environmental
research, which are summarised below [16, 108].
AUV operations and deployments
Hydrographic Survey
The use of AUVs in the place of manned-surface platforms or tethered undersea platforms
enables greatly increased spatial and temporal sampling. Importantly, the separation of AUVs
from the noisy sea surface enables much more efficient survey operations. This is particularly
important when comparing to classical tow-line based measurements; where the mobility of
the AUVs enables for much tighter-turning survey patterns or operation in inaccessible or
hard-to-reach locations such as polar survey [109].
Another significant factor is cost; the daily cost of operating a manned vessel can be
considerably higher than the costs of deploying, operating and recovering one or more AUVs
with equivalent capabilities [2]. Additionally, the use of low-power “glider” AUVs has lowered
the barrier to entry for extended mission types, such as persistent environmental survey, or
open-ocean operations. Depth-hardened AUVs have also opened up the deepest parts of the
oceans to exploration, with on-board autonomy, imagery and Simultaneous Location and
Mapping (SLAM) techniques allowing deep-dwelling survey AUVs to react to bottom-surface
features without the need for a tight craft-to-surface control loop. The natural extension
of these kind of applications is the use of AUVs on ice-covered planets such as Europa,
where three-dimensional, autonomous navigation without an on-the-loop controller is vital
for mission resource efficiency and success.
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Hull and Infrastructure Inspection
Ongoing concerns regarding the security, safety and legality of international shipping has driven
the application of AUVs to the area of near-surface hull and infrastructure inspections, looking
for damage as well as devices such as limpet mines and other contraband. This use case puts
a range of unique pressures on the AUV system; requiring highly accurate three-dimensional
localisation and path-planning to clearly image the contours of a hull [2]. Similarly, with the
increasing use and criticality of intercontinental undersea optical fibre connections, using AUVs
for both the laying of and inspection of these cables is an exciting area of work [110, 111].
Marine Petrochemical/Mineralogy
Oil and Gas industry requirements for high quality, low altitude bathymetry of seabed
structures for infrastructure development (pipelines/drill platforms etc.) as well as monitoring
of those structures over time (inspection etc.) is another significant application area, and a
major driver of research investment. As in Hydrography, the mobility of AUVs is the biggest
single advantage over classical platforms [112]. Additionally, recent advances in Synthetic
Aperture Sonar (SAS) have provided invaluable sub-surface profile data over much wider
areas for multi-spectral mineralogical analysis than previous sonar profilers [113].
Military
MCM Operations benefit greatly from, and significantly drive, AUV development; the ability
to rapidly explore and covertly survey a potentially dangerous area without risking a human
operator is a major benefit both in Dedicated MCM (e.g. Large Area Hunting/ EOD
Clearance) and in Organic MCM for Expeditionary Forces as well as general applications
in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Rapid Environment Assessment (REA), Navigational
Aid and Force projection, This benefit applies to protection as well as incursion; the ability
to rapidly deploy persistent survey of a valuable area such as a forward-operating harbour
is increasingly essential, and as AUV technology, autonomy and security practices develop,
this use is increasing. This Port Protection capability is particularly complex; teams of AUVs
are expected to repeatedly survey an area and remain densely-connected enough to maintain
end-to-end communications with all other nodes, in the face of an environment that is possibly
not well surveyed initially, and includes dynamically moving obstacles (i.e. ships). As discussed
in Section 1.2, this Port Protection scenario is used as a baseline for our simulation context.
Localisation Technologies
Given the subsurface nature of most AUV operations, terrestrial localisation techniques such
as GPS are unavailable (below ≈20cm depth). However, a range of alternative techniques are
used to maintain spacial awareness to a high degree of accuracy in the underwater environment.
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Long baseline (LBL)
Long-baseline localisation systems use a series of static surface/cable networked acoustic
transponders to provide coordinated beacons and (usually) GPS-backed relative location
information to local subsurface users. Such systems can be accurate to less that 0.1m or better
in ideal deployments and are regularly used in controlled autonomous survey environments
such as harbour patrol operations where the deployment area is bounded. However, the initial
set-up and deployment required in advance of any AUV operation makes LBL difficult to
utilise in unbounded or contended areas. LBL systems can also be deployed on mobile surface
platforms in the area (ships or buoys for example), but these applications put significant
computational pressure on the end-point AUV and have greatly reduced accuracy compared
to ideal deployments [114].
Doppler Velocity Log (DVL)
Doppler Velocity Logging involves the emission of directed acoustic “pings” that reflect off sea
bed/surface interfaces that, when received back on the craft with multi-beam phased array
acoustic transducers can measure both the absolute depth/altitude (z-axis) of the craft and
through directional Doppler shifting, the relative (xy-translative) motion of the craft since
the ping. While classical DVL was highly sensitive to shifting currents in the water column,
advances in the development of Acoustic Doppler Current Profiling has turned that situation
on its head, enabling the compensation-for and measurement-of water currents down to the
sub-meter level [115].
Inertial Navigation System (INS)
Inertial navigation systems use gyroscopic procession to observe the relative acceleration of
a mobile platform. This reference-relative monitoring is particularly useful in the underwater
environment, as it detects the motion of AUVs as they are carried by the water itself. Bias
Drift is a significant problem for INSs operating over longer (hundreds of metres) distances,
as they usually have some minimal amount of directional bias, that incurs a cumulative effect
over time without assistance. Several sensor synthesis processes have been demonstrated
which combine information from INS along with DVL data to improve localisation into the
sub-decimeter level [116–118].
SLAM
Simultaneous Location and Mapping is the process of iteratively developing a feature-based
model of an environment, and to use the relative movement within that modelled environment
to obtain estimates of absolute positioning. SLAM has been most well developed in the
contexts of either visual-based inspection using cameras, or LIDAR-style distance triangula-
tion, however the same principles have been successfully applied using marine sonar readings,
providing sub-meter accuracy, real-time, feature-relative localisation information that is (for
the most part) environmentally agnostic [119].
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In summary, current technology reliably enables AUVs to localise to a sub-metre accuracy
in most areas of application.
Example Maritime Autonomous Systems, Platforms and Operations
Kongsburg REMUS/HUGIN ranges
The REMUS range of AUV platforms have been very popular in research and UAN application
prototypes due to their relatively small size and high level of reconfigurability. The basic
configurations of the REMUS 100 configuration consist of a single pressure vessel, 0.2m in
diameter and 1.6m long, weighting in at 37kg, rated to operational depths of 150m. This
package includes DVL, Conductivity, Temperature and Depth of ocean (CTD), Underwater
Videography, LBL and on-board computing power suitable for low LOA independence, with
on-board Li-on battery packs rated to provide up to 10-hours of cruising operational endurance.
These capabilities can be extended through the addition of further modular extensions through
the REMUS range, such as the REMUS 600, rated for up to 600m depth and a cruising
endurance of 45 hours, or the REMUS 6000, rated for up to 6km depth with 22 hours duration.
The HUGIN 1000 is a high-resolution extension to the REMUS range, characterised
by it’s default payload of a High Definition SAS, co-designed with the Norwegian Defence
Research Establishment (FFI) for MCM operations, with a dynamic depth rating up to 3km
and 24 hour cruising endurance (17 hours with continuous SAS engagement)
The Konsburg range also include range specific semi-automated Launch And Recovery
System (LARS)
Figure 3.1: HUGIN AUV mounted on LARS
NOC Autosub
Developed under the UK’s National Oceanography Centres Marine Autonomous and Robotic
Systems group, the Autosub family of AUVs is similar in many ways to the REMUS deployment
profile; with long range and deep-ocean variants, operating at depths up to 600 km for up
to 36 hours (however, this configuration leaves it with a cruising speed of 0.4 ms−1)
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Figure 3.2: NOC Autosub 3 being deployed off the Pine Island Glacier
University of Washington SeaGlider
Taking a fundamentally different approach to underwater mobility for targeting depth-variant
environmental studies, the SeaGlider eschews classical propulsion to use it’s downward-facing
structure and fins to use it’s weight/buoyancy to propel itself. At 1.8 m long and weighing
only 52 kg, this highly portable AUV can cover ranges up to 4600 km with 650 1 km dive
segments at a rate of 0.25 ms−1.
Figure 3.3: ”Flight path” of the UW SeaGlider
USN Sea Hunter
The Sea Hunter is an autonomous unmanned surface vehicle (USV) launched in 2016 and
is undergoing seatrials as part of the DARPA Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail
Unmanned Vessel program, with a top speed of 50 kmh−1, weighing 122 t. While unarmed
during its sea trials, the Sea Hunter will be armed and used for ASW and MCM duties,
operating at a tiny fraction of the standard operating costs of a littoral destroyer.
Chapter 3. Maritime Communications and Operations 58
Figure 3.4: Initially manned deployment of the unmanned Sea Hunter. U.S. Navy
photo by John F. Williams/Released
Need for Trust in Maritime Networks
Given the breadth of the threat space in MANETs, many strategies for mitigating these
risks have been proposed in a matrix-basis; i.e. you can’t cover all eventualities with one
tool. Table 3.1 summaries some of these general strategies or “solutions” for range of threats
identified specifically in the context of the deployment of MANETs in a tactical/defence
context, originally based on Kidston et al. [120] but with some contextual alterations with
modifications discussed below.
In this context of this table, Vulnerability is an assessment of how available a particular
threat is to a generic attacker, Impact is an assessment of the in-system affects of a successful
attack, and Risk is a qualitative assessment of the likelihood of exploitation of an attack.
Kidston et al. [120] originally lowered the assessment of vulnerability of Eavesdropping to
“Low”, citing the tactical use of non-standard Medium Access Control (MAC) as a barrier
to attack, however considering the increasing commoditisation of tactical hardware across
the world, and increasing application of Consumer Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware, this is
no longer a fair assessment. Similarly, the assessment that the Risk of Data Corruption is
low is arguable on the basis of simplistic spread spectrum jamming but this assessment is
unchanged. Finally, Kidston et al. [120] did not take into account the presence of weapons,
EOD devices or other actuation methods with AUVs as the endpoint.
Resource Depletion, or DoS has a very wide ranging definition, from network-level attacks
to saturate a communications channel or the computing resources of routing nodes, or the
exploitation of a power-control loop to induce a node to waste energy with overly-high-powered
communications, to the intentional geographic misleading of nodes to induce a similar power-
drain on locomotive systems, through tactics such as location spoofing or GPS denial [126].
From Table 3.1, it is assessed that the highest overall threats are those of Resource
Depletion and Masquerading. Within this threat context, the general optimisation of any
TMF would be to prefer high but fair overall network throughput, while minimising delay,
PLR, and power usage.
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Table 3.1: Risks and Threat Mitigation Strategies for MANETs, extended
from Kidston et al. [120]
Threat Vulnerability Impact Risk Mitigation
Resource Depletion
/ DoS
Low-High High Low-High Layer Specific
Mechanisms [121, 122]
Eavesdropping Medium High Low Cryptography [123]
Masquerade Low Very High Medium Trust Systems
and Cryptography [124]
Data Corruption Low High Low Cryptography
Traffic Analysis High Low Medium Obfuscation [125]
Misfire/Misactuation Low Very High High Man-in-the-loop
firing [17]
Summary
As Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) platforms become more capable and economical,
they are being used in many applications requiring trust. These applications are using the
collective behaviour of teams or fleets of these AUVs to accomplish tasks [127], and this
behaviour is increasingly being distributed across a network rather than being under direct,
centralised, coordination [128]. With this use being increasingly isolated from stable commu-
nications networks, the establishment of trust between nodes is essential for the reliability
and stability of such teams.
The use of Trust methods developed in the terrestrial MANET space will be re-appraised
in Chapter 4 for application within the challenging underwater communications channel. That
channel, and the appropriate modelling of it, is explored in the next section.
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Maritime Communications Environment
The key challenges of underwater acoustic communications are centred around the impact
of slow and differential propagation of energy (RF, Optical, Acoustic) through water, and
it’s interfaces with the seabed / air. The resultant challenges include; long delays due
to propagation, significant inter-symbol interference and Doppler spreading, fast and slow
fading due to environmental effects (aquatic flora/fauna; surface weather), carrier-frequency
dependent signal attenuation, multipath caused by the medium interfaces at the surface and
seabed, variations in propagation speed due to depth dependant effects (salinity, temperature,
pressure, gaseous concentrations and bubbling), and subsequent refractive spreading and
lensing due to that same propagation variation [129].
In order to satisfy PSQ. 1, this complex channel must be explored and key features of it
extracted and modelled for simulation and testing of the assumption that TMFs can operate
at all within UANs.
Unless otherwise cited, formula and values for fundamental acoustic properties and models
used in this section are taken from Urick [130]
Mechanics of Acoustic Transmission
Unlike in RF energy transfer (where photons move through space to transmit energy from one
place to another), acoustic waves are the result of mechanical perturbation of a medium where
compressions and rarefactions pass energy across a medium1. These “compression waves”
propagate away from its source, and the rate of this propagation is the sound speed, velocity
or c, measured in ms−1. This is not to be confused with the fluid velocity corresponding to
the instantaneous motion of particles in the medium.
Hydrophones, like their more common microphone equivalent in air, are fundamentally
pressure sensors. Acoustic pressure is usually measured in Pascals (Pa/µPa). In the un-
derwater environment, the dynamic range (difference between instantaneous high and low
pressure values) may be extremely high, often more than 10 orders of magnitude higher. As
such, logarithmic notation is justified.
Useful acoustic signals are generally maintained vibrations rather than instantaneous
pulses. They are characterised by their frequency f expressed in Hertz (Hz) or by their
Period (T) in seconds. In commonly used underwater acoustics, used frequencies range from
≈10Hz−100kHz depending on application [131].
As with all waves, the relationship between frequency, period and the wavelength is given
as in Equ. 3.1 where c is the propagation speed in a given medium. As such the generally
used upper and lower bounds of wavelength in most applications is from 1.5m@10Hz to
0.015m@100kHz.
λ=cT=
c
f
(3.1)
1In essence, phased volumes of the medium (water) are put under instantaneous directed pressure, with
the molecules of the medium moving a small distance away from the source of the compression wave. These
in turn pressurise neighbouring molecules, continuing propagation forward and outward.
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Table 3.2: Summary of physical factors differentiating terrestrial and acoustic channel
constraints
Variable Air Water
Density 1.3kgm−3 ≈1027kgm−3±0.5%
Speed of Sound 340ms−1 ≈1500ms−1±5%
Speed of Light 2.99×108ms−1 2.249×108ms−1
This wide range of frequencies and wavelengths allow for a diverse set of constraining
factors; (Paraphrased from Lurton [132]).
• Attenuation in water; limiting the maximum usable range, which increases very rapidly
with frequency
• Dimensions of sound source; which must be decreased as f increases for a given
transmission power
• Spatial Selectivity of sources and receivers as f increases, due to similarly increasing
directivity of energy propagation.
• Acoustic Response of target surfaces (analogous to receiver gain in RF networks).
Velocity and density
Air has a baseline density of approximately 1.3kgm−3, and the speed of sound is typically
static around 340ms−1. In sea water, acoustic wave velocity is close to c=1500ms−1 (gen-
erally between 1450to1550ms−1 depending on temperature, pressure, salinity etc.). Similarly
variable is sea water density, which is nominally ρ=1027kgm−3 [133].
While the sea/air surface is (ideally) a simple refractive interface, the interface between open
seawater and marine sediment is graduated, with density ranging between 1200to2000kgm−3.
This results in refractive and reflective velocities in the sediment interface ranging from
1500to2000ms−1 [132]. Additionally, depending on the relative buoyancy of different compo-
nents of sediment in the water column, particularly fauna and biological/industrial sewage,
there can be stratified sedimentary layers beyond the surface of the seabed, particularly in
littoral and coastal shallow waters, that further complicate the characterisation of the density,
and thus speed of sound, over the water column.
For comparison, the speed of light in air/water is 2.99×108ms−1 and 2.249×108ms−1
respectively.
Mackenzie [134] proposed a more accurate model of acoustic velocity incorporating archival
data from 15 worldwide sites that takes Temperature, Salinity and Depth into consideration.
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(a) Surface Temperature
(b) Surface Salinity
Figure 3.5: Global Variations in selected Speed of Sound variance factors
c=1448.96+4.591T−5.304×10−2T 2+2.374×10−4T 3
+1.340(S−35)+1.630×10−2D+1.675×10−7D2 (3.2)
−1.025×10−2T(S−25)−7.139×10−13TD3
Where T is the temperature in Celsius, S the salinity in parts per thousand, and D is
the depth below the surface in meters.
These are “ideal” assessments, and the parameters of this model are massively varied both
across individual water columns, and indeed across bodies of water, across the world. National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) regularly publish their World Ocean
Atlas (WOA) [135, 136] that includes these variables and many more, sampled across the
world and at a range of depths. Outputs from these surveys are shown for example in Fig. 3.5.
Variability in Temperature across the globe is something that we are acutely aware of, but
the significant regional variations, such as in the Sea of Japan, the US Eastern Seaboard, and
between the Mediterranean and Black Seas (Fig. 3.5a). Global surface salinity appears almost
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Figure 3.6: Depth Variations in selected Speed of Sound variance factors
uniform in comparison (Fig. 3.5b). However, a few global variants stand out, both due to
the extremity of their transition in relatively small areas, and the general research / defence
context of those areas. For example the differential between the geographically proximate and
politically contentious Black, Caspian, and Mediterranean Seas, as well as the Persian Gulf
exhibit variations from less than 6ppt to over 40ppt. Similarly, there is a navigable waterway
providing access between the Baltic and North seas that across the 300km long run from
Malmo¨ in Sweden to Skagen in Denmark, transitions from less than 5ppt to just under 30ppt.
Below the surface, the variability increases; Fig. 3.6 shows an example of a depth profile of
these variations and the modelled impact on the speed of sound with respect to depth in three
different regions. The variability of this speed is crucial to the operation of an underwater
acoustic network, as it fundamentally changes the propagation paths of compressive energy
transfer, and in particular, the fastest “path”. Fig. 3.7 shows the impact on this fastest
received path and it’s true path between two nodes in shallow, littoral, waters. Even with
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Figure 3.7: Bellhop Model of Non-Linear Marine Shortest-Path Propagation in
various Speed of Sound Profiles
relatively small variations in sound speed, and with the introduction of sea floor/surface
interfaces, the “fastest” path deviates significantly from a true “line of sight” path where
there is any variability in speed of sound profile, making delay-based positioning extremely
difficult, and presents significant opportunities for out-of-sync multi-path effects2.
Recent work by Schmidt and Schneider [137] further complicated the ocean acoustic
communications field by showing that despite being one of the most studies areas of the world’s
oceans, the actual acoustic properties of the Beaufort Shelf have fundamentally changed in the
past 20 years. A thermally covalent subsurface acoustic channel has appeared that confounds
modelling explanation but can provide a direct reliable acoustic path without surface/bed
interfacing at a range of up to ±8km away, or a near continuous (but noisy, due to surface
ice interactions) to a range of ±80km.
Intensity and Power
The energy of an acoustic wave is encapsulated into its kinetic and potential parts; where
its kinetic energy corresponds to the active motion energy of the particles in the medium,
2Fig. 3.7 shows a staged, iterative approximation method to arrive at the shortest path, where the “colour
intensity” of the chart shows the stage at which that path was explored, so the “final” paths are darkest,
and the “exploitative” paths are lightest, however in reality these secondary paths are still emitted and arrive,
delayed, to the receiver, causing significant inter-symbol interference unless equalised.
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Figure 3.8: Thorp’s Absorption Model [131]
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Figure 3.9: Ainslie & McColm Absorption Model
and the potential energy corresponding to the elastic potential of the medium in displace-
ment/compression.
The acoustic intensity (I) is the energy flux mean value per unit of surface and time
Equ. 3.3 in Watts/m2 where p0 is the plane wave amplitude (pressure) and Prms=p0/
√
2
I=
p20
2ρc
=
p2rms
ρc
(3.3)
Attenuation
The attenuation that occurs in an underwater acoustic channel over a distance d for a signal
about frequency f in linear Equ. 3.4 and dB forms Equ. 3.5 is given as;
Aaco(d,f)=A0d
ka(f)d (3.4)
10logAaco(d,f)/A0=k·10logd+d·10loga(f) (3.5)
where A0 is a unit-normalising constant, k is a geometric spreading factor (commonly
taken as 1.5 for practical use, but may be 2 for perfect spherical propagation or 1 for perfect
plane-wave propagation)), and a(f) is the absorption coefficient, that may be modelled in
a variety of ways.
Thorp’s formula (Equ. 3.6) is very simple, only depending on f , and is designed to be most
accurate about a temperature of 4◦C at a depth of ≈1Km. The Ainslie & McColm model is
more complex, and incorporates water acidity levels (H+) as well as temperature (T), salinity
(S in parts per trillion) but not depth (Fig. 3.9). The Fisher-Simmons model (Fig. 3.10)
is significantly more complex, taking into account the effects of boric acid concentrations
and dissolved magnesium sulphate. While there are several limitations on this model in
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+A3P3f
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Where
A1=1.03×10−8+2.36×10−10·T−5.22×10−12·T 2
A2=5.62×10−8+7.52×10−10·T
A3=
(
55.9−2.39·T+4.77×10−2·T 2−3.48×10−4·T 3)×10−15
t1=1.32×103(T+273.1)e
−1700
T+273.1
t2=1.55×107(T+273.1)e
−3052
T+273.1
P1=1
P2=10.3×10−4·P+3.7×10−7·P 2
P3=3.84×10−4·P+7.57×10−8·P 2
Figure 3.10: Fisher-Simmons Absorption Model
terms of its being fixed at a salinity of 35 ppt and a pH of 8, as this model incorporates
depth, temperature, distance and frequency, it is very attractive for research directed at high
variability environments and is used for the remainder of this work unless otherwise stated.
Regardless of the variations of particular attenuation models, comparing Aaco(d,f) with
the RF Free-Space Path Loss model Equ. 3.9, the impact of range on signal power is ex-
ponential underwater, rather than quadratic in terrestrial RF (Aaco∝f2d vs ARF∝ (df)2).
While both frequency dependant factors are quadratic, approximating the factors in Equ. 3.6,
f∝Aaco is at least 4 orders of magnitude higher than f∝ARF
ARF(d,f)≈
(
4pidf
c
)2
where c≈3×108ms−1 (3.9)
Ambient Noise Model
Historically, ambient ocean noise has be assumed to be Gaussian with a continuous power
spectral density in dB re µPaHz−1, driven by four major factors, shown in Table 3.3, where s
is a shipping activity factor bounded from [0,1] and w is the surface wind speed in ms−1 [138].
Table 3.3: Contributing factors to Ocean Ambient Acoustic Noise
Source Approximation
Turbulence 10logNt(f)=17−30logf
Shipping 10logNs(f)=40+20(s−0.5)+26logf−60log(f+0.03)
Wind Driven Waves 10logNw(f)=50+7.5w
1
2 +20logf−40log(f+0.4)
Thermal Noise 10logNth(f)=15+20logf
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However, recent work has cast doubt on this generalisation, and while a naive Gaussian
model remains suitable and generally applicable for proof-of-concept work, in real world
applications, observed noise has several nigh frequency and impulsive components that must
be taken into account [139, 140].
Multipath effects
Refractive lensing and the multi-path nature of the medium result in line of sight propagation
being extremely unreliable for estimating distances to targets (See Subsection 3.2.2 and
Fig. 3.7). The first arriving acoustic signal has as the very least curved in the medium, and
commonly has reflected off the surface/seabed before arriving at a receiver, creating secondary
paths that are sometimes many times longer than the first arrival path, generating symbol
spreading over orders of seconds depending on the ranges and depths involved. Thus, the
multi-path channel transfer function can be described by :
H(d,f)=
P−1∑
p=0
h(p)=
P−1∑
p=0
Γp/
√
A(dp,f)e
−j2pifτp (3.10)
where τp=dp/c,c≈1500ms−1
where d=d0 is the minimal path length between the transmitter and receiver, dp,p=
{1,...P−1} are the secondary path lengths, Γp models additional losses incurred on each path
such as reflection losses at the surface interface, and τp=dp/c is the delay time.
Modelling and Simulation of the Acoustic Medium / Channel
Several toolkits exist in a that perform communications agent simulation, most notably
the NS-2 / 3 family of frameworks and their add-ons. Some of these frameworks, such
as SUNSET [141] and AquaTools [142], that are particularly proven in their capability in
modelling static network performance, with less in built support for advanced, reactive node
mobilities such as those involving collision or object avoidance.
Beyond the NS family, there are many other communications and simulation modelling
systems such as OpNet++ [143] and MATLAB toolkits such as the AcTUP interface to
the Ocean Acoustics Library, that primarily focus on simulation of the acoustic channel and
contention issues without concentration on Underwater-specific MAC protocols.
AUVNetSim is a simulation platform designed from the ground up with collaborative AUV
operations in mind [39]. Including support for dynamic modular mobility and application
behaviours, considering the stated context of an environmentally reactive UAN, AUVNetSim
was tested and selected as a foundation upon which to build an exploratory network testing
framework for this research.
In order to implement a collaborative, reactive, simulation suite, the SimPy [144] agent
framework was used for “background” synchronisation.
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As mentioned in the individual testing cases, transmission parameters for simulation were
initially taken from and validated against results from Stojanovic [131] and Stefanov and
Stojanovic [145].
Conclusion
Key Outcomes:
• Explored the use of AUVs in commercial, civil and defence applications, selecting a
port protection scenario for experimentation (Subsection 3.1.1) as well as demonstrating
that technologies relevant to localisation required for proposed trust assessment using
physical mobility relating to PSQ. 4 are suitable (Subsection 3.1.2)
• Selected the REMUS range of AUV as an appropriate AUV class for modelling within
this context (Subsection 3.1.3)
• Demonstrated the need for Trust in autonomous UANs (Subsection 3.1.4)
• Selected Fisher-Simmons as an appropriate Attenuation model for acoustic channel
simulation (Subsection 3.2.4)
• Characterised a suitable ambient noise model (Subsection 3.2.5)
• Selected the AUVNetSim and SimPy frameworks as suitable baselines for simulation,
with suitable validation cases (Subsection 3.2.7)
In this chapter, the opportunities, start-of-the-art and challenges to the use of mobile
autonomy in the marine space were investigated. The extreme differences in channel char-
acteristics between RF and UAN put great weight on the need to validate PSQ. 1, and
suitable models for this channel have been identified. Additionally, the particular threat
surface exposed to such operations highlight the need for Trust in such networks, reducing
communications overhead and accommodating the sparse and noisy nature of the medium3.
Having suitably explored the context around the problem in this work (Section 1.2), the
following chapters conduct a series of experiments and analyses to demonstrate the usefulness
of Trust in the marine environment (PSQ. 2), and to extend current communications-based
Trust into the Physical domain (PSQ. 4).
But first, the validity of applying these methods to the marine environment must be
verified (PSQ. 1).
3if it can be demonstrated that existing Trust models can be applied at all in this area
Chapter 4
Assessment of TMF Performance
in Marine Environments
Introduction
In this chapter, two primary assumptions are tested; that an efficient zone of performance
in terms of data rates and node separations can be found in realistic, multi-node, MANET
in the marine network (as explored in the Section 3.2) (PSQ. 1), and subsequently, if TMFs
can operate at all in UANs (PSQ. 2)
In both cases, this initial work firmly targets the methodology and results from previous
work that explored the operation of novel TMFs in the 802.11 terrestrial RF communications
environment [18], which once validated against, provides a strong foundation on which to
optimise such TMFs for the marine environment.
As a final part of this chapter, the use of machine learning for optimising identification
and detection filters is explored (Subsection 4.5.1
UANs as MANET analogue
As MANETs grow beyond the terrestrial arena, their operation and the protocols designed
around them must be reviewed to assess their suitability to different communications en-
vironments to ensure their continued security, reliability, and performance. With demand
for smaller, more decentralised MANET systems in a range of domains and applications,
as well as a drive towards lower per-unit cost in all areas, TMFs are increasingly applied
to resource constrained applications, as the benefits and efficiencies these systems present
are significant. Many UANs use MANET architectures, however the marine environment
presents new challenges for trust management frameworks that have been developed for use
in conventional (i.e. Terrestrial RF) MANETs. These increasingly decentralised applications
present unique threats against trust management [127].
Previous research has established the advantages of implementing TMFs in 802.11 based
MANETs, particularly in terms of preventing selfish operation in collaborative systems [8],
and maintaining throughput in the presence of malicious actors [9]
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To date this work has been limited to terrestrial, RF based networks, which, as discussed
in Chapter 3, is a much more favourable communications environment compared to the marine
environment of UANs, where extreme communications challenges are present (propagation
delays, frequency dependent attenuation, fast and slow fading, refractive multipath distortion,
etc.). As a result of these challenges, in underwater environments, communications is both
sparse and noisy. That is to say that long delays create high susceptibility to contention
blocking, requiring relatively low channel occupancy and significant back-offs and significant
retransmission penalties in the face of a multitude of noise sources over inconsistent, non-linear,
multi path transmissions. Therefore, observations about the communications processes that
are used to generate the trust metrics occur much less frequently, with much greater error
(noise) and delay than is experienced in terrestrial RF MANETs. Beyond the constraints of
the communications environment, knock on pressures in battery capacity, on-board processing,
and locomotion present opportunities and incentives for malicious or selfish actors to appear
to cooperate while not reciprocating, in order to conserve power for instance. These multiple
aspects of potential incentives, trust, and fairness do not directly fall under the scope of
single metric trusts discussed previously in Subsection 2.5.3, and this context indicates that
a multi-metric approach may be more appropriate.
As such, the use of trust methods developed in the terrestrial MANET space must be
re-appraised for application within the underwater context [48].
This chapter is primarily concerned with the analytical establishment of hard trust within
a topologically dynamic network of mobile autonomous actors. It will be shown that single
metric trust systems are not directly suitable for the marine context in terms of the different
threat and cost scenario in that environment. These single metric TMFs provide malicious
actors with a significant advantage if their activity does not impact that metric.
To validated PSQ. 2, from those TMFs discussed in Subsection 2.5.3, Hermes trust
establishment, OTMF are selected as indicative single metric frameworks for comparison
against the multi-metric MTFM, as Hermes captures the core operation of a pure single
metric assessment methodology, OTMF provides a comparison that combines assessments
from across nodes to develop trust opinions, to fairly assess PSQ. 2.
Modelling of UAN network
Mobility, Topology, and Communications
Four mobility scenarios are initially investigated, replicating the mobilities investigated by
Guo et al. [18] in the terrestrial RF environment:
1. All Nodes Static
2. Malicious node mobile
3. Malicious node mobile, all other nodes static
4. All nodes mobile
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For this case, the mobility model used is a random walk on the nodes modelled kinematic
response, i.e. the node periodically picks a spherically normalised random direction in the
XY plane. Maximum node speed (limited by kinematic acceleration/turning constraints) is
1.5ms−1 [146].
The six nodes are initially arranged as per Fig. 4.1 with each node on average 100m from
each other as per Guo et al. [18]. The use of six nodes and the particular layout enables the
investigation of the three trust relationships based on minimum path topologies, such that the
node generating the trust assessments, n0 has Direct, Recommendation, and Indirect trust
assessments of n1 available to it from itself, [n2,n3], and [n4,n5] respectively. (See Section 2.3.3)
Collaborations with NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE)
in La Spezia, and DSTLs Naval Systems Group inform that this is a practical team-size for
environmental and defence applications.
With respect to these topologies and mobilities inherited from ??, it is expected that the
most stable cases will be where all or all-but-one nodes are static, as there are not mobility
induced topology changes. The corolary to this is that the most chaotic network will be that
where all or all-but-one nodes are mobile and the topology is almost constantly changing.
The random-walk nature of the mobility model mean that there is a reasonable expectation
of partial temporary isolation of one or more nodes from the rest of the network. This factor
is a contributing reason for the relatively substantial number of repeated simulations that
will be performed for each scenario, to provide a statistically relevant model of near-realistic
network conditions regardless of mobility scenario.
n0 n1
n2
n3
n4
n5
Figure 4.1: Initial layout with nodes spaced an average of 100 m apart
Simulation Background
Simulations were conducted using a Python based simulation framework, SimPy [144], with
a network stack built upon AUVNetSim [39], with transmission parameters (Table 4.1) taken
from and validated against existing studies [131, 142, 145, 147]
Given the differences in delay and propagation between RF and marine networks, it would
not be expected that the same application rates (e.g. packet emission rates or throughput)
and node separations are equally stable in this environment. Therefore, a zone of performance
is characterised within which the network has stable operation.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of system model constraints as applied between Terrestrial
and Marine communications
Parameter Terrestrial Marine
Simulated Duration 300 s 18000 s
Trust Sampling Period 1 s 600 s
Simulated Area 0.7 km2 0.7 to 4 km2
Transmission Range up to 0.25 km up to 1.5 km
Physical Layer RF(802.11) Acoustic
Propagation Speed 3×108 ms−1 1490 ms−1
Center Frequency 2.6×109 Hz 2×104 Hz
Bandwidth 22×106 Hz 1×104 Hz
MAC Type CSMA/DCF CSMA/CA
Routing Protocol DSDV FBR
Max Speed 5 ms−1 1.5 ms−1
Max Data Rate 5×106 bits−1 ≈240bits−1
Packet Size 4096 bit 9600 bit
Single Transmission Duration 10 s 32 s
Single Transmission Size 1×107 bit 9600 bit
Establishing Scale Factors in Communications Rate
The simulated communications environment is characterised to establish an optimal packet
emission rate for comparison against [18] to validate PSQ. 1. This optimal emission rate
is taken to be an emission rate that provides reasonable network stability and protection
from network saturation. Network saturation is the point at which a network can no longer
successfully deliver the offered load1 presented to it to the relevant destinations (throughput),
and is characterised by a peak and a subsequent decline in the throughput of the network
when varying the packet emission rate.
This saturation rate occurs where the number of users (N) emitting packets at a given
rate (µ) exceeds the carrying capacity of the medium (λs), as per Equ. 4.1. After which, new
transmissions can not be sent, transmission queues grow, and if the emission rate (or number
of users) is not greatly reduced, it can be difficult to return the network to an optimal state.
Nµ>λsmax (4.1)
In order to establish the point at which the network becomes saturated, a range of packet
emission rates were explored between 0.01 packets per second (pps), equivalent to 96 bits
of offered load per node, up to 0.07pps (672bps per node). Initial node separation was set as
1It will become important to note that Offered Load in this case includes packet retransmissions
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per Guo et al. [18] at 100m, and each simulation is run 16 times, with each instance modelling
a 8 hour mission time. This configuration and duration are specified to correlate to previously
discussed mobile collaborative port protection scenarios from Section 3.1.
Looking first at the Static mobility case, where all nodes are stationary; from Fig. 4.3a
it is already clear that the throughput curve, exhibits a saturation point close to 0.025pps.
Similarly in Fig. 4.3b, the precipitous drop in packet delivery probability beyond 0.025pps,
indicating that this is a strong candidate value for an upper-limit to the safe operating
zone in terms of packet emission in the small static case. From Fig. 4.3c, raising packet
emissions above 0.025pps results in a significant increase in end-to-end delay. As per Table 4.1,
the Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) based MAC incurs a certain amount of control
overhead in the form of Request To Send (RTS) packets, when a node attempts to acquire
time in its neighbourhood. In Fig. 4.3d, the ratio of Control/Data packets increases linearly
up to 1.5 until just before 0.025pps, and then accelerates to almost 2.5, further demonstrating
that the network has become critically congested. It is worthwhile noting that in Fig. 4.3a that
even as the saturation point is passed, packet collisions do not significantly increase, and that
the saturation is in fact driven by contention for the medium rather than congestion-collisions.
Results are also included from the remaining mobility cases (all nodes mobile; all-but-one
node mobile; single mobile node), however from Figs. 4.2- 4.6, the throughput threshold
behaviour is qualitatively similar regardless of mobility for this initial node separation.
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Figure 4.2: Throughput performance overview for all mobilities under varying
emission rates
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Figure 4.3: Network performance varying packet emission rates for the static case
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(d) RTS Ratios
Figure 4.4: Network performance varying packet emission rates for the all mobile case
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Figure 4.5: Network performance varying packet emission rates for the all-but-one
mobile case
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Figure 4.6: Network performance varying packet emission rates for the single mobile
case
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Scale Factors in Physical Node Distribution
In this section the effect of node-separation scaling on communications operation is charac-
terised for comparison against [18]. This is particularly important considering the significant
scale factor differences in terms of the speed of propagation in the medium, and the range
of potential desired operation.
From Table 4.1, the operating transmission range of acoustic is ≈6 times further than
802.11, indicating that a suitable operating environment will have an area ≈√6 times the
area of the 802.11 case. Therefore, a reasonable experimental range would have an upper
bound of performance around this scaling factor, where nodes are approximately 400m apart.
RTS/Clear To Send (CTS) handshake functionality cannot operate well as interference
protection at node separations beyond 0.56 times the transmission range [148]. In the case
of marine acoustic transmission at the stated power output, above 1500m×0.56 = 840m,
handshake overheads should begin to dominate channel access. This is due to reduced channel
availability due to collisions, which are then due to a much longer potential contention period
between nodes.
A reasonable range around this is to scale from 100m apart on average to 800m, and from
the previous section, a packet emission rate of 0.02pps (slightly below the 0.025pps saturation
threshold) is used to explore this space. The “environment” of the simulations is also scaled
in accordance with the node scaling, based on an initial environmental “water-box” of 1km
for the 100m node separation, i.e. the water-box is consistently ten times larger than the
initial node separation.
In the case where all nodes remain static, increasing node separation does not significantly
impact throughput, delay, delivery probability or RTS ratios until rising above 700m (Fig. 4.8),
nearly double the initial estimate of where an appropriate separation zone would be.
The other mobility cases tell a very different story; as can be seen in Fig. 4.7b, where
adding a single mobile node to the network induces a saturation-style response at 500m, and
this drops further in Fig. 4.7c and Fig. 4.7d, reducing the separation of saturation at this
emission rate to just 300m.
Another aspect of these results to highlight is that the Offered Load presented to the
network increases beyond the collapse of the throughput curve. This indicates that there is
a subtly different saturation behaviour with respect to separation than the simple congestion
argument with respect to packet emission rate; packets are simply taking too long to cross
the increasingly sparse network and in-transit packet routes are logically disconnected and
require retransmission.
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Figure 4.7: Throughput performance overview for all mobilities under varying
separation
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Figure 4.8: Network performance varying node separation for the static case
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Figure 4.9: Network performance varying node separation for the all mobile case
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Figure 4.10: Network performance varying node separation for the all-but-one mobile
case
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Table 4.2: Tabular view of data from Fig. 4.11, including ideal propagation time
Initial Node
Separation
(m)
Delay(s) Probability of
Arrival
RTS/Data
Ratio
Ideal
Propagation
Time(s)
100 10.3551 0.9977 1.3546 1.0314
200 11.1631 0.9973 1.3322 1.1029
300 24.2225 0.9983 1.5650 1.1743
400 29.4864 0.9965 1.6210 1.2457
500 41.7093 0.9904 1.8331 1.3171
600 753.4040 0.8922 2.8038 1.3886
700 2360.0826 0.6899 4.3889 1.4600
800 3963.9830 0.3360 12.7323 1.5314
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Figure 4.11: Network performance varying node separation for the single mobile case
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Combined Scale Factor Analysis
Its clear from the previous results that the relationship between emission rates, separations and
mobilities is tightly coupled and not totally clear cut. To arrive at a more optimal operating
region, a coupled analysis is performed across both emission rate and initial separation distance.
Given what has been discussed so far; it’s clear that in identifying an appropriate operating
region, it is important to not only ensure throughput, but that that throughput is timely.
For instance, in Fig. 4.11 (tabulated in Table 4.2), a small increase in separation beyond the
apparent throughput-peak at 500m to 600m, which constitutes an increased ideal marine
acoustic “time of flight” between nodes by 0.02s, increases the average actual delay by 1800%.
To capture these performance requirements, the feature scaled product of Throughput
and Delay is taken and plotted against rate and separation in Fig. 4.12.
V = |S]×(1−|D|) (4.2)
For each scenario, the observed Throughput across the network (S in bytes) is normalised
across all observations (i.e. each combination of Node Separation and Emission Rate), as
is average end-to-end Delay (D). The normalised delay is inverted (1−|D|) and the prod-
uct of this and the normalised throughput is used as the basis of a two-dimensional linear
interpolation shown in Fig. 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Normalised Throughput-Delay Product for all mobilities under varying
separation and emission rate
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It is worthwhile noting that the above results are largely agnostic to the application zoned
or sharded routing protocols (See Section 2.2), as the key factor in the above network collapse
is not channel constraints on throughput of in-air packet transmission, but local channel
acquisition and collision avoidance. Future work could explore the compromise between
congestion and sharding in UAN, but from the discussion in Chapter 3, it is unlikely that
large enough numbers of nodes would be safely deployable in a small enough area to warrant
sharding of the acoustic network.
Summary
An appropriate safe operating zone for marine communications has been established by
investigating the impact of variations of the communications rate and physical distribution
across the mobility scenarios, providing initial validation of PSQ. 1.
So far in this chapter it as been established that when the separation is increased, the
emission rate at which the network becomes saturated decreases, reducing overall throughput.
This throughput degradation is tightly coupled with the mobility, as increasing mobility leads
to increasing delays as routes are constantly broken, re-advertised and re-established. For
instance, where all nodes are static, significant drops in throughput are not seen until node
separation approaches 800m, nearly double the initial estimate. However, when all nodes are
randomly walking the saturation point collapses from 0.025pps at 300m to 0.015pps at 400m.
These results indicate that a good area to continue operating in for a range of node separations
is at 0.015pps, and that a reasonable position scaling is from 100m to 300m, beyond which
communication becomes increasingly unstable, especially in terms of end-to-end delay. These
results are similar to related simulation work [38, 39, 149], and is to be expected in such
a sparse, noisy, and contentious environment. It should be noted that these rates are not
what would be expected in a single-node/single-operator environment that most current AUV
operations inhabit, as without any channel contention and mixed-delay effects, data-rates
many times higher than this would be expected. However, few practical experiments have
been performed that are suitable for direct comparison, as this context relies on multiple
available nodes in a dynamic MANET topology with differential mobility.
The results from Fig. 4.12b and Fig. 4.12c show that the single-node differential mobility
models don’t capture the reality of the network in the proposed port-protection context. The
reason for this is that in these single-differential mobility combinations, the node targeted for
misbehaviour (n1) will already be behaving differently compared to the rest of the network re-
gardless of the misbehaviour. A future extension to this work could be to look at differential ra-
tios of static/mobile nodes in alternative scenarios, such as in data-muling applications or WSN.
Operation of TMFs in UANs
We are primarily concerned with the direct trust relationship between n0 and n1, i.e. n0’s
assessment of the trustworthiness of n1, or T1,0 (See Fig. 4.1).
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Guo et al. [18] introduced a range of misbehaviours, including modification of the packet
loss rate of routing nodes and limiting throughput on a per-link basis as well as a selection of
combined misbehaviours. Given that the established links are already heavily constrained,
such attacks would severely impact the general performance of the network beyond the scope
of simple selfishness. These direct malicious behaviours effectively trigger saturation collapses
in operating regions of the network that should be stable.
Therefore, two more subtle misbehaviours to investigate are;
1. Malicious Power Control (MPC), where n1 increases its transmit and forwarding power
by 20% for all nodes except communications from n0 in order to make n0 appear to
be selfishly conserving energy to the rest of the team, while n1 itself appears to be
performing very well2.
2. Selfish Target Selection (STS), where n1 preferentially communicates, forwards and
advertises to nodes that are physically close to it in effort to reduce its own power
consumption.
Simulation and Initial Discussion
Having established a safe operating range for comparison at 300m average separation and
an emission rate of 0.015pps, each of the three selected behaviours (Fair, Malicious Power
Control (MPC), STS) are performed in both the static and mobile scenarios. We select a
trust assessment period of 10 mins for a five hour mission to scale in comparison to relative
bitrates experienced (1Mbps vs ≈15bps).
The six metrics used for grey assessment are; transmitted and received throughput and
power, delay, and PLR as calculated by aborted and unacknowledged, transmissions. Com-
pared to [18], this metric set lacks a data rate quantity as the network is not dynamically
adjusting bandwidth. In context of GRC generation Equ. 2.17, the best sequence g was
selected using the lowest PLR, delay, and powers, and the highest throughputs, and the worst
sequence, b the inverse of these metrics, reflecting the observations made in Subsection 3.1.4.
The particular factors under discussion are the relative performance of MTFM against
OTMF and Beta with respect to statistical stability across mobilities and in responsiveness to
changing network behaviour. We establish a similar result set by initially tracking the resultant
trust values established by MTFM in the pair of mobility scenarios, shown in Fig. 4.13. We
are also concerned with the opinions of n1 provided to n0 by other nodes, where [T2,1,T3,1]
and [T4,1,T5,1] denote the sets of recommendation and indirect trust assessment respectively.
We also include aggregate assessments; TAvgN,1 , the unweighted mean of direct trust assess-
ments of n1 from all nodes and T
MTFM
0,1 , the final MTFM trust assessment value based on
both network topology with respect to n0 and whitenization from Equ. 2.21.
The variability in assessment is coupled to mobility; in the static case the nodes exhibit rel-
atively consistent distributions (Fig. 4.13a) . In the full mobility case, this subjective variability
2This 20% figure is based on a similar power control behaviour used in [18] and has been maintained
as such for comparability between RF and UAN TMF operation, however a sensitivity analysis should be
performed in future to assess this figure
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is greatly increased(Fig. 4.13b). As the topology is highly dynamic, delays due to re-establishing
routes can be very large, perturbing the trust value. The TMTFM0,1 displays a significantly
reduced variation than those of the individual subjective observations in all cases, even when
compared to the unweighted average, TAvgN,1 . This demonstrates TMTFM ’s value as an aggre-
gating trust assessment in such sparse and noisy environments and suggests initial validation
of PSQ. 2. Further, in Fig. 4.13d a much higher variability in assessment is observed in T0,1,
correctly indicating that there is something wrong with the relationship between n0 and n1.
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Figure 4.13: MTFM Trust assessments of n1 (TX,1), showing Direct, Recommender
and Indirect relationships, and derived aggregates
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(b) Malicious Power Control (MPC) Scenario
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(c) Selfish Target Selection (STS) Scenario
Figure 4.14: T0,1 for Hermes, OTMF and MTFM assessment values for fair and ma-
licious behaviours in the fully mobile scenario. See Fig. 4.1 for initial network topology
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Figure 4.15: Alternative Visualisation of TMF performance comparison across Fair,
MPC, and STS scenarios
Comparison between MTFM, Hermes and OTMF
As per Guo et al. [18], “fair” scenarios were also performed with no malicious behaviour,
applying OTMF and Hermes assessment as well as MTFM, providing like-for-like comparison
of assessment.
The use of FBR and a CSMA with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) MAC scheme from
AUVNetSim [39] in our simulation mitigates a significant number of packet losses through
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collision avoidance and contention handling, leading to the situation that the only genuinely lost
packets occur when a node moves completely out of range of any other node and time out occurs
in route discovery rather than transmission (See Section 2.2). As such, confirmed packet losses
are relatively rare and in a delaying network like this, it is difficult to set a differentiating time
out between packets that are in the network but queued, and packets that are actually “lost”.
The single metric TMFs used in conventional MANETs require regular and constant
input to shape and adjust their evaluations, which for a network with significant and irregular
delays such as this, is not practical. This renders OTMF and Hermes assessment at best
uninformative and at worst misleading; consistently providing nodes a high trust assessment as
they have very little information to extract trust from. Fig. 4.14 shows a comparison between
the unweighted response of MTFM compared to OTMF and Hermes assessment functions
on the same data for the fair, malicious and selfish behaviours respectively. This time-series
perspective demonstrates how noisy and variable the assessments from all TMFs are in this
environment. For clarity, Fig. 4.15 displays a compressed-time perspective, showing the overall
trend and sensitivity of the different frameworks in the same scenarios as shown in Fig. 4.14.
It is important to note a distinction between the expectations of MTFM compared to
other TMFs; MTFM is primarily concerned with the identification of differences in the
behaviours of nodes in a network, and is relative rather than absolute. That is to say that
under MTFM, nodes are compared against the worst current performances across metrics of
other observed nodes and graded against them, rather than the absolute (objective) approach
taken by many TMFs.
In these cases, particularly since the methods of attack were not directly related to PLR,
OTMF and Hermes have not registered significant activity in either misbehaviour when
compared to the fair scenario. The difference between the MTFM trust assessments under
“fair” and “malicious” behaviour is lowered by ≈10% in both cases, in terms of the mean
values returned. At run time, similar results could be attained by an Exponentially Weighted
Moving Average (EWMA).
With regard to PSQ. 1, these results are not initially comforting; on their own, neither
OTMF, Hermes, or unbiased MTFM appear to be effective in detecting or identifying mali-
cious behaviour in this environment, in fact OTMF and Hermes don’t appear to differentiate
between fair and selfish scenarios at all. However, in the next section, PSQ. 3 is validated
and will rescue both problem statement questions.
Metric Vector Weighting
Building towards the application of machine learning to the metric weighting task, it is
worthwhile exploring the approach taken by [18], in that individual metrics were manually
weighted in turn, increasing the impact of detecting that a given metric is being impacted
by a misbehaviour3.
3not necessarily the presence or absence of a particular misbehaviour
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A sequence of vectors that preferentially weight each metric in Equ. 2.18 to each of the
three simulation runs. For a metric weight vector H, where the metric mj is emphasised as
being twice as important as the other metrics, forming an initial weighting vectorH′=[hi...hM ]
such that hi=1∀i 6=j;hj=2. That vector H′ is normalised such that
∑
H=1 by H= H
′∑
H′ .
Using this process the primary aspects of an attack can be extracted and highlighted by
comparing against the deviation from the “fair” result set.
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(b) PLR Emphasised
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(c) Received Power (PRX) Emphasised
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(d) Transmit Power (PTX) Emphasised
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(e) Throughput (S) Emphasised
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Figure 4.16: TMTFM1,0 in the All Mobile case for the Malicious Power Control
behaviour, including dashed ±σ envelope about the fair scenario
Fig. 4.16 shows that the malicious node is consistently outside the ±σ (one standard
deviation above and below the mean) envelope of the fair scenario it’s being compared to.
This is particularly true for PLR, with smaller impacts on delay, received power and offered
load. This weighted delta in received throughput is minimal to insignificant compared to the
width of the detection envelope, occasionally breaching the envelope for a short period.
In the selfish case (Fig. 4.17) a much lower weighted delta in PLR and delay is observed,
with greatly increased impact on transmission power. In comparison to [18], these results are
qualitatively similar, however here the differences between the fair case and the misbehaviours
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(b) PLR Emphasised
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Figure 4.17: TMTFM1,0 in the All Mobile case for the Selfish Target Selection behaviour,
including dashed ±σ envelope about the fair scenario
are less clear than in the comparable terrestrial space. Guo et al. [18] show similar types
of behaviour but report a weighted delta from ≈ 0.4 to ≈ 0.9 across the simulation period,
compared to our maximum delta in PTX in selfish behaviour (Fig. 4.17d) of ≈ 0.3 for an
inconsistent interval. While this does qualitatively validate both PSQ. 1 and PSQ. 2, it is
certainly not a resounding quantitative success yet.
Is it important to highlight that in both these results and those of Guo et al. [18] do not
detect or classify based on behaviour, but on the impact on a metric. To suitably resolve both
PSQ. 2 and PSQ. 3, behaviour must be the focus of analysis, detection and classification.
Weight Significance Analysis for Behaviour Classification
For a more quantitative assessment of the viability of multi-metric trust assessment methods,
a Random Forest regression [150] is applied to a large training sample set based on the above
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approach to assess the relative importance of the selected metrics on relative detectability
of malicious behaviour.
Random Forest aids in this by generating a large number of random regression trees and
prunes these trees to fit incoming data. While there are many potential machine learning
strategies that could be applied to this problem4, Random Forests’ key strength within this
context is that the concept of variable importance naturally emerges from the iterative and
randomised construction and assessment of the internal decision trees, rather than a secondary
analysis as could be the case in several other learning methods[151, 152]. Additional, and
also due to their iterative structure, unbiased training data (i.e. perfectly classified) is not
necessarily required, allowing for it’s importance assessments to be flexible to local minima
or saddles. Finally, the “depth” of decision trees can be constrained, making it particularly
capable at digesting highly dimensional data without suffering a combinatorial explosion
(once data has been generated for it to train against)
The target function for this regression was the area between the target behaviours weighted
TMTFM curve and the ±σ envelope of the base behaviour as shaded in Figs. 4.16 and 4.17.
From this training process, the relative importance of each input feature (metric) can be
inferred in terms of how good it is to differentiate between the fair case and a given misbe-
haviour. Additionally a cross correlation analysis is performed to establish the correlations
between given metric weighting emphasis and the output of the target function. Our intention
is to establish the metrics that not only differentiate both misbehaviours from the fair case,
but also what metrics differentiate the two misbehaviours from each other.
Applying this target regression to 729 different metric weight vector emphasis combi-
nations reveals that each of the three combinations (i.e. comparing fair to misbehaviours,
and comparing the misbehaviours) present distinct patterns of significance in three primary
metrics; received throughput, transmitted power, and PLR, with delay, received power and
transmitted throughput playing a lesser role. Practically this means that in order to accurately
distinguish between these scenarios, these primary metrics should be higher-weighted in the
generation of T1,MTFM in Equ. 2.20.
It may initially appear odd that the relative significance of the received throughput is similar
between all three scenario combinations, however a correlation analysis shows that in the MPC
attack; the received throughput is positively correlated with successful classification against the
fair case (R=+0.71,p≈10−100), while the inverse is the case for the STS attack (R=−0.70,p≈
10−100). It is expected that Transmitted power should be the defining characteristic of STS
(R=+0.72,p<10−100) as the node is acting fairly from a protocol perspective but is acting
unfairly at a higher (incentive) level; it is performing fairly in terms of it’s communications
with other nodes, however it is preferring to communicate with nodes that it can expend less
energy communicating with. A summary of these correlations is shown in Table. 4.3.
Comparing Figs. 4.14, 4.16b, and 4.17b, while it is possible that in a cleaner, less sparse,
and less noisy environment, OTMF would be able to detect the MPC behaviour, Fig. 4.18
4such a Deep Neural Networks, Genetic Algorithms, Support Vector Machines, Singular Value
Decomposition, Independent Component Analysis and Generative Adversarial Networks to name but a few
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Figure 4.18: Random Forest Factor Analysis of Malicious (MPC, Selfish (STS) and
Fair behaviours compared against each-other
shows that PLR plays almost no part at all in detecting the STS behaviour, and so OTMF
would not detect the attack.
Table 4.3: Correlation Coefficients between metric weights and behaviour detection
targets
Correlation Delay PRX PTX G S PLR
Fair / MPC 0.199 0.159 -0.416 0.708 -0.238 -0.401
Fair / STS 0.179 -0.009 0.724 -0.697 -0.145 -0.052
MPC / STS 0.058 -0.134 0.146 -0.768 0.052 0.146
As such this presents the open opportunity to develop a heuristic weight search scheme
to detect malicious behaviour without the comparison to the fair scenario. This would be
accomplished by assessing the impact of differential metric weighting on the mean trust
assessment rather than comparing co-weighted valuations across scenarios.
Conclusion
Key Outcomes:
• PSQ. 1 - Established a suitable analogue operation range between RF and UAN at an
emission rate of ≈0.015-0.025pps and 100-300m average node separation (Section 4.2)
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• PSQ. 2 - Demonstrated that while initial performance of directly transplanted TMFs
is very poor (particularly single metric varieties), suitably weighted MTFM is a good
candidate for optimisation (4.4)
• PSQ. 3 - Shown that the application of a Random Forest machine learning optimisation
significantly improves the responsiveness of (dis)trust in misbehaviours (Section 4.5)
It has been demonstrated that single metric MANET Trust Management Frameworks
are not suitable to the sparse, noisy, and dynamic underwater medium, and that even in
conventional analysis of multi-metric TMFs, performance is still very low. However, through
exploring the metric space of MTFM, there are significant indications that trained weight
vectors can be used to establish dynamic filters and classifiers, greatly improving the perfor-
mance of MTFM against known / observed misbehaviours, and these vectors can be carried
across different deployments.
These findings validate the assumptions of PSQ. 3, and thus PSQ. 2.
By comparing the operation and performance of trust establishment in MANETs in a
simulated underwater environment has demonstrated that in order to have any reasonable
expectation of performance, that throughput and delay responses must be characterised before
implementing trust. It is shown that across the tested TMFs, Hermes and OTMF demonstrate
a small discriminating factor between normal behaviour and one of the misbehaviours, this
discrimination is not very clear and OTMF does not detect the STS behaviour at all, while
MTFM shows a significant (≈ 10%) mean assessment drop the both misbehaving cases.
In terms of behaviour discrimination, the MTFM value only displays a small immediate
difference between the two misbehaviours, however it has been shown that by exploring the
metric space by weight variation, the existence and nature of the malicious behaviour can be
discovered. Another difference is that MTFM is significantly more computationally intensive
than the relatively simple Hermes / OTMF algorithms. The repeated metric re-weighting
required for real time behaviour detection is therefore an area that requires optimization.
With significant delays (from seconds to many minutes), in a fading, refractive medium with
varying propagation characteristics, the environment is not as predictable or performant as
classical MANET TMF deployment environments.
It is shown that, without significant adaptation, single metric probabilistic estimation
based TMFs are ineffective in such an environment. Additionally, it’s clear that existing
frameworks are overly optimistic about the nature and stability of the communications channel,
and can overlook characteristics that are useful for assessing the behaviour of nodes in the
network. This indicates that there is a good case, particularly within constrained MANETs
as this, for multi-vector, and even multi-domain trust assessment, where metrics about the
communications network and topology would be brought together with information about
the physical behaviours and operations of nodes to assess trust.
A significant additional factor of trust assessment in such a constrained environment is that
there may be long periods where two edge nodes (for instance, n0→n5) may not interact at all.
This can be due to a range of factors beyond malicious behaviour, including simple random
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scheduling coincidence and intermediate or neighbouring nodes collectively causing long back-
off or contention periods. This disconnection hinders trust assessment in two ways; assessing
nodes that do not receive timely recommendations may make decisions based on very old data,
and malicious nodes have a long dwelling time where they can operate under a reasonable
certainty that the TMF will not detect it (especially if the node itself is behaving disruptively).
However the demonstrated noisiness and sparseness of communications metrics for trust
assessment indicate that it may be more beneficial to look to other domains beyond communi-
cations to establish trust, such as the physical domain where we are concerned with the motion,
placement and behaviour of the network nodes, which is investigated in the next chapter.

Chapter 5
Use of Physical
Behaviours for Trust Assessment
Introduction
In this chapter, a core assumption of this work is validated; whether the physical mobility
and relationships between AUVs can be used as a trust assessment domain (PSQ. 4). This
is done by taking a more fundamental approach than was transposed from the terrestrial
RF domain in the previous chapter, and sets out to demonstrate that a simple classifier
based on observations purely about physical mobility can be used to differentiate between
subtly different physical misbehaviours, harking back to the secondary problem of this work
of differentiating between malicious and “faulty” misbehaviour (Section 1.2).
Physical Behaviours for Trust
Physical Metrics
The aim of any TMF is to constrain the operation of a system such that any “trusted”
behaviour is inherently “correct” behaviour; by monitoring PLR, delay, and throughput etc.
In the communications domain, TMFs aim to optimise the efficiency of these aspects of the
networks performance.
In the physical domain, the question becomes “What characteristics of the nodes operations
require constraint or optimisation, and what information is exposed to assess those?”.
Fundamentally, the physical information available (or at least, is reasonable to assume)
is simple positional and velocity information reported by the nodes itself. These assessments
could be augmented with the use of sonar or visual tracking at short distances, or through
time-of-flight positioning, but in the marine environment, both of these are difficult to ac-
complish and maintain consistently, and can only be treated as corroborating datasets rather
than fundamental knowledge1.
1The problem of false node reporting is not dealt with in this work
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As for what characteristics of operations require optimisation, an assumption can be made
that the primary threat is of a masquerading or damage of a node by a competent attacker,
i.e. a physical TMF should identify nodes that are behaving oddly. Additionally, and in
a less threatening manner, an additional aspect to optimise for is efficiency of mobility and
communication, i.e. maintaining relative proximity to lower communications energy costs,
and minimise expensive or “thrusty” course corrections.
Therefore, based on a fuzzy incomplete knowledge of the position and velocities of
fleet/team members over time, designed around the REMUS 100 AUVs Kinematics, three
primary initial metrics are arrived at:
1. Inter-Node Distance Deviation (INDD), a second order measure of the variation in the
average distances between nodes in a squad
2. Inter-Node Heading Deviation (INHD), similar to INDD but based on instantaneous
unit velocity, i.e. the direction of travel
3. Node Speed, looking at the variability of through-the-water speed of each node in the
squad with respect to the observable squads speeds.
Using these metrics, appropriate behaviour within a dynamic fleet can be assessed dynamically
and in a decentralised fashion.
INDDi,j=
|Pj−
∑
x
Px
N |
1
N
∑
x
∑
y|Px−Py|(∀x 6=y)
(5.1)
INHDi,j= vˆ|v=Vj−
∑
x
Vx
N
(5.2)
Vi,j= |Vj| (5.3)
Where i and j are indices denoting the current observer node and the current observed
node respectively; x is a summation index representing other nodes in the observers region of
concern; Pj is the [x,y,z] absolute position of the observed node (relative to some coordinated
origin point agreed upon at launch) and Vj is the [x,y,z] velocity of the observed node.
Thus, the metric vector used for the physical-trust assessment from one observer node
to a given target node is;
Xi,j={INDDi,j,INHDi,j,,Vi,j} (5.4)
At each time-step, each node will have a separate X assessment vector for each node it
has observed in that time. Ergo the fleet or team as a whole will have N×N−1 assessment
vectors at each timestep.
These physical metrics are used to encompass the relative distributions and activities of
nodes within the network. As such, these metrics completely encapsulate and abstract the
physical behaviour of any node. Additional metric constructions may be more suitable for
certain contexts, platforms or operations, however these were selected in collaboration with
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DSTL’s Naval Systems Group and NATO CMRE as suitable, generic, assessments, viable on
most current platforms in most current deployment schemes2. Given that local nodes within
the team are aware of the reported positions and velocities of their neighbours, it is believed
that this is a reasonable set of metrics to establish the usefulness of physical metrics of trust
assessment and validate PSQ. 4.
Physical Misbehaviours
Misbehaviours in the communications space is heavily investigated area in MANETs [153–156],
but attacks and misbehaviours in the physical space are far less explored. Both in terrestrial
and underwater contexts, as MANET applications expand and become increasingly de rigueur,
the impacts of physical or operational misbehaviour become increasingly relevant. As in the
communications space, the primary drivers of any “misbehaviour” come under two general cat-
egories; selfish operation or malicious subterfuge. Autonomous MANETs in general rely (or are
at least, most effective) when all nodes operate fairly, be that in terms of their bandwidth shar-
ing, energy usage, routing optimality or other factors. Physically, if a node is being “selfish”, it
may preferentially move to the edge of a network to minimise it’s dynamic work allocation, or
depending on it’s intent, may insert itself into the centre of a network to maximise it’s ability to
capture, monitor, and manipulate traffic going across the network. In the context of a secure
operation (or one that’s assumed to be secure), there is also the opportunity for capturing a le-
gitimate node and replacing it with a modified clone. Assuming a highly capable outside actor
and a multi-channel communications opportunity, there is also the possibility of a node appear-
ing to “play along” with the crowd that occasionally breaks rank to route internal transmissions
to a outside agent. In the underwater context this may mean an AUV following the rest of a
team along a survey path and occasionally “breaking surface” to communicate to a malicious
controller using a secondary communications link such as WiFi or satellite communications.
Alternatively, if an inserted node is not totally aware of a given mission parameter, such as a
particular survey or waypointing path, it may simply follow along, hoping not to be noticed.
In all these cases, such behaviour involves some element of behaving differently from
the rest of the team, however, there are other cases where such individual “deviance” is
observed; where a node is in some kind of mechanical “failure state”. In the underwater
context, this could be damage to the drive-train or navigation systems, causing it to lag
behind or consistently drift off course. An ideal physical trust management system would
be able to differentiate between both “malicious” behaviours and “failing” behaviours.
To investigate this hypothesis, we create two “bad” behaviours; one “malicious”, where
a cloned node is unaware of the missions’ survey parameters and attempts to “hide” among
the fleet, and a “failing” node, with an impaired drive train, increasing the drag force on the
nodes movement. These two behaviours are designated Shadow and SlowCoach respectively.
2An additionally prototyped metric was Reported Position Deviation which used a per-node Enhanced
Kalman filter based “god view” estimator that constructed positional models based on highly accurate timing
and time-of-flight modelling for non-linear channel paths to predict the movements of squad members and
report discrepancies against their periodic positional updates (assumed to be part of a normal broadcast
protocol), however this investigation is outside the scope of this work
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Figure 5.1: REMUS 100 Craft deployed at CMRE, La Spezia, Italy
Table 5.1: REMUS 100 Mobility Constraints as applied in simulation
Parameter Unit Value
Length m 5.5
Diameter m 0.5
Mass kg 37
Max Speed ms−1 2.5
Cruising Speed ms−1 1.5
Max X-axis Turn ◦s−1 4.5
Max Y-axis Turn ◦s−1 4.5
Max Z-axis Turn ◦s−1 4.5
Axial Drag Coefficient (cd) NA 3
Cross Section Area m2 0.13
Simulation and Validation
Simulation Background
Simulations were conducted using a Python based simulation framework, SimPy [144], with
a network stack built upon AUVNetSim [39], with transmission parameters taken from
and validated against [131] and [145]. For the purposes of this chapter, this network is
used for the dissemination of node location information, assuming suitable compression of
internally assumed location data compressed into one 4096 bit acoustic data frame, with the
network overall emitting approximately 10 frames a minute as per the results of Chapter 4.
Node kinematics are modelled on REMUS 100 AUVs (Fig. 5.1), based on limits and core
characteristics given in [146, 157, 158].3 These limits are given in Table 5.1.
3While the hydrodynamics of the control surfaces of the AUVs are not modelled in this case, axial drag
is modelled as a resistive inertial force on the craft.
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Figure 5.2: Visual representation of the basic Boidean collision avoidance rules used
Node Control Modelling
As discussed in the previous chapter and in Section 1.2, we use the example of a Port
Protection scenario, where a team of six AUVs are tasked with surveying a simplified harbour;
in this case a 1kmx1kmx100m cuboid volume. This is accomplished through a distributed way
point system where by the team overall must “check” several points around the exterior and
interior of this volume in reasonable time. In addition to this, there is a reasoned requirement
for both collision avoidance and a pressure for the fleet to maintain communications distance.
These are encapsulated as three heuristic rules; Cohesion, Repulsion and Alignment.
Fj,C=F+
pj, 1
N
N∑
∀i6=j
pi,dmax
 (5.5)
Fj,R=
N∑
∀i6=j
F−
(
pj,pi,dmax)
∣∣dmax>‖pi−pj‖) (5.6)
Fj,A=
1
N
·
 N∑
∀i6=j
vˆi
 (5.7)
Where F ’s are force-vectors applied to the internal guidance of the AUV, Fj,C representing
Cohesion, Fj,R representing Repulsion, and Fj,A as Alignment: F+ is a scaled vector attraction
function, and F− is an equivalent repulsion function
F+(p
a,pi)=(p̂a−pi)×|p
a−pi|
d
(5.8)
F−(pr,pi)=(p̂i−pr)×|p
r−pi|
d
(5.9)
In essence, the fleet is simultaneously attracted to its current target waypoint as well as
a lesser attraction to the centre of the fleet to retain communications.
Standards of Accuracy
The key question of this chapter is to assess the advantages and disadvantages of utilising
trust from the physical domain.
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It is important to clarify what is meant by “effective” in this case; the “effectiveness” of any
trust assessment framework is taken as consisting of several parts, the accuracy of detection
and identification of a particular misbehaviour, the complexity of such analysis, including any
specific training required, and the differentiability of behaviours using given metrics.
In this case we are particularly interested in the accuracy of detection and identification of
malicious / failing behaviours, and as such are looking at three key characteristics of accuracy;
true detection accuracy (what percentage of “bad” behaviours are detected at all); false
positive rates (what percentage of “control” behaviours are detected as being “bad”); and
misidentification rates (how many instances of one bad behaviour are mischaracterised as
the other and vice versa.
As such we have three primary questions to answer to establish if these metrics are
useful: How accurate are these metrics in being able to easily differentiate between Nor-
mal and Abnormal behaviours in terms of True-Positive and False-Positive rates? What
differentiation of response, if any, is there between the stated abnormal behaviours? Can a
simple classification be built to characterise these differentiations of response, and what is
it’s True-Positive/False-Positive accuracy?
Analysis
Having established the metrics under investigation, 64 simulation runs are executed for each
scenario (i.e. one node “Maliciously” following the fleet with no mission information (Shadow),
one “Failing” node with simulated drive train issues (Shadow), and one baseline control scenario
where all nodes are behaving appropriately (Control). Each of these simulated missions last for
an hour, matching realistic deployment times based on current MOD/NATO operations [66].
Metric Cleaning
In order to assess the viability of using the previously discussed metrics, the raw motion
paths recorded by the simulation are fed into an analysis pipeline aimed at abstracting the
instantaneous observed values into derived deviations from “normal” behaviour in the team.
dm,ti,j =x
m,t
i,j −
∑
kx
m,t
i,k
|M | (5.10)
αm,ti,j = |
dm,ti,j
σdm,ti,j
| (5.11)
Where i and j are indices denoting the current observer node and the current observed
node respectively; x is a summation index representing other nodes in the observers region
of concern; X is the vector of metrics from 5.4; d is an intermediate value of the distance
of a given observation from the mean, and α is a resulting normalised response value in terms
of it’s deviation from the mean.
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Behaviour Detection and Classification
A simple misbehaviour detection is to apply Dixon’s Q-test [159] to the resultant
∑
α values
for each node for each metric for each run establishing if a “misbehaving node” exists in a
given run, and if so, attempt to identify that misbehaving node. For our initial investigation
we will use a Confidence Interval of 95%.
Our initial hypothesis is that by using observations of the previously stated physical
metrics, that we will be able to detect and identify misbehaviours. Within that context, this
Confidence Interval indicates that we would expect only a 5% chance that any run or node
identified using the Q-test to not be a misbehaving run/node. Further, due to the range of
metrics available, by applying the Q-test on a per-metric basis, we can use the “votes” of each
metric as a simplified consensus classifier. This classifier may allow us to characterise some
aspect of a given misbehaviour in terms of metrics it heavily impacts, and those that are less
affected, finding some differentiating-limit between certain behaviours using certain metrics.
Operational Performance Metrics
While not the focus of this chapter, we are also concerned with the impact of these mis-
behaviours on the mission efficiency of the team overall. We monitor this in three main
measurements; the “speed” of the fleet in terms of how many of it’s port-protection way
points it successfully approaches and passes, the total energy used for communications, and
the average end-to-end delay in the acoustic network. We would expect that any misbehaviour
in positioning will incur some loss of efficiency, whether it is the fleet being slowed down by
a straggler attempting to catch up or of a node moving in an unexpected fashion dragging
the team temporarily off course. Given that in acoustic communications, transmission is
energetically expensive while reception is not, and while physical misbehaviours will not
impact the amount of offered load on the network, collisions induced by uneven distribution
of nodes should have a small but measurable effect on energy used for packet reception.
Results and Discussion
Fig. 5.3 shows the raw metric values (vertically) from one run of each behaviour (horizon-
tally), starting with the Control case, where all node are behaving properly with Alfa as
the misbehaving node in the remaining cases. It clear that using the (unitless) INDD and
Inter-Node Heading Deviation (INHD) metrics, Alfa is the outlier and other, fairly behaving,
nodes are all consistent in their metric values. This outlier-response is not nearly as clear
in the Speed metric case (bottom row of Fig. 5.3). This would be expected considering the
cumulative factor of increasing distance between nodes if a given node is “lagging” behind.
From a behaviour-perspective, it appears that the Shadow behaviour is creating the
largest, most obvious deviations.
In Fig. 5.4 the metric values are normalised as per Equ. 5.11. This has highlighted the
outlying-characteristic of INDD and INHD; largely eliminating the other nodes-responses. In
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Figure 5.3: Observed Metric Values for one simulation of each behaviour (xm,ti,j from
Equ. 5.10)
the Speed response of Fig. 5.4, the Speed metric is not obviously highlighting any significant
misbehaviours in that metric.
From Fig. 5.5, it appears that Speed is being significantly affected by the differing
behaviours, but much less so than INDD/INHD.
Detection of Misbehaviours
It has been demonstrated by graphical result that from the initial metrics set, INDD and
INHD do appear to accurately and obviously identify the malicious node in the case that there
is one. Using the deviance normalisation presented in Equ. 5.11, clear, almost contiguous areas
under the Alfa-values are observed in Fig. 5.4 in the Shadow and SlowCoach misbehaviours.
Further, from Fig. 5.5, it is shown that while it is nowhere near as “clear” as the deviance
in INDD and INHD, the Speed metric is registering a statistically significant deviation in
both misbehaviours, and that the difference between the deviances in Speed may indicate
a way to analytically differentiate between the two misbehaviours.
To investigate how this would relate to the ability to blindly detect misbehaviours, the
Q-test is applied to Σα results as used in Fig. 5.5, to attempt to correctly establish:
1. if a node is misbehaving and
2. which node is misbehaving
As such, the “correctness” rule for assessing this strategy is that, in misbehaving cases,
the Q-tests should return Alfa (otherwise a “Fail” is recorded), and in the Control case, the
Q-test should assert that there are no obvious outliers, (otherwise a “Fail” is recorded again).
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Figure 5.4: Normalised Deviance values from one simulation of each behaviour
(αm,ti,j from Equ. 5.11)
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Figure 5.5: Per-Node-Per-Run deviance for each metric, normalised in time (
∑
α/T)
In Table 5.2, the Null case (Control behaviour) is correctly identified 92% of the time. The
“malicious”, Shadow misbehaviour is detected and identified 98% of the time, and the “failing”,
SlowCoach misbehaviour is identified just 79% of the time. These values match our intuition
from Figs. 5.3 and 5.4.
We can investigate this further by looking at the “correctness” of the assessments of
each metric individually (Table 5.3). In both misbehaviours, INDD and INHD correctly
identify Alfa as the misbehaver 100% of the time. However, they misidentify a potential
misbehaviour in the Control case 13% and 7% of the time respectively. Meanwhile, Speed
correctly identified the Control case 97% of the time, and the Shadow case 94% of the time,
but missed the SlowCoach behaviour 63% of the time. This result is surprising on the face
of it, as SlowCoach is a misbehaviour that is exclusively about individual node speed and
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Table 5.2: Overall Q-Test Outlier Correct Detection Accuracy
Behaviour Mean Std.
Control 0.927 0.261
Shadow 0.979 0.144
SlowCoach 0.792 0.408
Table 5.3: Per-Metric Q-Test Outlier Detection Accuracy
Behaviour INDD INHD Speed
Mean Control 0.875 0.938 0.969
Shadow 1.000 1.000 0.938
SlowCoach 1.000 1.000 0.375
Std Control 0.336 0.246 0.177
Shadow 0.000 0.000 0.246
SlowCoach 0.000 0.000 0.492
conceptually should have had a much larger impact on the simple Speed metric. However,
the collaborative nature of the collision avoidance system, and the existing limits on node
kinematics from Table 5.1 are masking this impact.
Identification of Misbehaviours
Having established the ability of INDD, INHD and Speed to all detect physical misbehaviour
to a statistically significant level, and having shown that there is a demonstrable difference
in response to different misbehaviours, we return to the last question from Sec. 5.3.3; can a
simple classifier based on a subset of our results be constructed, and can it be blindly applied
to a new set of results successfully?
From Equ. 5.12, a per-metric-per-behaviour “Confidence” in the relationship between a
given metric deviance and each behaviour is established. It is hypothesised that this confidence
can be used as a signature for that metric, as “significance” was used in Section 4.5.
Cmi =Σtσ
m
i ∗
N−1∑
x6=iΣtσmx
(5.12)
Having demonstrated that the Null case (All nodes behaving fairly) can be identified to a
strong degree of accuracy, our classifier will continue to use the Q-test across all metrics for that
case and concentrate on differentiating the Shadow and SlowCoach behaviours where they exist.
From Table 5.4 it is clear that INDD and INHD have similar responses to both misbe-
haviours, with significant standard deviations, but the response of the Speed metric is much
more stable and discernible; across the range of training simulation runs. In the SlowCoach
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Table 5.4: Metric Confidence Responses for known behaviours Equ. 5.12
Behaviour INDD INHD Speed
Mean Control 1.064 0.966 1.010
Shadow 4.059 3.374 2.098
SlowCoach 4.246 3.352 1.491
Std Control 0.262 0.113 0.132
Shadow 0.398 0.436 0.206
SlowCoach 0.198 0.288 0.180
behaviour, this Speed response centres around 1.5, while the Shadow behaviour centres around
2.0, with these centres being at least one standard deviation away from each other respectively.
Our generated classifier is formalised in Equ. 5.13, taking a point of 1.75 between the
responses of each behaviour to provide a differentiating factor.
C→

Q95(X)=∅, Control
Q95(X) 6=∅∧SpeedX≤1.75, Shadow
Q95(X) 6=∅∧SpeedX>1.75, SlowCoach
(5.13)
Applying this simplified classifier to a blind test set of simulations (of the same scale) gives
surprisingly positive results as shown in Table 5.5, with greater than 90% identification rates
for both misbehaviours. However, in the Null (Control) case we experience a false-positive
rate of nearly 30%, that is to say that in the case where there is no misbehaviour, 30% of
the time a node will be misidentified as misbehaving when it is not.
Table 5.5: Successful Identification rates on untrained results using Equ. 5.13
True Behaviour Probability of Correct Blind Identification
Control 0.719
Shadow 0.906
SlowCoach 0.938
If the rules of this classifier are loosened to require two deviating Q95(X) observations
for detection of non-Control behaviours (i.e. multi-metric deviations), this false positive rate
is eliminated while maintaining true-positive detection characteristics for misbehaviours.
C→

|Q95(X)|≤1, Control
|Q95(X)|>1∧SpeedX≤1.75, Shadow
|Q95(X)|>1∧SpeedX>1.75, SlowCoach
(5.14)
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Table 5.6: Successful Identification rates on untrained results using Equ. 5.13, with
outlier consensus checks
True Behaviour Probability of Correct Blind Identification
Control 1.000
Shadow 0.906
SlowCoach 0.938
Given the simplicity of the applied classifiers, these are strongly positive results for the
use of physical metrics for trust assessment and behaviour discrimination (PSQ. 4); with
INDD and INHD proving as strong and obvious “canaries” of misbehaviour, and Speed in
this case proving a capable differentiator between conceptually close misbehaviours.
Impacts of Misbehaviour on operational performance
The anticipated “small but measurable” effects to communications performance and energy
usage are indeed extremely small and within the bounds of statistical uncertainty. One
observation of merit was an observed 10% increase in end-to-end delay in the case of the
Shadow behaviour; this is due to the misbehaving node “overshooting” the mission way points
and thus temporarily loosing direct connection to nodes on the opposite side of the fleet from
it, causing retransmissions and thus, delays. As for physical efficiency, achievement rates were
identical to within 2% error on each run across all behaviours, and total fleet distance covered
varied by a similar margin. It’s possible that our selected behaviours were too unambitious
in our impacts, and future work should be done to investigate the impact of “heavy-handed”
or destructive behaviours on the operational efficiency of autonomous networks.
Conclusion
• PSQ. 4 - First demonstration of a rudimentary TMF based purely on information
about the physical movements of nodes.
• Demonstrated that seemingly similar physical misbehaviours induce detectable changes
in observable metrics
• Demonstrated a highly accurate, manually configured, blind behaviour classifier (≈ 0%
FP, ' 90 % TP)
In this chapter we have demonstrated that with current and on-the-horizon underwater
localisation techniques, that in certain mobility models, that a set of relatively simple geometric
abstractions (INDD, INHD, and Speed), between nodes as part of an Underwater MANET
can be used as a Trust Assessment and Establishment metric.
These metrics are application-agnostic and could potentially be applied in other areas
of mobile autonomy such as AUV operations and Autonomous Vehicular Networks.
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We show, using a Port-Protection way point scenario built upon a Boidian collision
prevention behaviour that in a simulated underwater environment, the outputs of these
metrics can be used to detect and differentiate between exemplar malicious behaviour and
potential failure states.
This verification further supports the assertions the authors have made previously that it
is practical to extend Trust protocols such as MTFM [160] to include metrics and observations
from the physical domain as well as those from the communication domain [161]. In the next
chapter, this combination of physical and “logical” information is explored to establish if it
further supports the decentralised and distributed establishment of observation based Trust.

Chapter 6
Multi-Domain Trust Assessment
in Collaborative Marine MANETs
Introduction
Having validated the premises a fair analogue can be generated between RF and UAN
MANETs (PSQ. 1), that those networks can have communications trust management applied
to them with the aid of machine learning ( PSQ. 2, PSQ. 3), and that there are strong
indications that physical mobility can be applied as an additional trust management domain
(PSQ. 4), now the ability to meaningfully join these domains will be demonstrated (PSQ.
5) and their performance assessed (PSQ. 6).
A key question in this chapter is to assess the advantages and disadvantages of utilising
trust from across domains for MTFM. This includes a secondary question as to how trust
assessments from these domains are most effectively combined or synthesised.
This work is separated into three main experiments;
• Section 6.2 - Optimisation of a simple concatenation of trust domain metric vectors
with respect to each misbehaviour (using the same methodology as Chapter 4)
• Section 6.3 - Classification Performance Assessment of these domains (as well as proposed
“Alternate” metric groupings)
• Section 6.4 - Classification Performance Assessment of a Generalised Synthetic Domain
approach to per-misbehaviour training
Initial Optimisation of Multi-Domain Trust with Predefined
Domains
In this first experiment, the trust domains established previously in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
are combined as a single metric weighting vector for MTFM operation.
The communications domain metric vector is constructed using those trust metrics that
are applicable to the marine environment from [160], as the simulated marine acoustic modem
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stack does not operate on the same tiered data-rate approach as used in the 802.11 stack, the
data rate metric was not included. Remaining metrics are; Delay, Received and Transmitted
power, Throughput (S), Offered Load (G) and PLR.
Thus, the metric vector used for communications-trust assessment is;
Xcomms={D,PRX,PTX,S,G,PLR} (6.1)
From Chapter 5; Three physical metrics are selected to encompass the relative distributions
and activities of nodes within the network; INDD, INHD, and Node Speed. These metrics
encapsulate the relative distributions of position and velocity within the fleet, optimising for
the detection of outlying or deviant behaviour within the fleet.
Conceptually, INDD is a measure of the average spacing of an observed node with respect
to its neighbours. INHD is a similar approach with respect to node orientation.
INDDi,j=
|Pj−
∑
x
Px
N |
1
N
∑
x
∑
y|Px−Py|(∀x 6=y)
(6.2)
INHDi,j= vˆ|v=Vj−
∑
x
Vx
N
(6.3)
Vi,j= |Vj| (6.4)
Thus, the metric vector used for physical-trust assessment is;
Xphy={INDD,INHD,V } (6.5)
This simplest possible combination is a vector concatenation across domain metric vectors;
in this case;
Xfull=(Xcomms|Xphy)={D,PRX,PTX,S,G,PLR,INDD,INHD,V } (6.6)
Metric Weight Analysis Scheme
From Equ. 2.18, the final trust values arrived at using MTFM are dependent on metric values,
the weights assigned to each metric, and the structure of the g, b comparison vectors.
This permits the assessment of the significance of different metrics in the detection and
identification of different behaviours. The primary aspects of a (mis)behaviour can be detected
and assessed by comparing a weighted trust assessment against the deviation from a control
result set (“fair” node behaviour) using the same weight, i.e. we are interested in the weight
schemes that create the largest difference between fair and misbehaving cases.
For a metric weight vector H, where the metric mj is emphasised as being twice as
important as the other metrics, an initial weighting vector H′=[hi···hM ] is formed such that
hi=1∀i 6=j;hj=2. That vector H′ is then scaled such that
∑
H=1 by H= H
′∑|H′| .
The construction of the g and b vectors from Equ. 2.17 depends on the particular metric,
e.g. Throughput (S) on a link is assumed to be positively correlated to trustworthiness and
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so follows the default construction (g(S) 7→max,b(S) 7→min), whereas in the case of a metric
such as delay, this relationship is inverted, i.e. longer delays indicate less trustworthy activity
(g(D) 7→ min,b(D) 7→ max). This inversion relationship (i.e. those with the construction
g(x) 7→min,b(x) 7→max) is signified by a negative weights in the H vector.
This signed H vector reflects the search space of this analysis; probing the multi-
dimensional metric search space for metric combinations the create the largest deviations in
Trust assessment under node misbehaviour.
In complex environments, the relationship between metrics trustworthiness correlations
is not always as obvious as the throughput / delay examples. This phenomenon was men-
tioned by Guo [160], but was manually configured for each metric for each behaviour and no
analytical method for quantitatively establishing such relationships has been presented since.
With the nine selected metrics from across communications and physical behaviours, we
can explore this metric space by varying the weights associated with each metric, and choose
to emphasise across three levels; i.e. metrics can be ignored or over-emphasised. Naively this
results in 39=19683 combinations, however as these weights are being normalised, redundant
duplicates can be eliminated, e.g. [0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0]≡ [0,0,0,0,2,0,0,0,0] leaving 18661 unique
weights for analysis.
To assess the performance of a given weight combination (i.e. an optimisation factor),
we are initially interested in the metric weight vector that consistently provides the largest
deviation in the final trust value T across the cohort, i.e. producing the most clear detection of
a node misbehaving in that particular fashion. This is approached as an inverse outlier filtering
problem, and the range outside a ±σ envelope compared to the equivalent weighting in a
known “fair” behaviour is selected to assess detection (or comparing to other misbehaviours
to assess discrimination). See Section 4.5. Note that at this point we establish “signatures”
of different behaviours rather than optimal detection weights.
We apply a Random Forest regression [150] to assess the relative importance of the selected
metrics on relative detectability of malicious behaviour. Random Forest accomplishes this by
generating a large number of random regression trees and prune these trees based on how ac-
curate they are in correctly matching the input data. In this case that data is the deviation in
trust observed (∆T) between a two behaviours, i.e. maximising the ability to tell the difference
between two given behaviours (i.e. “Fair” and “Malicious”). A major advantage of Random For-
est in this case is that by walking the most successful regression trees, we can acquire an already
normalised maximal activation weight for the particular behaviour comparison being tested.
After establishing the importance of weights in particular behaviours, a final weight is
arrived at by algorithmically those few metrics that are important, rather than having to
further explore the computationally expensive weight-space.
Using this approach, the results of these simulations can be explored, condensing the
multi-dimensional problem (target / observer / behaviour / metric / time) down to a more
manageable level for analysis.
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Table 6.1: Multi Domain Metric Feature Correlation (Xmerge)
Delay PRX PTX S PLR G INDD INHD Speed
Misbehaviour
MPC -0.187 0.129 0.579 0.006 0.069 -0.146 0.040 -0.190 -0.297
STS -0.195 -0.035 0.019 -0.100 0.019 0.381 -0.209 0.057 0.062
Shadow 0.004 -0.654 0.030 -0.016 0.030 0.063 0.120 0.158 0.266
SlowCoach -0.157 -0.533 0.013 -0.132 0.013 -0.028 0.159 0.206 0.460
Results and Discussion
Figs 6.1 and 6.2, show the resultant feature significances for Communications -only and
Physical only metric selections respectively, and in Fig. 6.3, these metric spaces are brought
together and reassessed. Firstly, when the domains are brought together, the communications
domain appears to largely dominate significance, with SlowCoach being the only behaviour
where the significance of a Physical metric comes close to the assessed significance of commu-
nications metrics. While this does not initially bode well for the overall utility of the physical
metrics use in tandem with the communications domain, it may be that these physical metrics
become key deciding factors between conceptually similar behaviours; in Fig. 6.3, both the
Shadow and SlowCoach behaviours have a highly significant transmission power factor, but
SlowCoach also exhibits a significant Speed factor where Shadow does not.
In the next experiment, weighting filters based both these initial domains and a proposed
pair of “Alternate” domains are assessed for their blind operation and performance.
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Figure 6.1: Communications Metric Features (Xcomms)
Chapter 6. Multi-Domain Trust Assessment in Collaborative Marine MANETs 111
MPC STS Shadow SlowCoachBehaviour
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
E
st
.M
et
ri
c
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
0.7
0.53
0.46
0.37
0.33
0.55
0.32
INDD
INHD
Speed
Figure 6.2: Physical Metric Features (Xphys)
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Figure 6.3: Multi Domain Metric Features (Xmerge)
Performance Assessment and Alternative Domain Groupings
In both single-domain cases in the previous section, there are clear “signatures” in misbe-
haviours that don’t directly target that domain (PRX in the Physical Shadow and Slowcoach
behaviours in Fig 6.1 and INDD in the Selfish Target Selection behaviour in Fig 6.2). This
inter-domain activity is to be expected in MANETs in general, where the physical reality
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of the network (i.e. distance between nodes) directly impacts the behaviour of the logical
communications network (i.e. delay between nodes), and is a useful characteristic coupling
for differentiating potential misbehaviours.
Fig. 6.4 attempts to lay out the results of Feature Extraction across a spectrum of
Communications / Physical domain assessment, matching the assumed domains of the stated
misbehaviours based on the resultant significance in relevant domain misbehaviours. From
this, two alternative “domains” are constructed; “Comms. Alt.” and “Phys. Alt.”, as artificial
constructions of the relevant domains attempting to encapsulate the most responsive features
for each misbehaviour-domain1.
This gives 5 candidate metric “domains” for optimisation and performance assessment;
Xfull=(Xcomms|Xphy)={D,PRX,PTX,S,G,PLR,INDD,INHD,V } (6.7)
Xcomms={D,PRX,PTX,S,G,PLR} (6.8)
Xphy={INDD,INHD,V } (6.9)
X‘comms={PTX,S,G,PLR,INDD} (6.10)
X‘phys={D,PRX,INDD,INHD,V } (6.11)
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Figure 6.4: Assumptions made about the relevant domains of impact / detectability
of misbehaviours, and domain relevance of metrics, may not be optimal
From the significance information resulting from the previous section, an “estimated”
signature for each behaviour can be inferred, which can then be fed back into MTFM. The
aim of this iteration is to minimise the number of weight permutations required to come to
a conclusion about the behaviour under observation.
1These constructions are largely arbitrary and are the result of “extensive” analysis by the author and
their supervisors application of the MK I Eyeball
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However, these approximated signatures have no information regarding the “sign” of the
g,b comparison vectors from Equ. 2.18, i.e. there is no hint as to whether the relationship
is g(x) 7→max,b(x) 7→min or g(x) 7→min,b(x) 7→max)
One option would be to go back to the regression point and expand the combination options
to include negative values, signifying inverted g,b relationships, however this is combinatorially
explosive.2 Instead, the “significance” weight is permuted against it’s possible combinations
of “flips”, i.e. for Xs=[0.3,0.4,0.01,0.02,0.27] could also be X
p
s =[0.3,−0.4,0.01,0.02,0.27] and
so on. This sign permutation is filtered based on a threshold value (0.01), so for all indices
below that threshold will not be permuted on, halving the number of combinations required
for each indices eliminated. This reduces the number of additional assessments required from
1.9×106 to approximately 500 (when applied to all nine metrics) for each experimental run.
The best of these permutations is selected to both maximise the (correct) deviation
between each nodes trust perspectives and to minimise the trust value reported for the
misbehaving nodes; ∆T→max+ (Equ. 6.12, results summarised in Table 6.2). Additionally,
a “False Positive” assessment, ∆T− (Equ. 6.13 shown in Table 6.3) which encapsulates the
average false positive selection rate.
∆Tix=
∑
j 6=x
(
Ti,j
∀t)
N−1 −Ti,x
∀t
(6.12)
∆T−ix=
∑
j 6=x∆Tij
N−1 −∆Ti,x
∀t
(6.13)
Where i is a given observer, x is the known misbehaving node, Ti,j
∀t
is the average weighted
trust assessment of node j observed by node i across time and N is the number of nodes.
Conceptually, ∆Tix represents the “Relative Distrust” of the target node x, as the dif-
ference in trust value from 0→1, the higher the value the larger the “drop” in trst of the
misbehaviour compared to the cohort. ∆T−ix represents the average ∆Tij for all other nodes,
representing the likelihood of another node being as highly distrusted as x, where positive
values indicate that x is not the obvious outlier, negative values indicate that x is a very clear
outlier, and near-zero values indicate a difficulty in selection of any outlier from the cohort.
The “best” weight permutations, as shown in Table 6.4, are applied to untrained datasets
for these results.
This is a departure from the Dixons Q-Test applied in Chapter 5, as the number of metrics
in use, and the recognised variability in response to different metrics makes a simple outlier
assessment unfairly naive for performance assessment. With respect to PSQ. 3 and PSQ.
5, the primary motivation to this work is to generate weights that (in the case of a single
attacker) induce the largest Trust reduction observable by as many nodes within the network.
This motivation is encapsulated in the ∆Tix assessment, and allows increased abstraction so
2The current version of this analysis uses three metric weights; ignored, standard, emphasised, giving
39=19683 combinations. Expanding this to include inverted standard and inverted emphasised weights would
raise that to 59=1.9×106 for each training dataset for each node relationship
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as to assess the variability of metrics in use, and to assess the usefulness of such generated
“Alternate” or “Synthetic” domains.
An exemplar subset of the results is shows in Figs 6.5a- 6.6f, with the “misbehaving node”
indicated above its distribution plot.
The most intuitively “Communications” behaviour, MPC, scores comfortably in the 90th
percentile range in both Communications Domain (Fig. 6.5a) and Full Domain (Fig. 6.5e)
trust assessments. As seen in Table 6.4, both the “Full” and “Comms” metric optimisations
heavily weigh PTX, and as this is the metric directly modified by the misbehaviour, it is
expected that this is easily discernible using these domain weights. However when this
communications information is unavailable, as is the case in the use of Physical Domain
metrics alone in Fig. 6.5c, the misbehaving node (Alfa) is completely indiscernible compared
to the other nodes, with all nodes in the cohort tending to a trust value of 0.5. How this
discernibility would fare under varying emphasis of behaviours is an open question.
Under the most “subtle” behaviour; STS, where no direct metric is being modified in
operation, but where the behaviour is effectively in the “Application layer” of the networking
stack, the picture is far more murky and particularly disappointing when compared to the
initial significance assessments from Section 6.2. Comparing Figs 6.5b and 6.5f, while there
is a reasonable dip in the misbehavers trust assessment, the high level of variance across the
cohort is such that this “mistrust” triggering is neither consistent or obvious. From Table 6.4,
the metric of import is G, the Offered Load on the network, and given it’s negative weighting,
this matches the expectation that the node doing “less than it’s fair share” is potentially
misbehaving. Unfortunately this is the case across the STS responses, where in Table 6.2 we
have summarized out general results, STS has by far and away the lowest average ∆T in all
domains. Interestingly, Comms-only trust performs slightly better than Full trust weighting,
due to unnecessary redundancy with metrics in the physical domain “flattening out” the
response of the combined approach when presented with this relatively subtle behaviour.
Referring to Figs 6.1 and Fig. 6.3, it’s clear that the offered load (G) is the almost singular
feature of this behaviour, due to it’s almost completely logical behaviour that is only loosely cou-
pled to the state of the environment. The massive emphasis placed on load could only be dimin-
ished by putting it together in a larger ensemble. In Figs 6.6a and 6.6e, the misbehaving node
is much more obvious than in STS, which is moderately surprising for a physically-focused be-
haviour. Further, there is a roughly 20% improvement when incorporating the full metric space.
From Table 6.2, the Shadow behaviour is the most consistently detectable behaviour
across selected metric domains, which further suggests at the opportunity of correlating metric
assessments across multiple domains.
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(a) MPC Comms Metric Trust
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(b) STS Comms Metric Trust
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(c) MPC Physical Metric Trust
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(d) STS Physical Metric Trust
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(e) MPC Full Metric Trust
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(f) STS Full Metric Trust
Figure 6.5: TMTFM assessments for MPC and STS “Communications” behaviours
Table 6.2: ∆T across domains and “proposed” behaviours targeting known
misbehaving node
Domain
Behaviour
MPC STS Shadow SlowCoach Avg.
Full 0.81 -0.03 0.42 0.60 0.45
Comms 0.85 0.04 0.19 0.26 0.34
Phys 0.04 0.00 0.39 0.69 0.28
Comms alt. 0.85 0.03 0.38 0.45 0.43
Phys alt. 0.48 0.03 0.42 0.63 0.39
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(a) Shadow Comms Metric Trust
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(b) SlowCoach Comms Metric Trust
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(c) Shadow Physical Metric Trust
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(d) SlowCoach Physical Metric Trust
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(e) Shadow Full Metric Trust
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(f) SlowCoach Full Metric Trust
Figure 6.6: TMTFM assessments for Shadow and SlowCoach “Physical” behaviours
Table 6.3: ∆T− False Positive assessments across domains and “proposed”
behaviours across non-misbehaving nodes
Domain
Behaviour
MPC STS Shadow SlowCoach Avg.
Full -0.16 0.01 -0.08 -0.12 -0.09
Comms -0.17 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07
Phys -0.01 -0.00 -0.08 -0.14 -0.06
Comms alt. -0.17 -0.01 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09
Phys alt. -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08
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Table 6.4: Optimised metric vector weights per domain trained upon and behaviour
targeted
Domain, Behaviour
Metric
Delay PRX PTX S G PLR INDD INHD Speed
Full MPC -0.033 0.154 0.495 0.034 -0.035 0.062 -0.047 -0.039 -0.101
STS -0.106 0.042 0.010 0.095 0.438 0.010 -0.194 -0.049 -0.055
Shadow 0.019 0.656 0.007 -0.030 -0.021 0.007 -0.081 -0.054 -0.125
SlowCoach 0.040 0.373 0.009 -0.042 -0.025 0.009 -0.087 0.099 -0.316
Comms MPC 0.045 0.068 0.665 0.029 -0.043 0.150
STS 0.098 0.083 0.047 0.118 -0.608 0.046
Shadow -0.358 0.279 0.025 0.119 0.193 0.024
SlowCoach -0.082 0.309 0.021 0.090 0.478 0.020
Phys MPC -0.439 -0.383 -0.178
STS -0.729 -0.164 -0.108
Shadow -0.555 -0.142 -0.304
SlowCoach -0.285 -0.118 -0.597
Comms alt. MPC 0.731 0.019 -0.024 0.211 -0.014
STS 0.040 -0.131 -0.444 0.038 -0.348
Shadow 0.033 -0.124 -0.104 0.032 -0.707
SlowCoach 0.029 -0.164 -0.184 0.028 -0.595
Phys alt. MPC 0.043 0.389 -0.311 -0.075 -0.183
STS -0.356 0.095 -0.235 -0.135 -0.179
Shadow 0.081 0.577 -0.097 0.070 -0.175
SlowCoach -0.106 0.309 -0.067 0.099 -0.420
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Performance of Generalised Synthetic Domains
So far, the ability to generate and test the “best” metric weighting schemes across domains has
been demonstrated, optimising for the highest levels of selectivity between fair and expected
misbehaviours. However, these metric weighting schemes have been constructed into “domains”
based on natural experience in the operating environment. Through observation of the metric
significances shown in Fig. 6.3, potential alternative “domains” were generated through simple
observation of the visual result. In order to remove the human element, and investigate the
wider impact and potential optimisation of this “optimum subdomain” subset idea, the idea
whether these intrinsic domains (Physical and Communications) can be improved upon by
removing the assumption that “Communications” behaviours are best identified through the
use of Communications metrics is tested.
To accomplish this, the discussed analysis from metric weight significance regression and
generation to ∆Tix and ∆T
−
ix validation is performed for all combinations of the M = 9
explored metrics with three or more metrics (k≥3).
From this brute-force approach 3, a small investigation can be made in to both the
performance of metric subsets, and the potential redundancies between metrics. For instance,
one could expect that PRX would be almost always directly related to the expected positioning
between nodes and therefore to INDD. However, a counter hypothesis would be that this
redundancy is present in the “Fair” case, but in misbehaving cases, the discrepancy between
PRX and INDD could indicate or characterise a particular misbehaviour.
The True Positive (∆Tix) is again used to indicate the overall performance of a particular
synthetic domain (i.e. a synthetic domain created by the arbitrary selection of a given set
of trust metrics for optimisation and assessment). Fig. 6.7e shows the distribution in ∆Tix
for each behaviour for the top 10% of this simple mean. As has been shown before, it’s
immediately clear that MPC and SlowCoach are the more responsive behaviours to detect
across the metric space, with Shadow being slightly more difficult and STS remaining as
challenging to detect as in earlier attempts. This is disappointing, as it was hoped that some
combination of metrics in relative isolation would be capable of highlighting this behaviour
in a more convincing manner, but it is clear that the Application level nature of the STS
attack is avoiding significant impacts across all the metrics currently applied.
Across the figures in Fig. 6.7, when behaviours are targeted for this meta-optimisation,
naive as it is, the variability in response performance in other, unoptimised, misbehaviours is
greatly increased, indicating that, at least in the case of attempting to identify misbehaviour,
that this is a case of over-optimisation, and that in the majority of cases, optimising for the
mean response (Fig. 6.7e) will be sufficient to get a strong and consistent performance across
misbehaviours.
This is shown explicitly in Fig. 6.8, where the selective performance ratio between a
targeted subset optimisation and the “mean” subset optimisation demonstrates that in all
cases but STS, targeting specific behaviours for this domain synthesis does not meaningfully
3each “run” consisting of
(
M
k
)
individual weight assessments, with the same multiplicity of 8 experimental
runs per scenario per target node as before in previous runs
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Figure 6.7: Variability in cross-behaviour performance of Top 10% of synthetic
domains based on individual misbehaviours and the overall mean response
improve the true-positive behaviour of trust assessment, and in general decreases the detection
accuracy. The abstractions for the generation of Fig. 6.8 are shown in Table 6.10.
Looking at the performance of these targeted synthetic domains with respect to the metrics
used, Fig. 6.9 shows the metric selection correlations across metrics and behaviours. From
this it is observed that while there is a relatively consistent relationship between “Physical”
metrics (INDD, INHD and Speed) and “Physical” misbehaviours (SlowCoach and Shadow),
this is far from consistent across the domain space.
Looking back at the performance of the previously used Native and Alternative Domains,
Table 6.2 can be extended to include results from the “Best” synthetic domains for each mis-
behaviour, shown in Table 6.11. As stated, it is not surprising that these Behaviour-optimised
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Table 6.5: Top 5 performing synthetic domains, targeting MPC, and including their
performance in detecting other misbehaviours
Behaviour ∆Tix Metrics in Synthetic Domain
MPC STS Shadow SlowCoach Mean Delay PRX PTX S G PLR INDD INHD Speed
0.89 0.01 0.35 0.54 0.45 3 3 3 3
0.89 -0.03 0.17 0.64 0.42 3 3 3 3 3
0.89 0.05 0.12 0.46 0.38 3 3 3 3
0.89 0.04 0.35 0.55 0.46 3 3 3 3 3
0.89 -0.03 0.27 0.49 0.41 3 3 3 3
Table 6.6: As in Table 6.5, but targeting STS
Behaviour ∆Tix Metrics in Synthetic Domain
MPC STS Shadow SlowCoach Mean Delay PRX PTX S G PLR INDD INHD Speed
0.86 0.06 0.37 0.49 0.45 3 3 3 3 3
0.84 0.06 0.39 0.51 0.45 3 3 3 3
0.83 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.23 3 3 3 3
0.04 0.06 0.18 0.68 0.24 3 3 3 3
0.05 0.06 0.17 0.51 0.20 3 3 3 3
Table 6.7: As in Table 6.5, but targeting Shadow
Behaviour ∆Tix Metrics in Synthetic Domain
MPC STS Shadow SlowCoach Mean Delay PRX PTX S G PLR INDD INHD Speed
0.49 -0.00 0.44 0.66 0.40 3 3 3 3
0.81 -0.03 0.43 0.68 0.47 3 3 3 3 3
0.81 0.02 0.43 0.66 0.48 3 3 3 3 3 3
0.78 -0.02 0.43 0.62 0.45 3 3 3 3 3 3
0.40 -0.01 0.43 0.63 0.36 3 3 3 3 3
synthetic domains perform better at maximising ∆Tix in their targeted behaviours, with an
incurred reduction in the average response to other misbehaviours.
In terms of a comparison between the previously generated “Alternate” domains, which
were made by visual inspection of the returned relevance from Fig. 6.3, the “SlowCoach”
synthetic domain uses almost all the same domains as the “Phys Alt.” domain, such that the
synthetic domain leaves the Delay metric out, and in all cases except for STS, outperforms
the Alternate domain.
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Table 6.8: As in Table 6.5, but targeting SlowCoach
Behaviour ∆Tix Metrics in Synthetic Domain
MPC STS Shadow SlowCoach Mean Delay PRX PTX S G PLR INDD INHD Speed
0.47 0.00 0.37 0.72 0.39 3 3 3 3
0.67 -0.03 0.39 0.72 0.44 3 3 3 3
0.52 0.02 0.42 0.71 0.42 3 3 3 3
0.37 0.03 0.40 0.71 0.38 3 3 3 3
0.33 -0.02 0.40 0.71 0.36 3 3 3 3
Table 6.9: As in Table 6.5, but targeting the mean response across misbehaviours
Behaviour ∆Tix Metrics in Synthetic Domain
MPC STS Shadow SlowCoach Mean Delay PRX PTX S G PLR INDD INHD Speed
0.88 0.03 0.42 0.69 0.50 3 3 3 3 3
0.87 0.03 0.42 0.68 0.50 3 3 3 3 3 3
0.89 0.04 0.37 0.69 0.50 3 3 3 3
0.87 0.02 0.42 0.67 0.50 3 3 3 3 3
0.88 0.04 0.38 0.68 0.49 3 3 3 3 3
Table 6.10: Averaged summary of top 10% for each targeted behaviour, with the
average ratio of occurrence of each metrics for the summarised synthetic domains
Targeted
Behaviour
Behaviour ∆Tix Metrics in Synthetic Domain
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MPC 0.89 0.02 0.25 0.53 0.42 0.65 0.40 1.00 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.20 0.70 0.45
STS 0.58 0.05 0.25 0.43 0.33 0.80 0.40 0.55 0.70 0.30 0.65 0.30 0.35 0.35
Shadow 0.70 0.00 0.43 0.63 0.44 0.50 1.00 0.65 0.05 0.45 0.75 1.00 0.70 0.95
SlowCoach 0.52 0.00 0.38 0.70 0.40 0.50 0.80 0.25 0.35 0.65 0.15 0.65 0.05 1.00
Mean 0.87 0.02 0.40 0.67 0.49 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.35 0.70 0.20 0.60 0.20 1.00
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Figure 6.8: Ratio of relative per-behaviour synthetic domain targeting to Mean
targeting
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Figure 6.9: Correlations between highest performing synthetic domain metrics with
respect to Targeted misbehaviours
Selectivity Performance of Optimised Domains
Having arrived at a set of Basic, Alternate, and now Synthetic domains, optimised for maximis-
ing the induced “drop” in trust, (i.e. maximising ∆Tix), an estimate of the actual performance
of these assessments must be made. This is accomplished using an extension of the Dixon
classifier used in Chapter 5, such that rather than detecting outliers based on a physical metric,
outliers are detected based on the differential trust value given by a given optimised weight.
This is initially tested in what can be considered the “best case”; using the previously
optimised domains above to weight a collection of over 5000 execution runs in each of the
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Table 6.11: ∆Tix behaviour detection performance across basic, alternate, and
targeted-synthetic domains, showing the respective constituent metrics
Domain
Behaviour ∆Tix Metrics in Domain
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B
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ic Full 0.81 -0.03 0.42 0.60 0.45 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Comms 0.85 0.04 0.19 0.26 0.34 3 3 3 3 3 3
Phys 0.04 0.00 0.39 0.69 0.28 3 3 3
A
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e
Comms alt. 0.85 0.03 0.38 0.45 0.43 3 3 3 3
Phys alt. 0.48 0.03 0.42 0.63 0.39 3 3 3 3 3
S
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ic
MPC 0.89 0.01 0.35 0.54 0.45 3 3 3 3
STS 0.86 0.06 0.37 0.49 0.45 3 3 3 3 3
Shadow 0.49 -0.00 0.44 0.66 0.40 3 3 3 3
SlowCoach 0.47 0.00 0.37 0.72 0.39 3 3 3 3
Mean 0.88 0.03 0.42 0.69 0.50 3 3 3 3 3
basic, alternate and synthetic domains, and using this multi-domain trust vector in Dixons’
Q-Test. (Again, Q95)
The results from this detection test are shown in Table 6.12 and Table 6.12. Comparing
the synthetic domain results to the existing alternate and basic domains, in all cases except
for SlowCoach, the targeted domain performs marginally better than any other domain, but
the margin in this is very slim.
STS continues to evade direct detection despite having promising metric and domain
significances; across all metric weightings and domains applied, the 7% detection rate arrived
at with its synthetic domain (matching it’s false positive rate) may be the best that can be
expected from this methodology.
In the case where there is no misbehaviour, the targeted synthetic domain sets demon-
strate a marginally smaller True Negative performance compared to the basic and alternate
domains, with the exception of the Mean synthetic case, which is operationally equivalent in
performance to the “Full” basic domain in terms of detecting the “absence” of misbehaviour.
Considering that the Mean synthetic domain has just over half the number of engaged metrics
of the Full domain (Table 6.11), this would indicate that the Mean synthetic domain is
a prime candidate for a “general misbehaver detection” domain with lower computational
complexity than either re-running a full metric optimisation as per Chapter 4 at runtime,
or applying a suite of alternate or synthetic domains to perform an ensemble detection4.
4It is interesting to note that this “Mean” synthetic domain does not contain PLR, which is the primary
metric for most standard MANET TMFs
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Table 6.12: Accuracy of Correct identification of misbehaver using Domain-Trained
weight vectors with a Dixons Q based limit-classifier
Domain
True Positive Iden-
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Figure 6.10: Accuracy of Correct identification of misbehaver using Domain-Trained
weight vectors with a Dixons Q based limit-classifier
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Table 6.13: Negative-Accuracy of Correct identification of misbehaver using
Domain-Trained weight vectors with a Dixons Q based limit-classifier
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True Negative Iden-
tification of Misbehaver
False Negative Iden-
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Mean 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.10
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Figure 6.11: Negative-Accuracy of Correct identification of misbehaver using
Domain-Trained weight vectors with a Dixons Q based limit-classifier
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Conclusion
Key Outcomes:
• Demonstrated that (seemingly) domain-specific behaviours have detectable impacts
across other domains (Section 6.2)
• PSQ. 5 - Demonstrated that combining communications and physical domains yields
a functioning cross-domain TMF (Section 6.3)
• Demonstrated a generic method for generating optimised synthetic domains targeting
particular behaviour to reduce computation requirements (Section 6.4)
• Demonstrated that per-misbehaviour synthetic domains out-perform all other domains
in overall impact on resultant trust assessments (Table 6.11)
• Identified that the application-level STS is particularly difficult to blindly classify despite
high levels of metric significance (Section 6.5)
• PSQ. 6 - Demonstrated that in most cases, generalised synthetic domains outperform
both Basic domains and human-judged Alternate domain groupings in misbehaviour
detection and classification (Table 6.12)
In this chapter we demonstrate that in harsh environments, multi-domain trust assessment
can perform better on average than single-domain counterparts, both in terms of robustness
and sensitivity, but also covering a wider region of the potential behaviour space,
The extension of the methodologies of multi-vector trust into the marine space are al-
ready demonstrated, however including information from physical observations of actors in
a network enables the detection and identification of a much wider range of behaviours. We
also demonstrate a method for assessing trust metrics in harsh environments in terms of their
relative significance, and a method for establishing classification signatures for misbehaviours.
Finally, the synthetic generation of abstract metric domains is explored, where it is found
that in most cases, optimising for generalised performance provides the strongest deviations
in observed Trust when targeted specifically, further supporting the use of a mixed-domain
approach for Trust across domains for identification of misbehaviours (PSQ. 5, PSQ. 6).
It is to be noted that this presented method is significantly more computationally intensive
than the relatively simple Hermes / OTMF algorithms communications only algorithms, and
is exponential in complexity as metrics and/or domains are added. The repeated metric
re-weighting required for real time behaviour detection is therefore an area that requires
optimization. More work needs to be done to characterise how worthwhile this approach is
compared to a separate synthesis approach where by MTFM-style trust is generated and
assessed on a per-domain basis and subsequently fused.
Every effort has been made to avoid over-training the dataset, using cross validating
sampling for regression and ”best weight” generation, however more meta-analysis is required
to further demonstrate the optimality of this process.
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For greater fidelity and more optimal results, a wider range of weights can be used in
the initial regression step; however this is computationally expensive given that weighting
is applied to each perspective (i.e. observer/target node pair) for each trust assessment time
step, presenting 15 perspectives at each time interval in the 6 node case.
For discrete detection of the presence of misbehaviours and identification of a misbehaver,
it is shown that optimising for the ∆Tix mean response across misbehaviours provides a
domain with almost identical selectivity, which uses metrics from across both communications
and physical domains to provide a general “canary” trust assessment, and with further
exploration in to scenario and environmental applicability, could prove to be a viable “first
port of call” synthetic domain.

Chapter 7
Conclusions & Future Work
Conclusions
The use of MANET architectures in the UAN space requires a fundamental reassessment of the
security and reliability mechanisms and performance of such networks in the challenging under-
water environment. The strengths of MANET architectures inherently produce decentralised,
self-organised, collaborative networks that strive towards efficiency and performance where all
network members perform fairly. However, with the increasing introduction of autonomy into
the general MANET space, this assessment of “fairness” is simultaneously an assessment of
the capability of the network, and of the “trustworthiness” of the autonomous nodes within it.
The original MANET architecture was designed with no in-built defence or security
capabilities, and as such, threat mitigation mechanisms been superimposed over time to
protect against fundamental vulnerabilities in the architecture due to assumptions of fairness,
the use of open, wireless links with “fuzzy” operational boundaries, highly mobile nodes
inducing dynamic topologies, and constrained power/computation/locomotion/communica-
tions resources. These mechanisms vary, from evidence based cryptographic security such as
centralised trusted third parties, a-priori shared secrets or one-time-pads, to fully decentralised
PKI systems. However, these classical security measures require significant investments in
memory and computational power; communications channel occupancy; and inherently rely
on relatively short delays between links and from end-to-end points in the network.
In the terrestrial realm, the increasing computing power of devices such as mobile phones
has enabled the creation of pervasive, end to end security. However, as discussed in Chapter 3,
these assumptions of channel availability and low-latency do not hold in the underwater
acoustic space, which is massively variable in channel capacity and delay-response. As such,
regardless of on-board computing power, alternative, decentralised methods for ensuring
the integrity of the network and its operations is essential for expanding the applications of
MANET architectures in this space.
These applications vary from defensive patrolling, ASW and MCM, to pervasive environ-
mental monitoring, and in almost all cases, current military and commercial implementations
benefit from leveraging individual node autonomy in a distributed architecture to bring down
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development and operating costs, increase system efficiency, and fundamentally, save humans
time and in extreme cases, lives.
Trust is one alternative approach evidence based security to maintaining network integrity
in the face of selfish, malicious or faulty misbehaviours in MANETs, and this approach has
been well explored in the terrestrial realm. In Chapter 2, the fundamental concept of Trust
was explored, and a range of psychological, phenomenological, and technical approaches to
Trust assessment and collaborative Trust were investigated. While this included excursions
into the concepts of Design Trust (Subsection 2.4.3) and the impacts of human factors on
the expected performance of trusting systems (Appendix A), this discussion was directed
towards the application of Trust to autonomous MANET, as well as currently developed
methods for establishing and maintaining trust in MANETs such as the Hermes and OTMF
single-metric assessment frameworks (Subsection 2.5.4), and MTFM, which broke new ground
in Trust establishment by looking at many available communications related metrics as an
ensemble(Subsection 2.5.5), and applies Grey Relational Grading and whitenization (Ap-
pendix B) to take assessments across the communications domain and across the network
topology to assess the trustworthiness of nodes within a MANET in a distributed fashion
without requiring environmental or application specific “training”.
In general, Trust is “the level of confidence one agent has in another to perform a given
action on request or in a certain context” (Section 2.5), and has previously been exclusively
concerned with the communications operations of networks, generally relying on measures of
packet routing success to infer expectations of future packet delivery probabilities, improving
route generation and mitigating threats from selfish or malicious interference (Subsection 2.5.2).
However, the UAN application area and its challenging operation and communications con-
straints puts unique challenges on previous assumptions about the operation of abstract trust
frameworks in MANETs, and as such required reassessment.
Further, the UAN application area also highlights more general challenges to Trust in
autonomous MANET; with the imposition of a highly constrained communications channel, it
is difficult to maintain sufficient information about the operation of nodes in the network with
high enough regularity to reliably disseminate that information across the network. Also, the
high constrained physical dynamics and resource intensive communications and locomotion
in UAN MANETs greatly expands the potential threat surface, particularly for DoS-style
resource manipulation attacks; when locomotion is energetically expensive, if a node can
selfishly get a “free ride” by minimising its mobility rather than fairly distributing effort
across the network, operational mission times and overall efficiency can be impaired.
As such there is an open opportunity to explore the application of Trust methodologies
to the physical domain instead of and as well as the communications domain, making such
a TMFs able to identify a much greater range of potential misbehaviours and maintain both
integrity and efficiency.
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Contributions and Findings
Is it useful to return to the original problem statements made in Section 1.2 and the assump-
tions that were listed in the same section.
Within the given context, the primary problem investigated in this work is that
of establishing and maintaining trust between a team of mobile autonomous agents
(AUVs) which collaborate over a sparse, noisy, and delayful communications chan-
nel (UANs) in a distributed fashion to accomplish a specified mission goal (port
protection / persistent situational awareness) with the expectation of subversion
of one agent within the team by a technically capable actor to exhibit a malicious
or selfish behaviour against one or more of the remaining, fairly behaving, agents.
A secondary problem is that of differentiating between malicious or selfish
behaviour and behaviours emerging from damage or misconfiguration of agents
(false positive identification).
PSQ.1 Given the difference in operation and performance of terrestrial free-space RF vs UAN,
what is an optimal point of data rate and node separation that simultaneously maximises
network performance while matching realistic constraints of application?
PSQ.2 How much of existing RF Communications based Trust Management best practice and
theory can be carried over to the harsh marine acoustic environment? Indeed, given
the long delays and sparse communications, will existing TMFs be able to operate at
all? Are there any differences in the threats to trust in this new environment?
PSQ.3 Do machine learning and optimisation techniques increase the efficacy of metric weight
selection in multi-metric TMFs on blind simulations?
PSQ.4 Can these same or similar approaches to communications Trust be applied to other
metric domains, such as the relative position/movement of agents?
PSQ.5 Can these domains of Trust assessment be combined efficiently while improving detection
performance?
PSQ.6 Is this combined assessment method more effective than domain-only detection? Are
there particular classes of misbehaviour that are easy/difficult to identify using these
methods?
Within this context, Chapter 4 initially explores the scaling differences in node distance
and communications rates using a simulated agent based environmental and communications
model, identifying network saturation rates using a range of mobility, scaling, and offered loads,
maximising network performance in terms of a throughput-delay product, providing validation
for PSQ. 1. Existing TMFs methods are applied to this established range, demonstrating
that these (Hermes, OTMF and MTFM) existing frameworks are not directly suitable to
the sparse, noisy, and dynamic underwater environment. While there is little that can be
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done to augment Hermes and OTMF in this environment, the weighted-metric nature of
MTFM allows the metric space to be explored using machine learning techniques for “better”
weighting vectors to detect and identify misbehaviours that are hidden in the unweighted
assessment, providing validation for PSQ. 2 and PSQ. 3.
Having established the operation of Trust in the marine MANET environment, Chapter 5
demonstrates through statistical measures of node distribution and velocities, that malicious
and faulty misbehaviours can be both detected and identified to a high selectivity using
a simple tree-based classifier, using a collaborative Port Protection scenario as a targeted
waypoint mobility baseline. These results strongly validated PSQ. 4.
In Chapter 6, the combination of these domains is assessed. The relative significance of
metrics in the specific identification of a given behaviour is performed through a full-domain
random forest regression by comparing a significant number of simulated mission runs. These
significances, while simply a statistical measure of the importance of a given metric in discrim-
inating between two behaviour (i.e. a fair behaviour and the misbehaviour) provide actionable
information to generate a weighted metric sequence targeting that behaviour. The identi-
fication and classification methodologies from both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are combined
to generate a classifier with very beneficial performance, but this classifier encountered severe
difficulty in detecting the application-level STS behaviour, that had a weighted preference for
communicating with nodes closer to it to conserve energy, forcing others in the network to fill
in any gaps in the network. On the other hand, the MPC behaviour was extremely identifiable,
with a 100% detection rate when using a targeted synthetic domain approach, and it may be
the case that the 20% power increase that was originally taken from Guo et al. [18] is in fact
overplayed and could be reduced. Overall, these results strongly support the premise of PSQ.
5, and supports the statement of PSQ. 6, in so far as these multi-domain approaches are
at least as good as their “Basic” domain counterparts, with the advantage of being capable
of identifying many types of misbehaviour to a high degree of accuracy (See Table 6.12)
Future Work
One of the fundamental difficulties in establishing trust in sparse, noisy networks is that it takes
a significant amount of time to accumulate enough observational metric data to for actionable
opinions. This problem is exacerbated by the asynchronous nature of those metrics; this is
evident in the multi-domain discussion between communications and physical metrics where
overheard location updates for a given node my arrive out-of-sync from other useful information
about that particular relationship, but is also the case in the pure communications domain.
If these metrics are not synchronised, for instance if they are interrupt driven such as
communications-based observations, generating more abstract measurements requires inherent
assumptions about “how to accumulate the data while you wait”. For instance, Chapter 4 and
[19] demonstrated a periodic trust assessment framework for autonomous marine environments,
in such an environment, to establish useful, generalised, data, it was necessary to wait for
a relatively long time to accumulate enough data to make assessments. However, this leads
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to data being left in-buffer for a time before being used to make decisions, and by the time
the data was collated and processed, it could be wildly different from the reality. Further,
while some periods could be extremely sparse or even empty, others could be extremely busy
with many records having to be averaged down to provide a ’single period’ response. One
solution to this would be to move from a stepping-window of trust observations as used in
this work to a continuous trust log, updated on packet reception rather than waiting regular
periods for packets to be analysed. Therefore, the implementation of a suitable grey sequence
buffer version of the framework would be beneficial.
Such a sequence buffer framework would involve a tracking predictor that would provide
best-guess estimates of an interpolated value for a metric between value updates, and a
back-propagation algorithm to retroactively update historical assessments of that metrics so
as to better inform any abstracted trust value predictor.
Additionally, future work could investigate the improvement of weight-based detection
algorithms, the stability of GRA under multi-node collusion, the development of real-time
outlier detection on physical platforms.
From Chapter 5, it is recognised that the geometric abstractions used to assess the validity
of “physical trust assessment” are application-agnostic (assuming collaborative mobility)
and the applicability of this assessment and detection method to other areas such as AUV
operations or Autonomous Vehicle Networks, potentially forming a mode of “body language”
verification for autonomous systems. Equally, the selected metrics are by no means exhaustive,
and other application / mobility specific metrics, such as deviation from a planned path
rather than deviation from a current-node-centre, would benefit the field.
A similarly enticing area of research is the impact of variable misbehaviour will have on
such multi-domain approaches; taking the MPC behaviour as an example, a time-variant
power emphasis could evade windowed trust assessment.
With respect to the operational performance impacts of physical misbehaviour, this is a
very unexplored space and it’s possible that the selected misbehaviours were too unambitious;
future work will have to investigate the impact of “heavy-handed” or destructive behaviours
on the operational efficiency of autonomous networks.
One disappointing issue with these results presented in Chapter 6 is that the STS behaviour
has been stubbornly avoiding identification in the “live” multi-domain space while presenting
ostensibly discernible metric significances in the comparison space. However the performance
of the remaining targeted synthetic domains indicates that this is a valid result and that
the methodology is sound, if in need of some refinement and corroboration. It is possible
that the outlying results used in the initial training set are simply too noisy to accurately
optimise towards STS directly and this analysis is victim of over-fitting. On the other hand,
the fact that it is the only misbehaviour that is purely application-level indicates that there
is potential to further expand this methodology to include some traffic inspection and logical
link tracking as an additional “routing” level domain to explore irregularities in traffic patters
in addition to the largely physical-communication-domain metrics currently used.
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As with any trust framework, the effects of different contexts, misbehaviours, and environ-
ments are an interesting area. In this case, where we are primarily concerned with the interplay
and usefulness of trust between domains, the generation of new/other misbehaviours (particu-
larly attacks on the physical domain or cross-domain attacks) would provide insights and either
validation or invalidation to the presented optimisation methodology when applied to “Blind”
behaviours, or applying the final “Mean” synthetic to a range of totally untrained behaviours.
Summary
In this thesis, the operation of trust in the challenging UAN environment was explored,
demonstrating that without augmentation, current TMF approaches do not perform well. A
novel approach to Trust was demonstrated, using physical metrics as a raw trust assessment
metric source in addition to communications metrics previously well studied in the terrestrial
RF environment. Finally, a metric weight optimisation methodology was demonstrated
to automatically develop synthetic metric domains and weightings that highlight a given
misbehaviour, driving its targeted trust low so as to enable detection by even simple classifiers.
Overall, the approaches taken throughout this thesis are largely application agnostic and
are indeed domain-agnostic; it has been demonstrated that the use of trust assessment across
communications and physical domains yields beneficial results, but the same approach could
be applied to non-physical autonomous agents such as high-frequency trading initiatives,
forensic accounting/auditing, cheat-detection in online gaming, lane-assistance in self-driving
cars, and possibly most interesting, having the autonomous agents assess how trust-worthy
we are across domains such as vocal tonality, facial expressions, “body language”, and other
biometric factors in addition to just the words or commands we use. So, should they trust us?
Appendix A
Human Factors related to Trusted
Operation of Autonomous Systems
This work has largely considered autonomous systems as entities of wider systems, implicitly
involving human operators/agents in some part of the desired operation. We refer to these
systems as Autonomous Collaborative System (ACS). As described in Chapter 2, Operational
Trust has two main aspects, trust in the system to behave as expected and trust in the
interfaces between systems (human/machine and machine/machine). Of all of the interfaces
in an Autonomous Collaborative System, the most problematic is that arguably that between
the ACS and the human operator / team of operators. Cummings et al. [68] identified the
main challenges to Human Supervisory Control (HSC), summarised below:
Information Overload
Operator efficiency exhibits an optimum at moderate levels of cognitive engagement, above
which cognitive ability is overloaded and performance drops (Otherwise known as the Yerkes-
Dodson Law). Additionally, in the case of under-engagement, operators can fall foul of
boredom, and become desensitised to changing factors. However, predicting this point of
over-saturation is an open psychophysiological research problem.
Adaptive Automation
Automation is well tailored to consistent levels of activity. This is quite simply not the case
in many domains. Particularly in defence and military applications, activity is characterised
by long periods of “routine” punctuated by high intensity, usually unpredictable, activity.
At those interfaces between “calm” and “storm”, where real time situational awareness is
imperative, temporary Information Overload is highly probable. Adaptive Automation enables
autonomous systems to increase their LOA based on specific events in the task environment,
changes in operator performance or task loading, or physiological methods. It is taken as given
that for routine operations, and increased LOA reduces operator workload, and vice versa.
However, this relationship is highly task dependent and can create severe problems in cases of
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LOA being greater, or indeed lesser, than is required. In the cases of overly-high LOA, operator
skill is degraded, situational awareness is reduced as the operator is not as engaged, and the
automated system may not be able to handle unexpected events, requiring the operator to take
over, which, given the previous points, is a difficult prospect. Alternatively, in sub-optimal
LOA, Information Overload can result in the case of high intensity situations, but also the
system can fall foul of overly-sensitive human cognitive biases, false positive pattern detection,
boredom, and complacency in the case where less is going on. Therefore, as a corollary to
Information Overload challenges, there is a need to define the interrelationship between levels
of situational activity (or risk) and appropriate levels of automation. Under what circumstances
can adaptive automation be used to change the LOA of a system? Does the autonomous system
or the human decide to change LOA? What LOAs are appropriate for what circumstances?
Distributed Decision Making
In a modern, non-hierarchical, often distributed or cellular military management system
(Network Centric Warfare doctrine for example), tools are increasingly being used to mitigate
information asymmetry within command and control. A simple example of this is shared
watch-logs in Naval operations, providing temporal collaboration between watch-teams sepa-
rated in time. The DoD Global Information Grid is another example of a spatial collaborative
framework. Recent work has demonstrated the power of collaborative analysis and human-
machine shared sensing technologies even with low levels of training on the part of the operators
providing superior results and resource efficiencies than either humans or machines alone in
survey and search-and-rescue scenarios [162]. As these temporal and spatial collaboration tools
increase in complexity and ability, decisions that previously required situational awareness
that was only available at higher echelons within the standard hierarchy are available to
commanders on the ground, or even to individual team members, enabling the potential for
informed decisions to be taken faster and more effectively, enabled by automated strategies
to present relevant information to teams based on the operational context. However there are
a range of operational, legal, psychological and technical challenges that need to be addressed
before confidence in these distributed management structures can be established. Studies into
situational awareness sharing techniques (tele-present table-top environments, video conferenc-
ing, and interactive whiteboards) have generally yielded positive results, however investigations
into interruptive-communications (such as instant messaging chat) have demonstrated a neg-
ative impact on operational efficiency. In short, the biggest problem with distributed decision
making in the context of supervisory systems is that there is no consensus on whether it is
advantageous or not, and what magnitude of operational delta is introduced, if any.
Complexity
Beyond simple Information Overload, increasing complexity of information presented to
operators is having a negative effect on operational efficiency. In HSC, displays are designed to
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reduce complexity, introducing abstractions with an aim to presenting the minimum amount
of information to the operator required to maintain an accurate and up-to-date mental model
of the environmental and operational state. This has led to the development of many domain
specific decision support interfaces, however, in academic research, there has been nothing
but mixed results. One commonly raised negative is the general bias on the “cool factor” of
interfaces. Immersive 3D visual, aural, or haptic interfaces that at first appraisal seem to
provide more approachable information to the operator, and are indeed tacitly preferred by
operators in use. However, there has not been any evidence to demonstrate performance
improvement when using these tools, and in-fact, improving the “fidelity” of the interfaces
has led to operators overly-relying on these representations of the environment rather than
remaining engaged in the environment.
Cognitive Biases and Failing Heuristics
In many areas, operators are required to make rapid decisions with imperfect information,
driven by massively increased information availability and rates of change in areas such as
battlefield tactics and global finance markets. However, Human decision making isnt always
rational (especially under pressure), and operators use personally derived heuristics to make
“rational shortcuts”. This is a double edged sword, where these heuristics can be employed
to greatly reduce the normative cognitive load in a stressful situation, but also introduce
destructive biases, where these shortcuts make assumptions that dont bear out in reality.
For example, in the context of decision support systems, “Autonomy Bias” has been
observed as a complement to the already well known “Confirmation Bias”1 and “Assimilation
Bias”2, where operators that have been provided with a “correct” answer by a decision support
system do not look (or see, depending on perspective) for any contradictory information, and
will unquestionably follow, increasing error rates significantly.
This behaviour isn’t only the reserve of decision support systems, but also in the generic
allocation of operator attention; scheduling heuristics are used to decide how much time
tasks should be worked on, and time and again, humans are found to be far from optimal
in this regard, especially in time-pressured scenarios where these heuristics are in even more
demand. Even when operators are given optimal scheduling rules, these quickly fall apart,
often due to primary task efficiency degradation after interruption. This highlights a critical
interface in the adoption of complex autonomous systems that still demand Man in the
loop functionality; if a system is required to have full-time concentrated supervision (e.g.
flying a UCAV), but also event-based reactive decision making (e.g. alerts from non-critical
subsystems), both tasks are negatively impacted. In an assessment of factors influencing
trustutono in autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis support systems, Carlson et al also
identified that a major factor in an operator or users trust in a system was not only dependant
1Confirmation Bias is the tendency for people to preferentially select from available information that
information that supports pre-existing beliefs or hypotheses.
2Assimilation Bias is often thought of as a subset of Confirmation Bias, whereby it specifies that instead
of seeking out information supporting of current views, any incoming data is interpreted as being supportive
of a particular view without questioning that view, even if it appears contradictory.
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on past performance and current accuracy but also on “soft factors” such as the branding
and reputation of the manufacture / designer [163]. Further, autonomous decision support /
detection / classification systems have an “uncanny valley” to overcome in terms of accuracy,
in that there is a dangerous period when such systems are used but not perfect, but operators
become complacent, causing an increased error rate, until such a time that those autonomous
systems can match or exceed the detection rates of their human counterparts.
Conclusions
The separate fields of automation and user experience design have been running in parallel for
several years. However, there will soon come a point (in some cases already past) where human
operators must place their “Trust” in autonomous systems to not only accomplish what they
want and what they expect, but to do it in a way they are psychologically comfortable with. Fur-
ther, there is the aspect of how are (or should) autonomous systems be “trained” in how to deal
with the systematic failings in human cognition? At what point does the machine need to trust
the operator before it performs “responsibly” in the face of a possibly irrational or cognitively
broken use, and if so, how can it communicate the These are massively open research questions
I didn’t get to attempt to answer anywhere other than the appendices and the pub, and there
is no easy avenue to start from, so this author suggests Asimov’s “The Robot Collection”.
Appendix B
Grey System
Theory and Grey Trust Assessment
This appendix is simply a short discussion on the origins and use of Grey Theory that did
not fit anywhere else in this thesis.
Grey numbers, operators and terminology
Grey numbers are used to represent values where their discrete value is unknown, where that
number may take its possible value within an interval of potential values, generally written using
the symbol ⊕. Taking a and b as the lower and upper bounds of the grey interval respectively,
such that⊕∈ [a,b]|a<bThe “field” of⊕ is the value space [a,b]. There are several classes of grey
numbers based on the relationships between these bounds. Black and White numbers are the
extremes of this classification; such that ⊕˙∈ [−∞,+∞] and ⊕˚∈ [x,x]|x∈R or ⊕(x) It is clear
that white numbers such as ⊕˚ have a field of zero while black numbers have an infinite field.
Grey numbers can also represent partial knowledge about a system or metric, and
as such can represent half-open concepts, by only defining a single bound; for example
⊕=⊕(x)∈ [x,+∞] and ⊕=⊕(x)∈ [−∞,x].
Primary operations within this number system are as follows;
⊕1+⊕2∈ [a1+a2,b1+b2] (B.1a)
−⊕∈ [−b,−a] (B.1b)
⊕1−⊕2=⊕1+(−⊕) (B.1c)
⊕1×⊕2∈ [min(a1a2,a1b2,b1a2,b2a2),
max(a1a2,a1b2,b1a2,b2a2)]
(B.1d)
⊕−1∈ [b−1,a−1] (B.1e)
⊕1/⊕2=⊕1×⊕−12 (B.1f)
⊕×k∈ [ka,kb] (B.1g)
⊕k∈ [ak,bk] (B.1h)
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where k is a scalar quantity.
Whitenisation and the Grey Core
The characterisation of grey numbers is based on the encapsulation of information in a
grey system in terms of the grey numbers core (⊕ˆ) and it’s degree of greyness (g◦). If the
distribution of a grey number field is unknown and continuous, ⊕ˆ= a+b2 .
Non-essential grey numbers are those that can be represented by a white number obtained
either through experience or particular method [106]. This white value is represented by ⊕˜ or
⊕(x) to represent grey numbers with x as their whitenization. In some cases depending on the
context of application, particular grey numbers may temporarily have no reasonable whitenisa-
tion value (for instance, a black number). Such numbers are said to be Essential grey numbers.
Grey Sequence Buffers and Generators
Given a fully populated value space, sequence buffer operations are used to provide abstrac-
tions over the dataspace. These abstractions can be weakening or strengthening. In the
weakening case, these operations perform a level of smoothing on the volatility of a given
input space, and strengthening buffers serve to highlight and A powerful tool in grey system
theory is the use of grey incidence factors, comparing the “likeness” of one value against a
cohort of values. This usefulness applies particularly well in the case of multi-agent trust
networks, where the aim is to detect and identify malicious or maladaptive behaviour, rather
than an absolute assessment of “trustworthiness”.
Application of Grey Relational Grading to Trust
Grey Relational Grading performs cohort based normalization of metrics at runtime. This
creates a more stable contextual assessment, providing a “grade” of trust compared to other
observed entities in that interval, while maintaining the ability to reduce values to a stable
assessment range for decision support without requiring every environment entered into to
be characterised. Grey assessments are relative in both fairly and unfairly operating cohorts.
Entities will receive mid-range trust assessments if there are no malicious actors as there is
no-one else “bad” to compare against.
Guo et al. [18] demonstrated the ability of GRA[164] to normalise and combine disparate
traits of a communications link such as instantaneous throughput, received signal strength,
etc. into a Grey Relational Coefficient, or a “trust vector”. In [18], the observed metric set
X=x1,...,xM representing the measurements taken by each node of its neighbours at least
interval, is defined as X= [packet loss rate, signal strength, data rate, delay, throughput].
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The Grey Relational Grade is given as
θtk,j=
mink|atk,j−gtj|+ρmaxk|atk,j−gtj|
|atk,j−gtj|+ρmaxk|atk,j−gtj|
(B.2)
φtk,j=
mink|atk,j−btj|+ρmaxk|atk,j−btj|
|atk,j−btj|+ρmaxk|atk,j−btj|
where atk,j is the value of a observed metric xj for a given node k at time t, ρ is a distinguishing
coefficient, usually set to 0.5, g and b are respectively the ’“good” and “bad” reference metric
sequences from {atk,jk=1,2...K}, e.g. gj=maxk(atk,j), bj=mink(atk,j) (where each metric is
selected to be monotonically positive for trust assessment, e.g. higher throughput is always
better).
Weighting can be applied before generating a scalar value which allows the identification
and classification of untrustworthy behaviours.
[θtk,φ
t
k]=
 M∑
j=0
hjθ
t
k,j,
M∑
j=0
hjφ
t
k,j
 (B.3)
Where H = [h0 ...hM ] is a metric weighting vector such that
∑
hj = 1, and in the basic
case, H = [ 1M ,
1
M ...
1
M ] to treat all metrics evenly. θ and φ are then scaled to [0,1] using
the mapping y = 1.5x− 0.5. The [θ,φ] values are reduced into a scalar trust value by
T tk=(1+(φ
t
k)
2/(θtk)
2)−1. This trust value minimises the uncertainties of belonging to either
best (g) or worst (b) sequences in (B.2).
MTFM combines this GRA with a topology-aware weighting scheme(B.4) and a fuzzy
whitenization model(B.5). There are three classes of topological trust relationship used;
Direct, Recommendation, and Indirect. Where an observing node, ni, assesses the trust of
another, target, node, nj; the Direct relationship is ni’s own observations nj’s behaviour. In
the Recommendation case, a node nk, which shares Direct relationships with both ni and nj,
gives its assessment of nj to ni. The Indirect case, similar to the Recommendation case, the
recommender nk, does not have a direct link with the observer ni but nk has a Direct link
with the target node, nj. These relationships give us node sets, NR and NI containing the
nodes that have recommendation or indirect, relationships to the observing node respectively.
TMTFMi,j =
1
2
·max
s
{fs(Ti,j)}Ti,j+1
2
2|NR|
2|NR|+|NI|
∑
n∈NR
max
s
{fs(Ti,n)}Ti,n (B.4)
+
1
2
|NI|
2|NR|+|NI|
∑
n∈NI
max
s
{fs(Ti,n)}Ti,n
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Where Ti,n is the subjective trust assessment of ni by nn, and fs=[f1,f2,f3] given as:
f1(x)=−x+1
f2(x)=
2x if x≤0.5−2x+2 if x>0.5 (B.5)
f3(x)=x
Grey System Theory, by it’s own authors admission, hasn’t taken root in it’s originally
intended area of system modelling [106]. However, given it’s tentative application to MANET
trust, taking a Grey approach on a per metric benefit has qualitative benefits that require
investigation; the algebraic approach to uncertainty and the application of “essential and
non essential greyness”, whiteisation, and particularly grey buffer sequencing allow for the
opportunity to generate continuous trust assessments from multiple domains asynchronously.
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